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INTRODUCTION
DroCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg' has proved as intractable as the
X weather. Three years after the case was decided, everyone is still
talking about it, but no one has done anything about it.2 ProCD is the
first published opinion to squarely hold that a "shrinkwrap" license,
with its allegedly contracted-for restrictions on re-use of copyrighted
information, is enforceable. 3 As a result, it has stimulated a sizable
1. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For the facts and procedural history of the case,
see infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text. Stated bluntly, the holding of ProCD
is that "shrinkwrap" licenses that accompany most computer software are enforcea-
ble. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53. The actual holding of the court is probably more
refined. This Article, however, argues that ProCD has had an effect on information
and copyright practice that vastly exceeds the proposition for which the case actually
stands.
2. Early commentary on ProCD urged congressional intervention to define con-
ditions under which shrinkwrap licenses would be unenforceable. See, e.g., Brandon
L. Grusd, Note, Contracting Beyond Copyright: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 353, 366-67 (1997) (arguing that Congress should decide what contract
rights should be preempted by the Copyright Act). Other scholars have urged more
aggressive judicial application of the doctrine of federal preemption. See, e.g., Dennis
S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 512, 525-41 (1997) [hereinafter Karjala, Federal Preemption] (arguing that state
contract law should be preempted by federal copyright law in most circumstances).
The rightness and wrongness of the court's reasoning and result continue to be de-
bated. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intel-
lectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 1999) (manuscript at 7
n.20, on file with author) [hereinafter Lemley, Beyond Preemption] (collecting au-
thorities); Brett L. Tolman, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. The End Does Not
Justify the Means in Federal Copyright Analysis, 1998 BYU L. Rev. 303, 328-31 (argu-
ing that ProCD reached the correct result, but incorrectly found that the database at
issue was not copyrightable). In late 1997, legislation was introduced in Congress that
would limit the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses and at the same time assure leg-
islative protection for technological "copyright management" systems that implement
shrinkwrap-style licenses automatically and electronically. "Copyright management"
legislation moved ahead in Congress; provisions addressing shrinkwrap did not. See
infra note 438. Proposed legislation that would, among other things, validate most
shrinkwrap licenses under state contract law, the project to draft an Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), is moving forward. See infra notes 405-06 and
accompanying text.
3. "Shrinkwrap" licenses for computer software, also once known as "box-top"
and "tear-me-open" licenses and more recently as "End User License Agreements,"
consist of form summaries or "offers" of "license" terms that an acquirer of the
software purportedly "accepts" by opening the cellophane wrapper that encases the
package containing the computer media. See 5 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 27.02[B], at 27-14 (1998). In most of this Article, the term
"shrinkwrap" broadly encompasses all manner of nonnegotiated, unsigned forms that
purport to regulate the behavior of the readers, users, and consumers of the works of
information that such forms accompany. See infra Part I.C. Previous cases concerning
shrinkwrap licenses called shrinkwrap practice into question but stopped short of in-
validating shrinkwrap altogether. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech.,
939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that a software "box-top" license contained
"additional terms" under section 2-207 of the UCC that did not become part of the
parties' original contract, formed when orders for the software were placed and ac-
cepted by telephone); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a Louisiana statute that purported to validate shrinkwrap
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amount of criticism 4 and some applause,5 but no significant number of
similar cases.6 That fact, coupled with the fact that ProCD itself dealt
with the law of one state,7 means that doctrinal tension between the
limits of contract as a means to exploit intellectual property rights, on
the one hand, and mandates of public intellectual property policy, on
licenses was preempted by the Copyright Act); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759,764-66 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding open the possibility, even
under section 2-207 of the UCC, that if the software developer's "offer" consisted of
delivery of shrink-wrapped software to the user, opening the shrink-wrapped package
could amount to "acceptance" of the license within).
4. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract,
12 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 93 (1997); Karjala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 537-41;
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and tire Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev.
873 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Romantic Authorship] (reviewing James Boyle, Sha-
mans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society
(1996)); Apik Minassian, Comment, Tire Death of Copyright." Enforceability of
Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 569 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After tire ProCD Case:
A Market-Based Approach, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53, 56 (1997) [hereinafter
O'Rourke, Market-Based Approach] (arguing that the Seventh Circuit's approach in
ProCD was "fully appropriate given the relative novelty of the technology and con-
gressional silence regarding preemption").
6. As of this writing, only a handful of subsequent opinions have considered the
validity of shrinkwrap licenses or analogous forms under state contract law. See
Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (holding, on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in a trademark and
contract dispute, that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its breach of contract claim
because the defendants, by accessing the plaintiff's Internet services, agreed to abide
by the terms of service that prohibited sending spare or pornography via those serv-
ices); infra Part III.B.2. The apparent absence of disputes between publishers and
consumers is consistent with an efficient market regarding intellectual property rights
in software. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Laist of the Horse, 1996 U.
Chi. Legal F. 207, 210-13 (arguing that in rapidly changing markets for new technol-
ogy, rules should be clear, and property rules rather than liability rules should
predominate to facilitate bargaining); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Property and In-
novation in the Global Infornation Infrastructure, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 261, 285
[hereinafter Perritt, Property and Innovation] ("The absence of much case law on
license or copyright violations by subscribers to host-based services is consistent with
an acceptable level of compliance with copyright and license terms."). Because
shrinkwrap licenses are characterized by user acquiescence, but not by genuine bar-
gaining, it is difficult to separate out the lack of litigation because of efficient bargain-
ing from the lack of litigation because of other factors, such as the transaction costs
faced by publishers in identifying and prosecuting copyright offenders, publishers'
choices not to enforce such licenses, costs, and other incentives discouraging chal-
lenges to shrinkwrap licenses, and the possibility, which this Article explores, that
software developers have so appropriated the rhetoric of acceptable use that users do
not test the limits of what is legitimate, but unauthorized, use to a degree that produ-
cers find troublesome, or that tempts a response. See, e.g., Green Book Int'l Corp. v.
Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that the enforceability of
shrinkwrap licenses is generally not contested). One cannot argue that the current
system "works" without knowing whether, if software were distributed without -li-
cense"-based restrictions on re-use, the volume of litigation over nonconsensual re-
use would increase.
7. ProCD concerned Wisconsin commercial law. See infra note 93 and accompa-
nying text.
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the other hand, continues.8 May a private supplier of information that
lies in the public domain impose use-restricting conditions on access
to that information? May material that is copyrightable be subject to
restrictions that proscribe even "fair use," whether bargained for or
not?
Despite the doctrinal uncertainty, ProCD's acceptance of shrink-
wrap informs the development of the tension between fair use and
private restrictions. The decision is shaping intellectual property prac-
tice in ways that are, in turn, altering how questions of fair use and the
public domain are addressed. First, ProCD is encouraging the devel-
opment of legal practices and technological systems that implement
use-defining "contracts" between readers, listeners, viewers, and users
and authors, publishers, and information developers. It is increasingly
common for shrinkwrap licenses and other widely used forms to im-
pose such conditions and restrictions. Digitization of the information
economy9 reinforces that trend. We are approaching, if we have not
already achieved, a point where books, magazines, and commercial
television programs can be regularly accessed only after acknowledg-
ing some form of "user" agreement.'" The blunt reality of ProCD
8. The tension stems from the widely-accepted belief that authors and publishers
should be able to secure some greater protection from copying through bilateral con-
tract than the Copyright Act explicitly provides. See generally Karjala, Federal Pre-
emption, supra note 2, at 531 (arguing that the ability to contract privately for
protection should be limited to genuine bilateral negotiations); J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51, 70
(1997) (characterizing copyright law as reflecting a "state-imposed" cultural bargain).
Without enough additional protection, it is suspected that too few works will be pro-
duced: with too much protection, the Copyright Act itself will be undermined as a
statement of public policy.
9. This phrase deliberately conflates two phenomena: the convergence of differ-
ent species of expressive works into generic "information," see Margaret Jane Radin,
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & Com. 509, 509-12 (1996), and the conver-
sion of all works of "information" into digital form, see John Perry Barlow, The Econ-
omy of Ideas, Wired, March 1994, at 84, 88. The phrase "information economy," of
recent coinage, may itself be out of date. Some commentators now refer to the
"bandwidth economy" to note how access to digital information depends on the capa-
bilities of computer networks, see, e.g., Bob Quillin, Viewpoint: Strike up the
Bandwidth, S.F. Examiner, Sept. 14, 1997, at B5 (observing the tension between the
need for higher bandwidth and the substantial economic investment hurdles to pro-
viding it), and the "trust economy" to note the extent to which computer-mediated
transactions suppose or demand a degree of trust between human transactors, see,
e.g., Peter G.W. Keen, Are You Ready For the "Trust" Economy?, Computerworld,
April 21, 1997, at 80, 80 (discussing the need to instill trust among Internet consumers
to promote greater electronic commerce).
10. The examples are not as extreme as they might appear at first glance. They
include technological copyright management systems or trusted systems; web-wrap
agreements, which state terms and conditions that purport to bind visitors to sites on
the World Wide Web; and copyright notices affixed to hard-copy media, such as books
and videotapes, that restrict users' conduct. See infra notes 124-68 and accompanying
text. But see David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property & Product: U.C.C. Arti-
cle 2B, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 621, 646 (1997) [hereinafter Rice, Digital Information]
(suggesting that § 301(a) of the Copyright Act may preempt enforcement of certain
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says, in effect, that regardless of what the Copyright Act may provide
as a matter of public policy," such practices are at least acceptable,
and perhaps encouraged.
Second, by affirming and proclaiming the validity of shrinkwrap
practice,'2 ProCD encourages norms of information use"3 that depress
the development of a coherent understanding of what I call "open
space." Open space is shorthand for the combination of material and
information that lies in the public domain and the fair use of copy-
righted works. 4 ProCD does more than enable intellectual property
contract terms that restrict users' uses if the contract term was part of a contract of
adhesion used on a market-wide basis).
11. For works of expression, copyright law appears to define what is potentially
protectable "expression" and what is unprotectable "fact." See Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991). Only those elements of a work
within the subject matter of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994). that are "origi-
nal," that is, are "independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and that possess[ ] at least some minimal degree of creativity," are pro-
tected by copyright. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citation omitted). Not surprisingly, this
standard may be difficult to apply in practice. Compare American Dental Ass'n v.
Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a taxonomy
of dental procedures is a copyrightable original work of authorship), with Warren
Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1517-20 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the selection of communities in a fact book about cable television systems was
not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1998). The Copyright Act grants owners of copyright a schedule of rights to enable
exploitation of their works, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (listing exclusive rights in copy-
righted works), and grants readers, users, and consumers of those works certain privi-
leges to access those works without restriction, see, e.g., id. § 102(b) (uncopyrightable
works); id. § 107 (fair use). Through contracts, particularly through form contracts,
and other form language accompanying the distribution of works of information, pro-
ducers attempt to protect material that copyright law appears to declare unprotect-
able, that is, they attempt to expand their schedule of rights and to restrict their
readers' privileges. This was the situation presented by ProCD, in which the plaintiff
sought by contract to impose use restrictions on acquirers of its un-copyrightable
database of telephone numbers. Arguably, it attempted to restrict the re-use of mate-
rial that lies in the public domain. Doctrinally, therefore, ProCD concerns contract
law, not copyright law.
12. This is what I refer to as "legal-ware." See infra note 16 and accompanying
text. Such legal-ware existed, and created similar (though far less pronounced) ten-
sions between public policy and private control, in pre-digital contexts. See Karjala,
Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 520 n.27 (noting the presence of a resale restric-
tion in the copyright notice of a turn of the century book).
13. For an analysis of the relationship between norms and law, see Cass R. Sun-
stein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 947-65 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Sunstein, Social Norms] (arguing that behavior is largely a function of norms and
that government has a significant role in shaping those norms).
14. This metaphor extends a suggestion by James Boyle.
[A] lot could be learned from the history of the environmental movement.
That movement not only alerted the public that the political process was
failing to take account of an important set of values that in the long run
would affect everyone, but offered a set of conceptual tools that helped us
both to understand those issues and to build coalitions around them.
James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online" A Young Person's Guide, 10 Harv.
J.L. & Tech. 47, 56 (1996); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
579 (1994) (stating that the purpose of the fair use doctrine is to guarantee "breathing
1030 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
owners to use contract norms to create a formal private property right
that exceeds the public rights provided by the Copyright Act.15 That
argument assumes that the Copyright Act accurately reflects an ex-
isting social and political consensus concerning the protection and ex-
ploitation of works of information. Beyond the doctrine, shrinkwrap
licenses and similar form restrictions, or what I call "legal-ware,"16
space" within copyright); James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environ-
mentalism for the Net?, 47 Duke L.J. 87, 113 (1997) (analyzing the controversy over
copyright on the Internet and the history of the environmental movement to argue for
the creation of a politics of intellectual property); David Lange, Recognizing the Pub-
lic Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1981, at 147, 176 (analogizing the pub-
lic domain to "the public grazing lands on the Western plains of a century ago"). The
phrase refers not to the argument that the Internet can be, is, or should be "zoned" as
real property is zoned. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,
45 Emory L.J. 869, 883-95 (1996) (observing that the Internet is capable of and is in
fact being "zoned"); see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2353-54 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Professor Lessig's
work to suggest that zoning of the Internet is desirable and, by extending principles
guiding zoning of real property, possible). It is intended to evoke physical open
space, and the social and political consensus that some amount of open space, pre-
served from private ownership or development, is necessary and valuable in urban
and rural settings for reasons or values derived independently of the market. This
consensus includes the proposition that open space is quintessentially public in its
institutional creation, sustenance, and protection, in its character as a resource for
consumption on roughly equal terms by all citizens, and in its contributions to private
and to other public activities. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Saving Overton Park: A Comment
on Environmental Values, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1671, 1683 (1998) (noting the importance
of parks as expressions of community identity). Professor Keith Aoki has observed
the shifting boundaries in intellectual property law between "public" and "private"
realms of information. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners:
Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain (pt. 1), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. &
Arts 1. 2 (1993) (arguing that trends to increase the number of exclusive rights for
authors are converting the public domain into private intellectual property, and con-
straining other types of socially valuable uses of expressive works that do not fit the
"authorship" model underlying American copyright traditions). For the considera-
tion of different possible constructions of intellectual open space, see infra Part III.
15. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons" Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 660 n.173 (1998) (noting that
exchange through contract can give rise over time to new property rights).
16. The court in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 47 (1997) which affirmed and extended the contractual analysis of ProCD
(though not in an intellectual property context), used the term legal-ware to describe
the form terms and conditions supplied to and purportedly binding on the acquirer of
computer-related technology. See id. at 1150. This term made its initial appearance in
federal cases in 1988 as the name of a plaintiff in Ramsey v. Glassie Pewett Dudley
Beebe & Shanks, No. 87-2629, 1988 WL 86617 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 1988) (unpublished
per curiam opinion) and has served as the name of a website for a firm that markets
client and case management software to lawyers. See ACS/Legal Software, Inc., Legal
Software Development, Inc. (last modified Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.legalware.com/
>. The growth of the computer industry has spawned an increasing variety of applica-
tions of the "-ware" suffix as segments of the industry have been perceived as less
specialized and more generic. For example, computer "hardware" begat "software"
and the differentiation of software begat "shareware," "freeware," and "middleware,"
among others. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1453 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (noting characteristics by some of Microsoft's marketing practices as
"vaporware"). Affixing a label to a practice reflects some common understanding of
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generally approved by ProCD,17 are shaping our conventional under-
standings regarding copyright and information rights. Those conven-
tions increasingly mean that no open space exists save that which
information producers choose explicitly to provide.
There is little doubt that open space should exist.18 There is, how-
ever, a great deal of doubt as to why. Congress could explain why, but
it has declined to do so.' 9 The normative question, then, is left to
scholars and judges. Scholars disagree.20 Judges decide cases, which
present issues framed in part by precedent and in part by the parties'
expectations concerning what they believe they are entitled to. Legal-
ware is changing those expectations. As a practical matter, then, it
casts a pall over our ability to determine whether and why open space
is valuable. If open space is a function of social and political consen-
sus,2 ' then developing such a consensus is made far more difficult by
doctrine and resulting practices that encourage the public to accept a
its nature, see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
943, 958-61 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Social Meaning] (observing that social mean-
ings draw greater power from uncontested, or "invisible," expectations), and antici-
pates or hopes to shape the prevailing characterization of the practice. See id. at 956-
58 (providing examples of social meanings used as tools); see also George Orwell,
Politics and the English Language, in A Collection of Essays 162, 172-73, 177
(Doubleday Anchor Books 1954) (1946) (discussing language as an instrument for
concealment rather than expression). Using the label "legal-ware" in place of the
legal term of art "contract" suggests that the specific terms and conditions in question
are less significant than the idea that the instrument governing the use of information
is itself a private, manufactured product, uninformed by public interests. Cf. William
Safire, On Language: There's No Weanvare, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1991, § 6 (Magazine),
at 6 ("Let the speaker beware: The combining form -ware is everywhere."). Software
producers may characterize the license itself as a product. See Pamela Samuelson,
Does Information Really Have To Be Licensed?, Comm. ACM, Sept. 1998, at 15, 18
[hereinafter Samuelson, Infornmation].
17. Technological manifestations or implementation of legal-ware present a
closely related concern. The implications of such "copyright management" systems
are taken up at infra Part I.C.2.
18. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Econonic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Managemen;" 97 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Cohen,
Lochner in Cyberspace] (manuscript at 10-14, on file with author).
19. See infra note 438.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Nenvork Communi-
ties, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 349, 369-71 (1993) [hereinafter Perritt, Dispute ResolutionI (argu-
ing that social norms of fairness should determine the acceptability of contract terms);
cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Conunons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 777 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, Comedy] (rea-
soning that evolving standards of what constitutes "inherently public property" ex-
pressed through environmental caselaw respond to evolving norms of -commerce"
and socializing behavior). The scope of fair use might be a function of the market for
copyrightable expression, but that conclusion should not itself necessarily be market-
driven. ProCD sets up the market as premise, argument, and conclusion. It asserts
that the market should define the scope of fair use and the public domain, sanctions
licensing practices that are limited only by market forces, and, because the market has
produced licenses that provide for a narrow fair use privilege (if they provide for fair
use at all), concludes that the market has behaved efficiently. See infra Part IV-A.
1998] 1031
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norm that prohibits the unlicensed use of information.22 Legal-ware
undercuts the already diminishing degree to which formal public law
expresses the importance of public uses of information while also ac-
knowledging the merits of private arrangements concerning
information. 3
The need for a consensus concerning open space can be overstated.
The point is not that we lack a black-letter boundary between infor-
mation that is protectable and information that is not. We lack, in-
stead, a means of identifying what uses or behaviors test the limits of
the public system of copyright that is not itself entirely a creature of
private ordering.24  Conventions of use or non-use encouraged by
legal-ware are interfering with the process of establishing such a
means. This Article, then, argues that shrinkwrap practice, as mani-
fested in shrinkwrap forms and in cases dealing with limitations on the
use of and access to information, is an appropriate starting point,
along with technological 25 and economic 6 analyses, for framing con-
flicts2 7 between contract law and copyright policy.28
22. Cf. Phil Agre, The Internet and Public Discourse (visited Nov. 15, 1998) <http:/
/www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/agre> (observing that technological standards
shape political discourse, which in turn shapes the nature of social relationships). In
addition to affecting the shape of public discourse, such standards may impose social
costs that lie entirely outside the domain of formal legal decision-making if they dis-
courage the beneficial re-use of works of information that a consensus understanding
of "open space" would allow or encourage.
23. Licensing practice is "private" in the sense that private actors define the scope
of the "rights" that readers and users of the material are offered. As such, private
arrangements are judicially enforced, they acquire public sanction. Thus "private"
definitions become "public" and threaten to displace other "public" expressions of
value concerning intellectual goods. Cf. Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are
Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 739-42 (1980) (noting the
importance of the "public" enforcement of traditional "private" rights).
24. One cannot eliminate self-referential features from the market entirely, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal Stud. 217,
219 (1993) (arguing that market preferences are endogenous to existing legal policy,
including the setting of legal entitlements), but we can recognize those features at
work and consider whether and how the legal system should deal with them.
25. See, e.g., Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 262 (discussing the
need to appreciate the technology of networks to analyze the role of legal protection
against piracy).
26. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 210-16 (arguing that changes in cost
structures for information production and delivery do not necessarily require changes
in legal structures); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293, 1298 (1996)
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules] (stating that as cost structures
change, intellectual property rights should be structured to encourage formation of
private licensing collectives in repeat-bargaining markets).
27. Recent scholarship concerning copyright and contract has acknowledged the
need to reconcile form licenses for copyrighted works, and for digital works in partic-
ular, with formal copyright law, as part of the pursuit of the elusive "correct" balance
between incentives to produce creative works and other works of information, on the
one hand, and interests in marketing public access to such works for creative re-use
on the other hand. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 581-82
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Part I reviews and discusses ProCD and the changing social, eco-
nomic, and technological landscapes that influence, and are being in-
fluenced, by the changing conventions concerning the use of
copyrighted works, and how those conventions shape the concept of
open space. Part II reviews the elements of the present scheme for
(1998); Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 18 (manuscript at 23-62); Mark A.
Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkvrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L Rev. 1239 (1995)
[hereinafter Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses]; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property
and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 Mich. L Rev. 1570, 1609-
13 (1995) [hereinafter Merges, Review Essay]. Within the rogue's gallery of meta-
phors that afflicts this Article, the "balance" paradigm is well-established. See, e.g.,
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (noting that the Copyright Act "creates a
balance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of copyright
protection and the public's need for access to creative works. The copyright term is
limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's
labors" (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (stating that the Copyright Act was "intended to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors. . . and to allow the public access to the products of their
genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired"))).
28. For the most part, academic commentary concerning shrinkwrap has assumed
that issues posed by these forms arise along the incentive and access axis provided by
intellectual property policy. Scholars have analyzed either problems of contract for-
mation and interpretation in the shrinkwrap context, see, e.g., David A. Einhorn, Box-
Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forins, 5 Software LJ. 401, 418 (1992) (discussing
the need for enforceable confidentiality agreements); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz &
Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Sofnvare License Agreements,
22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 335, 341-61 (1996) (discussing the importance and
main advantages of end user license agreements); Karjala, Federal Preemption, supra
note 2, at 523 (arguing that bilateral contracts for copyrighted works should be en-
forced if they are freely negotiated); Michael G. Ryan, Note, Offers Users Can't Re-
fuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10
Cardozo L. Rev. 2105,2135 (1989) (analyzing shrinkwrap in the context of the uncon-
scionability doctrine); see also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765,
1790-91 (1996) (analyzing the legal costs and benefits of shrinkwvrap warranty dis-
claimers); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Erpanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Betveen Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L
Rev. 261, 293-98 (1985) (reasoning that non-enforcement of shrinkwrap under ex-
isting contract rules discourages innovation in contract language). or possible changes
to positive copyright law, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L Rev. 981, 1007-
09 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously] (arguing that an indi-
vidual's right to read copyrighted material anonymously should be protected because
of its intimate correlation with speech); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 118-30 (1997) [hereinafter Merges, End of Friction] (describ-
ing the problems of applying traditional contract law to cyberspace commerce); David
A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy. Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pitt. L Rev. 543,
577-621 (1992) [hereinafter Rice, Public Goods] (discussing whether patent or copy-
right law preempts the enforcement of a prohibition against reverse engineering of
computer object code under state contract law). The fundamental question, "whether
and how intellectual property and contract can coexist," remains open. See Lemley,
Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1292. While legislators, scholars, and judges
debate the merits of different legal structures, however, shrinkwrap practice evolves
and grows. As it evolves, it changes the nature of the issue at hand.
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owners and developers of works of information and discusses those
aspects of the scheme that call attention to conventions of copyright
practice and usage. Part III sets forth the terms of the broader de-
bate-the proper scope of the interests of the reader, user, or con-
sumer, in the context of an individual work, or of the "public," in the
context of works taken in the aggregate-implicit in the agreement
that shrinkwrap may improperly foreclose consideration of open
space. Part IV discusses contract and copyright law paradigms that
ProCD either explicitly or implicitly sets up as candidates for analyz-
ing shrinkwrap practice: the efficiency of private markets; the law of
adhesive contracts and unconscionability; trade usage as a guide to
contract interpretation; and federal preemption doctrine, which is cur-
rently used to distinguish questions of copyright law from issues of
contract law. Part V suggests a mechanism to address the growing
conffict between the enforcment of evolving copyright norms and the
public interest.
The analysis below is suggestive, not conclusive. Waiting for con-
clusive proof of the argument may foreclose implementation of any
effective remedy. The suggestion, however, is that we must maintain
an institutional environment that is not only receptive to copyright
but, more importantly, affirms a concept of the public interest in copy-
right. The recommendation-that Congress should make explicit in
the Copyright Act the idea of common law elaboration of fair use and
the public domain-may not solve the problem. Some other strategy
or combination of strategies may prove more effective. If modern
copyright and information law is in large part a battle of metaphors,29
then we need to develop and implement a process that prevents legal-
ware in the information landscape from eliminating our intellectual
open space.
I. THE CHALLENGES OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, .PROCD,
AND THE NEW WORLD OF SHRINKWRAP
This part summarizes changes in social, technological, and economic
antecedents of what I call conventions of information use 30 processed
through, and encouraged by, the doctrinal framework of ProCD that
is expressed in shrinkwrap. It argues that formerly established copy-
right conventions are being challenged, and new economic and tech-
nological conditions are setting the stage for the development of new
29. Cf Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the
Framing of Legal Options, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 541, 543 & n.13 (1998)
(discussing the power of metaphor in framing, developing, and adopting rules and
regulations regarding new technologies and services) (citing Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371,
1383 (1988)); Robert Reilly, Mapping Legal Metaphors in Cyberspace: Evolving the
Underlying Paradigm, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 575, 579 & n.2 (1998)
(discussing the effect of metaphor on the structure of logic and experience).
30. For a discussion of these conventions in a theoretical context, see infra Part II.
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conventions. The part then describes how that development fits into
the contract-oriented analysis of ProCD and how the result of this
strange brew is manifested in copyright practice.
A. Digitization and Its Effects
With a book, I think I know, or at least I used to know, what I may
do with the physical book itself and with the text I find inside, without
asking for permission from the author, the publisher, or the book-
seller. I may browse the aisles of my local bookstore and read sec-
tions of books without buying copies or intending to buy copies. If I
do bring a copy home, whether by buying it myself or receiving it as a
gift, I may give or loan the book to a friend. I may cut whole chapters
out of a book that I own and give those chapters piecemeal to differ-
ent people. I may write notes in the margins. I may read the book
aloud to my spouse or to a classroom of children. I may read it to
myself over and over again. I may cite and even quote excerpts from
the book in letters, academic papers, newspapers, and magazine arti-
cles, which I may write using a pen, a typewriter, or a computer pro-
gram. I may use facts and ideas expressed by the author in my own
work and, under some circumstances, I should credit the author for
the use of the material. I may create a parody of the book in private
correspondence and may distribute copies of my parody to a limited
audience. I may not, however, take the book to my neighborhood
photocopy center and have the entire thing reproduced. I may not re-
copy all or a substantial portion of the text in print, audio, or video
form and distribute those copies under either my own name or under
that of the original authors. I may not charge or collect money in
exchange for any of the above except for a literal resale of the book
itself, assuming that I own that copy.
These "rules" are not written down, and I do not recall anyone for-
mally teaching me that they are so. I grew up reading and using
books, magazines, and newspapers and, over time, before I entered
law school, I acquired an internal sense of what was "fair" and legal
and, to a degree, what I could get away with. These rules do not ex-
haust a possible list of do's and dont's for books, they do not track the
precise contours of copyright, trademark, or unfair competition law,
and for any particular soul, and especially for certain well-defined
communities, 31 they may differ a little, or even a lot. I doubt very
much, however, that anyone with at least a high school education in
the United States lacks some related conventional sense of what
"rights" come with a book.3
31. Such as scientific researchers.
32. Cf. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235, 237-40 (1991)
[hereinafter Litman, Myth] (describing the conventional "myth" of how copyrights
are created and enforced).
1998] 1035
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
My conventional sense of books rests on a series of implicit assump-
tions about the nature of books, how they and the information they
contain are created and distributed, how enough profit is recovered on
account of their sale to warrant writing and publishing them, and how
authors and publishers prevent others from capitalizing on their in-
vestments. Digital technology is changing all of those assumptions.
Any work of information that can be created today can also be (and
increasingly is) inexpensively converted, translated, or adapted to dig-
ital form. Then it may be stored, reproduced, and transmitted virtu-
ally costlessly as easily to an audience of millions as to a single reader.
Conventions like the ones sketched above that may have historically
attached to particular media (for example, books, magazines, or rec-
ord albums) or types of works (for example, literary fiction, encyclo-
pedias, or photographs) have had a settled, if somewhat narrow,
regulatory influence. These conventions are in danger of losing their
power. What are the conventional limits on what I may do with a
book if, among other things, it is within my power to cheaply scan the
entire text of the book onto a computer storage medium and thereaf-
ter reproduce perfect copies of the entirety or any part of it? Others
have noted the possible broad implications of phenomena labeled
technological "convergence. '33 Let me note five phenomena associ-
ated with the digitization of our information culture and economy that
require us to appreciate how conventions concerning all information
use may be becoming more relevant than prior conventions divided by
product, market, or type of work.
First are the changes in the conditions that support the economic
rationale for copyright law, which generally holds that copyright law is
a response to a market failure associated with the public goods nature
of information works. Without some form of government subsidy,
creators will be unable to capture a sufficient portion of the value cre-
ated by their works to justify the investment of resources necessary to
create them. Traditional accounts of the economics of copyright lo-
cate this market failure in two features of the intangible nature of in-
tellectual property. First, the creator is not able to physically exclude
those who possess copies of the work from the copyrightable elements
33. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Law and the Information Superhighway
§§ 1.4-1.11, at 12-25 (1996) [hereinafter Perritt, Information Superhighway] (discuss-
ing technological convergence through the National Information Infrastructure); Fred
H. Cate, Telephone Companies, The First Amendment, and Technological Conver-
gence, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 1035, 1064-65 (1996) (suggesting that technological conver-
gence leads to the breakdown in distinctions in constitutional law between traditional
publishers and telephone companies). Professor Perritt argues that we are seeing the
collapse of a gap between the right to read and the right to reproduce, where reading
digital works requires reproducing them. See Perritt, Information Superhighway
supra, § 1.9, at 21. The right to read has always encompassed at least some right to
reproduce, however, even if reproduction was not required. I do not think that the
gap is closing, but rather that the dimensions of the link between reading and repro-
duction are being re-defined.
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of the work that the creator owns, as the producer of a tangible thing
could do. This phenomenon makes anyone who acquires a copy of
the work a potential rival publisher?4 Second, distributing one copy
of a copyrightable work does not deplete the creator's supply of the
copyright interest itself. In theory, this limits the price that the creator
can charge for any single copy.35 The creator, in short, needs to locate
the means of preventing piracy (the cost of the first problem) and
free-riding (the cost of the second problem).3 6 The effectiveness of
public copyright law in responding to market failure arguments de-
pends, among other things, on the quantity and types of transaction
costs involved in matching producer and consumer behavior, in prac-
tice, to the statutory scheme.37
With digital storage and transmission technologies, transaction costs
in the digital world are different than in a traditional publishing and
reading, viewing, or listening marketplace.38 For digital works and for
works capable of being digitized, those costs may grow as the cost of
free-riding and piracy decrease.39 Publishers may have an increasingly
difficult time using existing copyright law to prevent piracy because
34. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy-
right Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 332-33 (1989).
35. See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 255, 268 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley & O'Brien, Software Reuse].
36. What appear to creators as the costs of free-riding may be, from a public
standpoint, a net social benefit. But see infra Part IV.A (describing problems of
achieving "open space" via market mechanisms).
37. The market failure account of copyright law applies equally to works of infor-
mation that as a matter of public policy are excluded from copyright. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1994) (listing works excluded from copyright protection). Additionally, it
explains ongoing efforts to locate formal legal protection for the fruit of creators'
"sweat of the brow" or time and resources invested in collecting and publishing (pri-
marily factual) works, despite the rejection of "sweat of the brow" theories under
copyright doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S.
340 (1991). See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 56 (proposing "either the use
of unfair competition principles to protect database contents, or the adoption of an
intellectual property regime based on more refined liability principles, rather than on
exclusive property rights"). Protection of factual compilations under corresponding
"misappropriation" theories was included in legislation that passed the House of Rep-
resentatives in August 1998. See infra note 158. The final Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), signed by President Clinton in
October 1998, omitted a section on misappropriation. See infra note 158.
38. Thus, the so-called "frictionless" world of digital publishing. See Merges, End
of Friction, supra note 28, at 116 (describing varieties of transaction costs that remain
in the digital, on-line environment).
39. A different way to express the same phenomenon is to note that the public
good aspect of intellectual property (its non-rivalrous, non-excludable character) is
acute with respect to computer software and works available on open computer net-
works. See Paul Goldstein, Conments on a Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2573, 2574 (1994) [hereinafter Goldstein,
Comments on a Manifesto] (arguing that market failure arguments for intellectual
property law must balance cures for market failure on account of producers' inability
to recover costs with cures for market failure on account of the indivisibility of intel-
lectual works); Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 275.
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the costs of detecting, identifying, and enforcing limits on unauthor-
ized copying have become substantially greater than before. If tech-
nological and other private law means of restricting access to and the
use of digital materials are widely deployed, then such costs may be
lower.40 In either case, how an author or publisher analyzes these
problems and responds to them is driven by the omnipresence of the
digital format in which the work is created, reproduced, and distrib-
uted, rather than by the nature of the work (is it a book? a sound
recording? an image?) or the framework of much of the existing
Copyright Act.4'
The second phenomenon is the standardization of use-based distri-
bution models for the original digital work: computer programs.
Years ago, the computer software industry almost uniformly adopted
a "license" paradigm for distributing computer program code.42 The
choice to license rather than to sell software had both technological
roots43 and roots in the development of the appropriate legal regime
for software in the late 1960s and 1970s.44 Software licenses in gen-
eral, and shrinkwrap licenses in particular, arose in part in response to
uncertainty over how to apply copyright law, particularly copyright's
"first sale" doctrine,45 to packaged software distribution. Early on,
40. See Merges, End of Friction, supra note 28, at 116-17.
41. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (regarding secondary transmissions by cable systems
of performances or displays in primary transmissions); id. § 113 (providing protection
for pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works); id. § 114 (addressing sound recordings);
id. § 115 (involving compulsory licenses for nondramatic musical works); id. § 117
(relating to computer programs); id. § 120 (regarding architectural works).
42. At least in the mass market, courts have been reluctant to agree that computer
software is in fact licensed, rather than sold as a good, under the UCC. See Micro
Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the delivery of custom software is the sale of a "good" under New Hampshire
law). This doctrinal gap has not, in the main, discouraged software publishers from
asserting that their programs are merely licensed.
43. Most early computer software was written for and could be used only in con-
junction with particular computers, which, on the whole, were neither cheap enough
nor practical enough for use outside of educational and industrial applications. The
software was physically inseparable from the hardware. It could not be sold because
there was nothing to sell apart from the computer system itself, yet there was clearly a
separate value to be protected in the program code. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailor-
ing Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1332-36 (1987)
(describing the design of computers and highlighting the relationship between hard-
ware and software).
44. Before the Copyright Act was amended to make it clear that computer pro-
grams are expressive works subject to the Act, the relative advantages of copyright,
trade secret, and patent law as appropriate legal models for software distribution were
widely debated. See Miles R. Gilburne, The Proprietary Rights Pyramid: An Inte-
grated Approach to Copyright and Trade Secret Protection for Software, Computer
Law., Mar. 1984, at 1, 6-8. But see Rice, Digital Information, supra note 10, at 633
(observing that firms seized opportunities presented by shrinkwrap licensing to strip
consumers of warranty protections).
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). The doctrine of first sale restricts the copyright
holder's distribution rights in any particular copy of a work that is sold. The pur-
chaser of that copy is free to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy without interfer-
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piracy or facilitation by software rental firms was identified as the ma-
jor business risk associated with distributing copies of computer
software.' If copyright law applied to computer programs, then the
first sale doctrine, which appeared to enable the owner of a particular
copy of a computer program to dispose of that copy without further
restriction, arguably did not condemn such piracy as a matter of law.
Consumers acquired most packaged software not from publishers
themselves but from distributors and resellers who may have been
free under the law to re-copy the programs at will. In theory, then,
shrinkwrap licenses created contractual privity between the copyright
holder and the end-user of the software without requiring the pub-
lisher to identify and negotiate a license with each user. These
"licenses" asserted the holder's reservation of title and the right to
specify the uses to which each copy of the computer program could be
put. Specifically, shrinkwrap licenses could and did forbid lending or
renting the program.4 7 Guarding against the contingency that copy-
right law does not apply, software publishers also used shrinkwrap to
shoehorn software distribution into the law of trade secrets. They did
this either by asserting the creation of a confidential relationship be-
tween publisher and user, or by obtaining the user's undertaking not
to disclose trade secrets embodied in the program, or both.
Congress has amended the Copyright Act to confirm that copyright
applies to computer programs and to clarify that the first sale doctrine
does not authorize renting computer software.48 Software rental busi-
ence. See Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125,
1134 (1998) (holding that the "first sale" section of the Copyright Act bars copyright
infringement action against an importer of lawfully manufactured product bearing
copyrighted label, where the importer acquired the product from a foreign distributor
that purchased it from the copyright holder).
46. See Richard H. Stem, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Softwvare: En-
forceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 51,
51-52 (1985).
47. See Rice, Digital Information, supra note 10, at 630-34; Stem, supra note 46, at
57-65.
48. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (confirming that computer programs are copyrightable "literary
works"). Section 109(b)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act qualifies the first sale doctrine
and forbids the unauthorized "rental, lease, or lending" of a copy of a computer pro-
gram, "for direct or indirect commercial purposes." 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). The
Copyright Act now also includes a discussion of the legitimate uses of computer pro-
grams. For example, § 117 of the Copyright Act now provides that the "owner" of a
copy of a computer program may make a copy of that program "as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine .... " Id.
§ 117(1). This amendment was intended to recognize that any use of a computer pro-
gram involves technically reproducing or making a "copy" of the program, as the code
is "copied" from one medium (disk, tape, hard drive) to another (computer memory
accessible by the computer processor) and to limit acquirors of computer programs to
only that use. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482). Under
§ 117, and absent other restrictions imposed by license, the medium containing the
computer program may be resold, and the new purchaser may use the program. The
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nesses have been absorbed into the market for software licenses. 49 By
building distribution models based on licenses or control of rights of
use to guard against threats from piracy and free-riding,50 however,
software producers have learned the value of use-based models for
seller and buyer, or transferor and transferee, may not, however, concurrently use
copies of the same program downloaded from a single disk or other medium.
The extent to which Congress meant what it said when it restricted this privilege to
"owners" of computer programs has been disputed, and the ambiguity has preserved,
from the standpoint of the statute, a justification for shrinkwrap. The legislative his-
tory of the statute does not explain the shift in terminology from "rightful possessor,"
which appeared in earlier versions, to "owners." See National Comm'n on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report of the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 31 (1978). Courts have been divided
over whether § 117 rights accrue to "owners" of the medium (disk, tape, or CD-
ROM) that contains the program, who merely "possess," as a result, the sequence of
electrons that constitutes the program copy itself. Under this reading of the statute,
an ordinary acquiror of computer software is a mere "licensee" of the copy of the
program, not an "owner," and has, therefore, only those rights to use the program
that the copyright holder specifies rather than those rights provided by § 117. Com-
pare Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)
(accepting without comment the "license" character of initial distribution of
software), and Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp.
208, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (accepting the "license" character of software distribution),
with Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 535-36 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(stating that Congress limited the grant of rights to copy software to the "owner" of a
program under § 117). Courts willing to read § 117 as strictly applying only to true
"owners" rather than mere "licensees" support publishers' assertion that shrinkwrap
licenses validly restrict the use of software, and thus reinforce the conventions of in-
formation use with which this part is concerned. See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bos-
sard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the use of a software
program from a computer's hard drive for the program's designated purposes consti-
tutes infringing "copying" unless the use is licensed by the copyright holder); see also
Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. Dayton
L. Rev. 547, 576 n.180 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights] (stating
that the combination of a narrow reading of § 117 and ProCD would read that section
out of the Copyright Act); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program
Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 Jurimetrics J. 157, 162-65 (1990)(framing the statutory controversy regarding the Copyright Act first sale doctrine).
Section 117, in other words, may have been conceived as a statutory clarification of
users' rights in software. It has become an instrument for restricting or eliminating
those rights. But see DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 976
F. Supp. 359, 362-63 (E.D. Va. 1997) (reasoning that whether a possessor of a copy of
software is an "owner" depends on "economic realities," not on the nominal charac-
terization of the transaction as a "license").
49. By describing early efforts to combat piracy masquerading as legitimate
software rental, I do not intend to understate the significance to software publishers
of other restrictions on use in shrinkwrap licenses, particularly those concerning re-
verse engineering. See infra notes 120-50 and accompanying text.
50. The trend toward enforcing software publishers' characterizations of these
transactions from an infringement standpoint has not been matched by accepting
these characterizations for purposes of applying the UCC. See ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651 (W.D. Wis.) (treating Zeidenberg's acquisition of a
ProCD product as a sale for UCC purposes), rev'd on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit's opinion in ProCD accepted the district court's
determination that the transactions in question were governed by the Wisconsin
UCC. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
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generating revenue.5' Distributing computer software via license
rather than sale remains the industry norm5 2 rationalized not only as
a mechanism to avoid the transaction costs of individual licenses with
each user 3 but also as the basis for new business models.' The link
between use-regulation as a deterrent to theft and as a predicate for
profitability suggests, moreover, that publishers may now be incapable
of returning to a "sale" paradigm.5 As the entirety of the information
51. See Perritt, Information Superhighway, supra note 33, § 10.22, at 458-64;
Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protec-
tion of Digital Works, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 845, 869-74 (1997) (arguing that a digital format
for copyrighted works increases publishers' ability to price discriminate and reduces
the need to expand copyright protection to maintain existing profit levels); Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 Minn. L
Rev. 609, 625-30 (1998) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace] (describing dif-
ferent Web-based revenue models); Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renais-
sance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on tile Internet, 12
Berkeley Tech. L2. 15, 21-34 (1997) (explaining the variety of business models being
developed on the Internet). Cf David A. Rice, Whither (No Longer Whether)
Software Copyright, 16 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 341,350-51 (1990) (stating that
computer software developers use shrinkwrap as both a shield and a competitive
sword).
52. This remains true, notwithstanding predictions that shrinkwrap would die a
natural death as computer software increasingly acquired property-like legal charac-
teristics and as the indicia of "sales" of software increasingly surrounded consumer
software distribution. See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable
Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 Deny. U. L
Rev. 577, 599 (1994) (predicting the demise of shrinkwrap); Pamela Samuelson,
Software Compatibility and the Law, Comm. ACM, Aug. 1995, at 15, 20 (highlighting
the widely-held opinion that shrinkwrap licenses are unenforceable).
53. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke LJ. 479,532
(1995) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary] (noting that "mass-market li-
censing sprang up because transaction costs made negotiating with every licensee im-
practical"). Software producers now generally fear reverse engineering,
decompilation, and re-distribution of their code across computer networks at least as
much as piracy via wholesale duplication of their code.
54. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (discuss-
ing how shrinkwrap licenses may facilitate price discrimination); Perritt, Property and
Innovation, supra note 6, at 307-08; supra note 51; see also, eg., N. Jansen Calamita,
Note, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keeping the Sound Recording
Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L Rev. 505, 534-551 (1994) (proposing
new business model solutions to prevent piracy and free-riding problems).
55. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va. L Rev. 713, 740-
60 (1997) (describing learning and network externalities that limit the mix of innova-
tion and customization and encourage standardization in corporate contracts); see
also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion. An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L
Rev. 1173, 1222-23 (1983) [hereinafter Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion) (noting that
the use of standard form documents directs firms away from individual contract nego-
tiations). But see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Nenvork
Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 599-600 (1998) (questioning the extent to
which network effects cause sub-optimal contracting through the "lock-in" of legal
forms). Few software publishers other than computer game developers explicitly
adopt a "sale" model for their software. An undercurrent of practitioner advice rec-
ommending such a model is generally ignored. See Gilburne, supra note 44, at 1 (dis-
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world is either created in digital form or is capable of being digitized
at minimal cost, technologically it all begins to look like "software."
Licensing and shrinkwrap forms migrate accordingly.5 6
The third phenomena are the marked changes for the reader or
consumer of works of information in the contrast between tangible
products embodying intellectual property and the intangible underly-
ing property interest. Books, for example, have posed comparatively
few problems under commercial law because it has been relatively
simple to physically, visually, and conceptually distinguish rights in the
thing, which are governed by state contract and commercial law, from
the copyright holder's rights in the expression, which are governed by
copyright law. My sense of what I may and may not do with a book is
predicated, in large part, on cues provided by the physical thing, the
book itself. The distinction is expressed with reasonable clarity in
§ 202 of the Copyright Act, which states that ownership of a copyright
in a work is distinct from ownership of "any material object" in which
the work is embodied,57 and further provides that the transfer of own-
ership of that material object "does not of itself convey any rights in
the copyrighted work embodied in the object,"58 and in the first sale
doctrine, which limits the copyright holder's right to prevent re-distri-
bution of individual copies of its work that have been sold. 9 With the
development of copyrightable computer programs, the relative lack of
physical contrast between the "thing" and the "rights" leads to ambi-
guity in the law60 and in the minds of users over precisely what rights
accrue to the acquirer of a copy of a computer program. The ability to
cussing the circumstances where the sale of object code and source code copies is
appropriate); Ian N. Feinberg, Shrink Wrap Licenses: Do They Cause Software Pub-
lishers More Harm Than Good? (last modified Aug. 26, 1995) <http:ll
www.softwareindustry.org/issues/docs-htm/shrnkwrp.html> (noting that warranties
and other important terms in shrinkwrap licenses could be as effectively applied in
sales transactions for software).
56. The collapse of license, sale, and other forms of information rights transfer is
evident in drafts of the proposed Article 2B of the UCC, which, by defining "license"
as a contract that controls the use of information and grants fewer than all rights in
the information, effectively asserts that the license has become the sole means of
transfer of rights in or to works of information. See generally David A. Rice, Digital
Information, supra note 10, 643-45 (arguing that the drafters of Article 2B have im-
properly conflated property and contract attributes of copyright); infra Part IV.C (dis-
cussing whether codification of shrinkwrap practice will address and protect open
space issues).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Using books as the paradigm for
this example turns out to be more than coincidence; the first sale doctrine under fed-
eral law is related to the state common law copyright "right of first publication" that
enabled authors of unpublished works to prevent unauthorized distribution of their
works. See Karjala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 523-25.
60. Because using almost any computer software requires making a copy of the
code, § 202 suggests that if the software user buys the disk containing the computer
program, the user cannot, without some separate authorization from the copyright
owner, or as a matter of law, use the embedded software. Section 117 could be read
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copyright computer software creates a gap between what § 202 says
and what it means because human beings cannot perceive the subject
of the intellectual property interest, the copyrighted code itself, in its
operable state.6 ' As more works of information resemble "software"
in a technological sense and as "software" increasingly lacks any
"thing"-like physical attributes, 2 the dominant license norm renders
§ 202 essentially meaningless. A publisher may assume, for example,
that as it licenses computer software, it should license-that is, regu-
late the use of-digital books, because the physical "thing" is increas-
ingly nothing more than a collection of electronic impulses. A reader,
however, assumes that because he buys the book and does with the
book itself as his conventional sense dictates, he buys the digital copy
of the book in the same sense. Whether he does so from a legal stand-
point is unclear.
The fourth phenomena are the various aspects of computer
software that make it a unique and somewhat troublesome animal as a
to overcome that problem, but as usually applied, that section reinforces the pub-
lisher's position and the user's predicament. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. Computer code can be printed as text in either object code (machine readable)
or source code (human readable) form. Whether the electronic embodiment of the
code is the original work and the printed text is its translation, or vice versa, the result
is the same for the consumer or user. If the code is delivered in tangible form at all, it
is embedded in a medium (disk, CD-ROM, cartridge) that renders the code inaccessi-
ble except via the application of another computer program. A purchaser of a book
or magazine can at least see the copyrighted expression on the printed page. Some
software developers admonish users to treat their programs as they would treat
books. See Green Book Int'l Corp. v. Inunity Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 n.1 (D.
Mass. 1998) (discussing a license that instructed users to treat software like a book
because two people cannot easily read the same book at the same time). If one could
treat software like one treats a book, one would not need a computer. Yet book
publishers are increasingly providing limitations on the use of books, in the same
sense that software producers use shrinkwrap to limit use of their programs. See infra
Part I.C.2. Electronic books are becoming commercially feasible. See Eugene Volokh,
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale LJ. 1805, 1823-26 (1995); Peter H.
Lewis, Taking on New Forms, Electronic Books Turn a Page, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1998,
at Gi; Steve Silberman, Ex Libris, Wired, July 1998, at 98, 98, 101. Accordingly, legal
decisions that depend, at least in part, on sharp distinctions between "books" and
"software" will be called into question. See, e.g., Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd. v.
Adobe Sys. (Europe) Ltd., 1996 Scots L. Times 604, 609 (Scot. Outer House 1995)
(holding that the software acquirer who ordered the program by telephone from the
distributor was entitled to return the package, unopened, when the shrinkwrap license
disclosed objectionable terms: "The analogy with a printed book is, in my opinion,
false.... A book typically is intended to be read, not copied, as a way of enjoying or
using the object"); see also Online Originals, Online Originals (visited October 10,
1998) <http'//www.onlineoriginals.com> (publishing "books" on line). The site at-
tracted publicity during the Summer of 1998 when one of its "books," The Angels of
Russia, by Patricia LeRoy, was nominated for the Booker Prize, though the -book"
had never been "published" in printed form.
62. Increasingly, consumers and institutional users acquire computer software
(and other works of information) via computer networks, rather than on media.
There is no tangible "thing" at all. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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"literary work" 63 under copyright law. Whether computer programs
ever have seemed more like copyrightable "books" than patentable
"machines" continues to be debated.64 Technological evolution only
complicates that debate. Definitionally, "software" is an increasingly
inapt term for the myriad of products, processes, and tools that are
digitized. Within the realm of what is colloquially known as
"software," there are copyrightable computer "programs,"" which in-
struct a computer, and there are "data," which are information that, in
coded form, does not instruct the computer but instead interacts with
"programs. '66 Aggregations of data (whether digital or analog) gen-
erally are copyrightable if they exhibit at least a modicum of "original-
ity."' 67 The distinction between these classes is increasingly blurry.
Single "products" may consist of combinations of programs and data
63. "Computer programs" are copyrightable as literary works under the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "computer program" as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result"; "copies" as including objects in which a work is "fixed," from which it
can be perceived "either directly or with the aid of a machine or device"; "fixed" as
requiring that the work be sufficiently "stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration"); id.
§ 102(a)(1) (discussing literary works); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.. 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982). Screen displays, that is, the output of computer pro-
grams, are copyrightable "audiovisual works." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining audiovi-
sual work); id. § 102(a)(6) (identifying audiovisual works as protectable subject
matter).
64. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1875-80 (1990); J.H. Reichman,
Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17
U. Dayton L. Rev. 797, 801-06 (1992); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional
Expression, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149, 1180-93 (1998) [hereinafter Weinreb, Functional
Expression]; see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12
(2d Cir. 1992) (applying, in a "substantial similarity" analysis for copyright infringe-
ment of computer software, the "abstractions approach" developed by Judge Hand
for traditional literary works).
65. "Programs" generally are strings of computer code-statements or instruc-
tions-that cause a computer to execute some function(s) or operation(s). See 17
U.S.C. § 101. Historical divisions between "operating systems" and "application pro-
grams" are also being called into question. Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
147 F.3d 935, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the claim that the Microsoft operating
system and the Internet browser clearly constituted distinct products for purposes of a
consent decree), with Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer
Software, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1329, 1334 (1987) (noting two principal classes of
programs).
66. The evolution of "object-oriented programming" calls even this division into
question. See Michael A. Dryja, Looking to the Changing Nature of Software for Clues
to its Protection, 3 U. Bait. Intell. Prop. L.J. 109, 131-38 (1995) (arguing that patent
rather than copyright law is better suited to the protection of object-oriented pro-
gramming); Oops!, The Economist, Feb. 28, 1998, at 82, 82 (describing the growth of
object-oriented programming in the database industry). Distributed computing net-
works may do even more to disrupt the traditional division described in the text. See
After the PC, The Economist, Sept. 12, 1998, at 79, 79-80; Kevin Kelly & Spencer
Reiss, One Huge Computer, Wired, August 1998, at 128, 130-31.
67. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51 (1991).
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that the user cannot, as a functional matter, readily distinguish. "Digi-
tal content" providers, as some publishers are now known,6s use form
"contracts"-shrinkwrap--to control access to and distribution of
both.69 The blurred distinction becomes more troubling as "software"
distribution and use migrates toward networked environments, away
from traditional delivery models involving a complete product in ex-
change for a one-time fee.7" Across the Internet or in a networked
environment, the program or data user may not receive the complete
computer code in one usable package,71 but instead may receive
pieces of the code, or updates, on a "need to use" basis. A prototype
consumer software user of the not-too-distant future may not go to a
software retailer (whether on-line or on the street corner) and ex-
change a small sum of money for a package containing the entire pro-
gram code for the most recent version of Microsoft's Word or Intuit's
Quicken. Instead, that person may log onto a network intending to
update a resume, a financial portfolio, or a set of blueprints and
download pieces of the applicable program, priced accordingly, as the
work progresses. From the user and producer's standpoint, computer
software-or any digital work-is no longer a thing at all. It may be a
process.72
68. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Foreword: The Digital Content Symposium,
12 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 1, 2-9 (1997) [hereinafter Samuelson, Foreword] (discussing
various views of protecting digital content).
69. Distinctions between computer software and computer hardware may also be
blurring, see Fred M. Greguras, Systems-on-a-Chip: Intellectual Property and Licens-
ing Issues (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http'J/www.fenwick.com/publsystems-on-a-
chip.html>, raising a thorny legal question that is, fortunately, beyond the scope of
this Article: What are the limits of permissible use restrictions that accompany
software (which may be copyrightable) that is embedded in (that is, hardwired, not
merely copied into the computer's memory) a computer device, which itself is only
patentable, or protectable as a "mask work"? See 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914. Will cell
phones, pagers, and digital television sets come with shrinkwrap licenses or notices
concerning acceptable use?
70. See generally Rice, Digital Infornation, supra note 10, at 641 (recounting tradi-
tional forms of transfers of rights in copyrighted works and observing that the Copy-
right Act does not contemplate the licensor as a "toll-collector"); Schlachter, supra
note 51, at 24-30 (reviewing Internet-based business models). Current trends in tech-
nology industries, at least, take the toll-collection feature of digital technology and
networks as an essential element of business planning. See Michael Lewis, The Little
Creepy Crawlers Who Will Eat You in the Night, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 1, 1998, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 40 (quoting John Doerr, general partner of Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & By-
ers, a technology-oriented venture capital firm, on the premise that Internet-based
companies' information products have a marginal cost of zero: "You just collect the
toll as people download it from the Internet").
71. Subject, of course, to patches, bug fixes, and updates.
72. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1385 (1996) (quoting Esther Dyson, Intellectual
Value, Wired, July 1995, at 136, 138-39, 183 ("The trick is to control not the copies of
your work but instead a relationship with the customers-subscriptions or member-
ship.")); Radin, supra note 9, at 520-21 (questioning whether the scope of Dyson's
prediction amounts to evolution or revolution with respect to current practice). Char-
acterizing digital content as process challenges assumptions about what society values
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The fifth, and last, phenomenon is the growth of the digital econ-
omy, the popularization and commercial importance of products and
services based on digital technology, and the growth of the computer
software industry in general and of the Internet in particular, to such
an extent that the idea of creative "authorship" of expressive works is
at best a rhetorical device.73 By creating opportunities for firms to
grow and thrive based on little more than intellectual property rights
and a business plan, the growing digital economy has commercial and
securities law consequences. 74 In the business world, equity and debt
about works of information. The relevant question may not be only "how do we
encourage the development of more computer programs/software/digital works as
raw material for social consumption and reuse?" See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright
Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 975, 980 (1994). It is also, "How do we most encourage the use of
computer programs/software/digital works as tools to produce the works that are con-
sumed and reused?" See Lemley & O'Brien, Software Reuse, supra note 35, at 259
(arguing that patent law is superior to copyright law in promoting the efficient crea-
tion of computer program code); Allen Newell, The Models are Broken, the Models
are Broken!, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1023, 1034-35 (1986) (concluding that the current
models of economic incentives are "broken" as applied to computers and patent law);
Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 271 n.42 (noting how copyright law
can decrease the production of information by increasing the price of intellectual
works). Roughly equivalent questions-for example, to what extent do we favor orig-
inators at the expense of those who create based on prior works?-arise if copyright
law is examined less from an economic or instrumental standpoint, and more from the
standpoint of the rights or interests of authors themselves in autonomy and self-fulfill-
ment. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1661, 1745-62 (1988) (describing different philosophical traditions present in
analyses of author autonomy in copyright law); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24
Rutgers L.J. 347, 408-11 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright Alienability] (describ-
ing social, individual benefits from author inalienability rules in copyright). But see
Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (stating that the primary object of the copyright statute is to
effect the constitutional purpose of copyright, not to reward the labor of authors);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1984) (observing
that the monopoly created by copyright rewards authors in order to benefit the
public).
73. See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cul-
tural Geography of Authorship, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1322-27 (1996) (discussing the
creation of the notion of the "romantic author" and the use of that idea to expand
modem property law conceptions of copyright).
74. From the Prospectus for the initial public offering of common stock of Net-
scape Communications Corporation in 1995:
The Company's success and ability to compete is dependent in part upon its
proprietary technology. While the Company relies on trademark, trade se-
cret and copyright law to protect its technology, the Company believes that
factors such as the technological and creative skills of its personnel, new
product developments, frequent product enhancements, name recognition
and reliable product maintenance are more essential to establishing and
maintaining a technology leadership position. The Company presently has
no patents or patent applications pending. There can be no assurance that
others will not develop technologies that are similar or superior to the Com-
pany's technology. The source code for the Company's proprietary software
is protected both as a trade secret and as a copyrighted work. The Company
generally enters into confidentiality or license agreements with its employ-
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markets increasingly require precise delineation of patent, trade se-
cret, and copyright portfolios in the context of complex transactions. 75
Private law structuring of intellectual property privileges and obliga-
tions, and licenses that anticipate and structure relationships over time
as opposed to one-time sales, create the appearance of restoring to the
firm the power to privately protect and manage its key resources.76
The perceived ability to plan, in turn, strengthens the ability of those
firms to use revenue streams to justify investment by shareholders,
loans from banks and bondholders and, for debt holders, to have as-
signable interests, such as license fees, that can be pledged as secur-
ees, consultants and vendors, and generally controls access to and distribu-
tion of its software, documentation and other proprietary information.
Despite these precautions, it may be possible for a third party to copy or
otherwise obtain and use the Company's products or technology without au-
thorization, or to develop similar technology independently. In addition, ef-
fective copyright and trade secret protection may be unavailable or limited
in certain foreign countries, and the global nature of the Internet makes it
virtually impossible to control the ultimate destination of the Company's
products. To license its products, the Company primarily relies on "shrink
wrap" licenses that are not signed by the end-user and, therefore, may be
unenforceable under the laws of certain jurisdictions. Despite the Com-
pany's efforts to protect its proprietary rights, unauthorized parties may at-
tempt to copy aspects of the Company's products or to obtain and use
information that the Company regards as proprietary. Policing unauthorized
use of the Company's products is difficult. There can be no assurance that
the steps taken by the Company will prevent misappropriation of its technol-
ogy or that such agreements will be enforceable. In addition, litigation may
be necessary in the future to enforce the Company's intellectual property
rights, to protect the Company's trade secrets, to determine the validity and
scope of the proprietary rights of others, or to defend against claims of in-
fringement or invalidity. Such litigation could result in substantial costs and
diversion of resources and could have a material adverse effect on the Com-
pany's business, operating results or financial condition.
Netscape, Prospectus: 5,000,000 Shares Netscape Common Stock (visited Sept. 25,
1998) <http://home.netscape.com/comprod/investor/prospectus.html>. The density of
this text betrays the firm's recognition of investors' reliance on the value of Net-
scape's software. Despite early success following its initial public offering, Netscape's
future prospects are unclear. In early 1998, in response to competitive pressure from
Microsoft, Netscape announced that it would release without charge (though not
without restriction) copies of the source code for its World Vide Web browser. See
Don Clare, Netscape to Share Browser Program Code, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at B6.
By mid-1998, the firm was re-inventing itself as an Internet "portal" company.
75. See, eg., Diane Holt Frankle, Sample Agreenent and Plan of Reorganization
for Technology Company, in Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held Company 364-67
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Handbook Series No. 1059, 1998) (noting, in a sample agree-
ment for a technology company, the need for detailed schedules of intellectual prop-
erty rights and obligations).
76. The growth of the digital economy may be pushing transactional norms.
Transactional practice may be simultaneously driving the expansion of that economy.
See Merges, Review Essay, supra note 27, at 1571-72 (arguing that growth in -proper-
tization" of intellectual property rights is driving increases in transactional practice).
The two phenomena are at the least highly symbiotic.
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ity." Intellectual property entrepreneurship in the digital age
demands the ability to value and control the use and re-use of intellec-
tual property assets. In turn, these economic demands subvert the
ideals of "authors" and "creators" on which my conventional sense of
copyright may rely. Business interests always have been wrapped up
with copyright law as a practical matter. The digital economy may be
making that connection all too transparent.78
77. Professor Rice argues that the interests of the other sides in these transactions
and flexibility in capital markets generally favor limiting the contractual ability of
firms to control the use of their intellectual property assets. See Rice, Digital Informa-
tion, supra note 10, at 638-43. Some information-dependent customers may not ac-
cept possession of a key asset merely under a "right to use" license. Law firm
partners, for example, have ownership interests in the assets of the firm, including the
contents of the firm's library. A collection of CD-ROMs that contains licensed copies
of judicial opinions and statutes is worth little to the firm's balance sheet and provides
little incentive for the partners to contribute capital to sustain the firm's business.
Article 9 of the UCC is undergoing revisions that, among other things, may address
such problems by freeing licensees of software to encumber their interests without the
licensor's consent. The copyright implications of such a rule are potentially troubling.
See Revision of UCC Article 9 Ready for Presentation to State Legislatures, 67
U.S.L.W. 2105 (1998); ABA Section Says Proposed UCC Revision Would Disrupt In-
tellectual Property Licensing, 67 U.S.L.W. 2056 (1998). For the text of the revised
Article 9, see Uniform Commercial Code: Art. 9 (Proposed Final Draft Revision
Apr. 15, 1998).
78. Copyright has long been at least partly concerned with the author's ability to
obtain some return on the investment in creating the work. The fact that copyright
law is now explicitly driven by the economic needs of information industries, and the
awesome degree to which the information that surrounds us is commonly considered
to be copyrightable, and thus expressive, mark a significant departure from copy-
right's origins in ensuring paid audiences for "expressive," i.e. artistic, works. This
departure is as yet unaccompanied by a cultural algebra that comfortably relates such
breadth of popular experience and use to copyrightable "art" as the fruit of an au-
thor's or artist's creation. The historian Daniel Boorstin has noted that not until the
early twentieth century, with the introduction of film, was a form of "art" or "crea-
tive" work introduced to a truly mass audience. See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Creators
739 (1992).
Whether film constitutes "art" in the historic and cultural sense is a debate that
waxed fiercely for decades. There is little doubt now that both as a copyright matter
and culturally, film is (or at least can be) understood to be "expressive." As a collab-
orative form published to a mass audience, digital content is film on a huge scale. It
surrounds us; it has features of "expressiveness" and features that are purely
"mechanical"; it is created and consumed (at least) in equal parts by elites and indi-
vidual citizens. Socially, we have only begun to figure out, as we have with other
forms of popular "art," what to make of this. Legally, therefore, the decision to deal
with all copyright questions under a single standard for determining copyrightability
may have been premature. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other
Protection of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 342-
49 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?] (noting that the Supreme Court in
Feist imposed a unitary high expression standard of originality on works of both high
creativity and low creativity); Lange, supra note 14, at 157 ("Indeed, the reach of the
new Act can seem ludicrous: notes to babysitters, instructions to chimney sweeps,
directions to my house-all of those almost certainly meet the minimal standards of
creativity required by the law of copyright .. "); Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist:
Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Pub-
lic Goods, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1343 (1991) [hereinafter Yen, The Legacy of Feist] (arguing
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B. ProCD, Convention, and the Uses of Contract Doctrine
With these changes afoot, I am not in any position to conclude that
I have a firm sense regarding my acceptable use of a computer pro-
gram, a website, a music clip that I download from the Internet, or the
text of a "digital novel." I strongly suspect, however, that there will
develop one belief, which emanates from a presumption that each and
every "use" of "information," no matter how fine-grained, requires a
sort of copyright due process: notice from the copyright holder and
the holder's opportunity to grant permission. This suspicion derives
not from digital technology itself 9 but from the legal form-shrink-
wrap, as I have broadly defined it'-that increasingly accompanies
digitized and digitizable information.
By confirming that shrinkwrap is a valid tool, ProCD provides the
hook, or confirms the presumption, on which the creators and manag-
ers of the digital age are setting the legal and public agendas for infor-
mation use."' ProCD enables publishers to legally implement the
changes that the foregoing summary of new phenomena entails.
that the "creativity" criterion for copyrightability is a poor solution to market failure
arguments for fact-based works). There may yet be room for explicit consideration in
copyright law of high and low artistic values. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions
and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 247, 301 (1998).
79. Scholarly analysis of the challenges posed by digitization and the growth of the
Internet has often focused not on how changing technology affects users' and consum-
ers' relationship with copyright law, but on the changing "architecture" of cyberspace.
This includes the need to appreciate the details of computer networks, packet switch-
ing, browser functionality, and the like to design an efficient legal regime that ac-
counts for these phenomena in creating an optimal incentive for the production of
creative works. See, eg., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L Rev.
1403, 1403-06 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace] (describing the limits
of cyberspace); O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 51, at 630-34 (describing
the technical aspects of navigating the Internet); Perritt, Property and Innovation,
supra note 6, at 261-62 (suggesting a proper balance between property ownership and
public use of information resources). The desirability of regulating architectural fea-
tures is contested. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (interpreting a consent decree to permit the marketing of an integrated product
that combines functionalities in a way that is advantageous to the purchaser). Rhetor-
ically, however, the focus on the "architecture" of cyberspace suggests that rules and
standards are being specified within a bounded space. Conceptually, that rhetoric
may miss the degree to which public and private rules and standards should define a
space beyond which they do not govern.
80. See supra note 3 (defining shrinkwrap in the context of this Article).
81. Deference to "private action" in response to difficulties in capturing an appro-
priate legal rule in this environment, see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997) (deferring to the parties' private ordering con-
cerning a trademark license dispute, in light of rapidly changing technology), grants to
copyright owners a form of "agenda setting" authority for norms of copyright law.
Professor Lessig argues that we need to consider how regulatory principles expressed
in law now might be expressed in computer code itself. See Lawrence Lessig, The
Constitution of Code" Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regula-
tion, 5 Comm. L. Conspectus 181, 186-88 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution of
Code]. The degree to which computer code actually does or will regulate is empiri-
cally uncertain. See Radin, supra note 9, at 520-21.
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Under ProCD, there is but one use, which is the authorized use. The
broad impact of ProCD has gone far beyond the limited holding of
the case. It is thus appropriate to first review precisely what ProCD
dealt with and what the case actually holds.
ProCD, Inc., the plaintiff, assembled and distributed packages of
CD-ROM discs (branded "SelectPhone") that contained a large
database of residential and business telephone numbers, addresses,
zip codes, and, for commercial listings, applicable industry or "SIC"
codes, assembled from publicly available telephone directories. 82 The
SelectPhone CD-ROMs also contained a computer program, to which
ProCD held the copyright, for searching the database and retrieving
data.83 ProCD packaged a printed user's guide in the box that con-
tained a "license agreement." The user's guide stated that the ac-
quiror's use of the program constituted acceptance of the "license,"
limited use of the listings and of the computer program to "individual
or personal use," and specifically noted that copying the listings of the
program to a second computer or to a networked environment was
forbidden." The full text of the license could not be read before ac-
quiring the product, but the exterior of the package bore a notice that
use of the contents was subject to a license. Furthermore, the pro-
gram itself supplied a "pop-up" screen that notified the user that ac-
cess to the listings was conditioned on acknowledgment, via a mouse
click, of a license. 5 Zeidenberg, the defendant and a Wisconsin resi-
dent, acquired SelectPhone, accessed the data using the ProCD com-
puter program, and downloaded and copied portions of the database
contents to a server connected to the Internet. 6 He offered public
access to the listings over the Internet, allowing users to search and
access the listings themselves via a computer program supplied by
Zeidenberg. 7 ProCD sued Zeidenberg for copyright infringement,
breach of the license agreement, and unfair competition.88
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
summary judgment for Zeidenberg. 9 Specifically, the court held that
Zeidenberg's use of ProCD's computer program fell within the scope
of § 117 of the Copyright Act.9" The court held that the telephone
82. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 644-45.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 645.
87. See id. The district court noted that Zeidenberg's computer program was
"written by" a corporation, defendant Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., of which
Zeidenberg was the sole shareholder and president. See id.
88. See id. at 644.
89. See id. at 662.
90. See id. at 649. The relevant text of § 117 follows:
[Ilt is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com-
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and address data in ProCD's CD-ROMs were not copyrightable be-
cause they did not meet the "originality" standard set forth in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,91 but that they none-
theless fell within the "subject matter of copyright." 92 Therefore,
Zeidenberg could not be liable under copyright law as an infringer of
any copyright in the data, and federal copyright law preempted
ProCD's claims for breach of the license agreement and for unfair
competition. 93
Thematically, then, the district court opinion focused on copyright
law and policy. Technically, however, much of its preemption ruling
dealing with the claim for breach of the license agreement is dicta.94
The court held that under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
Zeidenberg did not enter into an enforceable contract with ProCD
concerning use of the data95 because he did not have adequate notice
of the terms of the license, which appeared in the user's manual and in
the execution of the computer program itself, before he paid for his
copies of SelectPhone.96 Thus, absent fair notice of a purported "of-
fer" to license, there could not have been an "acceptance."
puter program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created
as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner ....
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). The district court stated that § 117 rights extended to "right-
ful possessors" of computer programs, relying on certain legislative history of the law
that added § 117 to the Copyright Act. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 649. According to
the district court, Zeidenberg had acted within § 117 because he used ProCD's pro-
gram only to access the data supplied by ProCD. See id. The language of § 117, how-
ever, permits only the "owner" of a computer program to make copies of the
computer program for certain uses. See 17 U.S.C. § 117. The court did not discuss
whether the ostensible "license" character of Zeidenberg's acquisition of the program
would change the applicability of § 117. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. It
did conclude separately, however, that for purposes of the UCC, the transaction
would be characterized as a sale of goods. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 650-51.
91. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
92. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 656-57. Sections 102 through 105 of the Copyright Act
define the "subject matter" of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-105. Courts and schol-
ars generally concur that a class of works, or parts of works, exist that fall within the
subject matter of copyright as compilations of facts, see, e.g., id. § 103 (excluding pre-
existing material from copyright protection but including them in the subject matter
of copyright), but that are not themselves protected by copyright. See ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 656-62. ProCD also asserted a claim for violation
of Wisconsin's Computer Crimes Act; the court held that this claim, too, was pre-
empted. See id. at 661-62. The appellate court's application of preemption doctrine is
discussed infra at notes 100-03 and accompanying text, and preemption doctrine is
discussed generally infra Part IV.D.
94. The court's discussion of the preemption ruling might be characterized as an
alternative holding, though it seems clear that the preemption issue does not arise
unless an enforceable license is found to exist. See infra notes 100-03 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the opinion of the Court of Appeals).
95. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 650-56.
96. See id. at 650-55. Zeidenberg acquired three packages of SelectPhone, in suc-
cession, each of which contained identical license terms. See id. at 645.
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In a decision that emphasizes these contractual aspects of the dis-
pute and downplays its copyright context in roughly the same propor-
tions that the district court did the opposite, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded with instructions that judgment be entered in
ProCD's favor.9 7 On the facts summarized above, the court found
that Zeidenberg did have adequate notice of the terms on which
ProCD offered him its product. The exterior of the packaging bore a
notice stating that acquiring the product subjected the user to a li-
cense, the terms of which were stated inside the package. The ProCD
computer program supplied a screen that referred to the license terms,
which Zeidenberg had to acknowledge with a key stroke or a mouse
click before he could use the program to access the listings. Accord-
ing to the court, he was, therefore, bound by the license terms when
he chose to use the product rather than to return it to the "seller."
Under Wisconsin's version of the UCC, Zeidenberg accepted one and
declined the other of the two options explicitly put to him by ProCD
in the license: use the product and accept the license, or reject the
license and return the product for a refund.9" The court dismissed the
district court's preemption analysis. Relying exclusively on § 301 of
the Copyright Act, which states that state law rights equivalent to
rights in copyright are preempted with respect to works that fall
within the subject matter of copyright,99 the court drew a nearly abso-
lute distinction between rights concerning works of information trans-
ferred by bilateral contracts, the enforceability of which depends
almost entirely on proof of an agreement under contract law, and
rights under the Copyright Act itself, which impose liability independ-
ent of any agreement to honor them. 100 Preemption of a bilateral con-
tract was possible, the court said, but only in more narrow (but
unspecified) circumstances.101
97. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
98. See id. at 1452-53. Wisconsin's version of the UCC does not differ in any ma-
terial respect from the uniform version of the statute.
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
100. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-55. The Seventh Circuit's subsequent decision in
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. reinforced the theme of ProCD that shrinkwrap generally
presents contract questions, not copyright questions. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir.) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate a defect dispute
contained in a "shrinkwrap"-style agreement that accompanied computer hardware
was enforceable when the purchaser failed to object before using computer system),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see also Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d
569 (App. Div. 1998) (following Hill and enforcing an arbitration clause under New
York law). It is possible that cases such as Hill and Brower depend more on special-
ized rules and public policies surrounding enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
See, e.g., Comvest, LLC v. Corporate Sec. Group Inc., No. A98A1120, 1998 WL
658555 (Ga. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1998) (holding that a brokerage customer was bound
by an unsigned arbitration agreement, based on a customer's retention of benefits of
brokerage services and the expectation that all brokerage accounts would be subject
to arbitration agreements).
101. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55. The court's preemption analysis started and
ended with its analysis of preemption doctrine as a statutory matter under § 301. The
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As a doctrinal matter, therefore, ProCD has little strictly to do with
copyright law. The case held that the seller of a non-copyrightable
database of facts entered into an enforceable contract with the ac-
quiror of that database not to use the database, or its contents, in any
manner or for any purpose contrary to the specifications of the con-
tract itself. That characterization of the case leaves little room for the
debate regarding intellectual open space.1 02 Open space is a function
of interests in information or expression, not a function of contract
law. From a certain perspective, one might even hope that the limita-
tions of the case-a decision by a federal court sitting in diversity and
asserting its interpretation of how Wisconsin courts would deal with a
question under the UCC-would lead to its being distinguished or dis-
missed as a departure from broader "trends in the law.""0 3
Whatever later courts may do, however, the effect of ProCD has
not been so limited, and the case should not be understood solely in
its contract context. ProCD has been absorbed by the licensing bar
and by the market for transactions in information as confirming the
proposition that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable."4 For the prac-
ticing bar, the lessons of ProCD are generally to make sure that the
court did not address the possibility that some form of constitutionally-derived pre-
emption doctrine might bar ProCD's claims. See infra Part IV.D.
102. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text; hifra Part III.
103. One court has so interpreted ProCD. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr.,
Inc., No. Civ. 2:95CV523G, 1997 WL 1048530, at *10 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 1997) (hold-
ing, on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the software developer and
software distributor, that the "shrinkwrap license" included by the developer with the
original software package did not effectively defeat the application of the first sale
doctrine and preclude the distributor from acquiring and re-selling "upgrades" to that
software, when only "authorized" acquirers of the original soft-ware had the contrac-
tual "right" to acquire an upgrade). Factually, however, Novell may resemble ProCD
less than it does Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Erpress Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337
(9th Cir. 1995), in which a technology market leader similarly attempted to use copy-
right law to attack service and upgrade competition. In Triad, however, the court did
not attempt to assess the genuineness of the original licensees' assent to form license
restrictions on "authorized use."
104. See Fred Greguras et al., On Line Licensing Can Yeld Benefits for Software
Sellers, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at C14; Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On-Line
Software Distribution" New Life for 'Shrinkwrap' Licenses?, Computer Law., Apr.
1996, at 1, 1; Thomas O'Rourke, Recent Developments in Shrink Wrap Licenses, IPL
Newsletter, Summer 1996, at 7, 9, 37; Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon, Shrink-
wrap and Click-On Licenses After ProCD v. Zeidenberg, Computer Law., Sept. 1996,
at 1, 5; William A. Streff, Jr. & Jeffrey S. Norman, Courts, UCC Tackle Shrink-Wrap
Licenses, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 14, 1997, at 56; D.C. Toedt III, Enforcing Shrinkwrap and
Internet 'Click-On' License Agreements, 145 NJ. LJ., Sept. 30, 1996, at S12; Kent
Stuckey, Shrink-Wrap/Point-and-Click Agreements (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://
www.ljx.com/internetlexcerpt.html>. See generally Darren C. Baker, Note, ProCD v.
Zeidenberg.: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation, and Notions of
Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkuwrap Licenses, 92 Nw. U. L Rev. 379, 418-32
(1997) (welcoming ProCD's flexible approach to contract formation); Kell Corrigan
Mercer, Casenote, Consuner Shrink-wrap Licenses and Public Domain Materials;
Copyright Preemption and Uniform Commercial Code Validity in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1287, 1344-46 (1997) (arguing that the focus in mass
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user or reader has at least some notice in advance of acquiring the
product that use or other restrictions follow, that the user has at least
a nominal opportunity to reject the additional terms and to obtain a
refund, and that the more the transaction genuinely resembles a true
offer followed by an opportunity for rejection, the less a court will
review the substance of the terms involved."°5 If use-based conven-
tions concerning information are increasingly ingrained in consumers
and users via shrinkwrap, the more remarkable it may become that
any particular shrinkwrap should be challenged, let alone voided. By
the time another court faces the ProCD issue squarely, therefore, not
only the legal, but also the conventional, landscape may have
shifted. °6 The next section discusses the manner in which ProCD-
style shrinkwrap licenses and forms are overtaking the universe of
published information, setting up a standard, and thereafter a conven-
tion, in which the right to use any type of information is controlled by
the author and publisher.
C. Shrinkwrap All Around Us
The continuing disagreement over what constitutes an effective li-
cense or an enforceable contract lies, at one level, at the core of the
debate over the proper outcome of ProCD. The district court found
that the defendant, Zeidenberg, was not bound by shrinkwrap terms
of which he had no adequate notice before acquiring the plaintiff's
software program and database. 07 The court of appeals found that
Zeidenberg did have adequate pre-transaction notice of the terms of-
fered by ProCD.10 That debate tends to treat "shrinkwrap" and
other form notices and "licenses" as if the many versions of these phe-
nomena in fact follow traditional definitions of "license"'10 9 or meet
market license cases should be on adequacy of notice to consumer of terms in
license).
105. See, e.g., D.C. Toedt III, Shrinkwrap License Enforceability Issues, in Shrink-
wrap License Enforceability Issues 613 (PLI Patent Handbook Series 453, 1996) (dis-
cussing ProCD and the enforceability of shrinkwrap license terms).
106. See Samuelson, Information, supra note 16, at 17 ("Whatever one's view on
the Pro-CD [sic] decision, it has unquestionably changed the intellectual landscape
about shrinkwrap licenses and copyright policy.").
107. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 655 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
108. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
109. Black's Law Dictionary defines "license" as a "personal privilege to do some
particular act or series of acts on land without possessing any estate or interest
therein, and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licensor and is not assignable."
Black's Law Dictionary 919-20 (6th ed. 1990). For intellectual property rights, Black's
provides the following earliest citation, concerning patents: "A written authority
granted by the owner of a patent to another person empowering the latter to make or
use the patented article for a limited period or in a limited territory. A permission to
make, use or sell articles embodying the invention." Id. at 920; see also United States
v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1977) (considering whether the facts sur-
rounding the distribution of a film constituted a sale rather than a license and finding
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the standards of the Restatement for enforceable "contracts."' 10 Lim-
iting the analysis of shrinkwrap to "shrinkwrap as enforceable con-
tracts" misses an important aspect of the impact of ProCD, namely
the extent to which this case encourages owners of copyrighted and
other works of information to create private systems of use and re-
use. This Article, therefore, uses "shrinkwrap" to encompass non-ne-
gotiable restrictions on the use and consumption of works of informa-
tion that do not necessarily require any action on the part of the user-
reader-consumer:'' statements of terms and conditions for access to
or use of computer systems, programs, data, and other types and
forms of information, including books, magazines, and pre-recorded
music and film. Shrinkwrap has been commonplace for computer
software for many years. It is, however, increasingly all around us,
whether we are Internet addicts, occasional computer users, or Book
of the Month Club devotees, pushed by the social, economic, and
technological changes summarized above and encouraged by the con-
tract principle of ProCD. The following summary of the scope of
shrinkwrap is intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. It
strongly suggests, however, the broadening of what once was a rela-
tively esoteric phenomenon. Whether or not these forms are literally
enforceable even under the relatively liberal standards of ProCD,
their increasing use and visibility themselves may have important con-
sequences in copyright law.
1. A Very Brief History of Shrinkwrap
Where we are now is best understood in light of a brief examination
of how we got here. Shrinkwrap took its generic name from software
producers' practice of encasing the disks and related documentation in
a cardboard package and sealing the package with clear cellophane.
A document or card-the "license"-was placed inside the package.
In some cases, the prospective acquirer of the software could read the
terms of the "license" through the cellophane before paying for the
package. In other cases, the text of the card was available for review
that a sale occurred); United States v. Vise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190-92 (9th Cir. 1977)
(analyzing the difference between license and sale of film rights).
110. Contract-based arguments over shrinkwrap licenses focus on the extent to
which the offeree is bound to terms of which he allegedly was not aware at the time
the offer was accepted. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 23 cmt. e (1981)
(stating that "[a]n offeree, knowing that an offer has been made to him, need not
know all its terms"); Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 Jurimetrics J.
311, 317 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace].
111. Section 2B-208 of the proposed Article 2B of the UCC, discussed in greater
detail in part IV.C, would apply the standards of Article 2B to "mass-market"
licenses. See also H.R 3048, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing in pertinent part an
amendment to the Copyright Act that would apply to works distributed to the public
subject to non-negotiable license terms).
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only after the box itself was opened. 112 The contractual or "license"
nature of the transaction was suggested by a notice, printed on the
card, sometimes on the exterior of the package, that by opening the
cellophane wrapper, the acquiror agreed to the terms and conditions
printed on the card. In theory, the license card constituted an offer
and opening the package constituted the acquiror's acceptance. Users
acquired almost all software not from the software publisher or other
intellectual property rights holder, but from an intermediary: an
OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer), VAR (Value Added Re-
seller), or other distributor, integrator, reseller, or retailer. Thus, this
device formally created a direct bilateral relationship between the
rights holder and the consumer or user, which stated and confirmed
the scope of the recipient's rights and the copyright owner's duties
with respect to the intellectual content and the operation of the
software. 113
The discussion above briefly referred to restraints on the user's abil-
ity to loan or rent software as a major influence on early shrinkwrap
licenses. 114 The terms of the relationship contemplated by a shrink-
wrap license is in fact considerably more complex. Current software
shrinkwrap practice typically includes a bundle of use regulations
designed to guard against piracy or competitive re-use, and to limit
free-riding. Without separate and specific authorization from the
software publisher, and under the terms of most licenses, users typi-
cally may not transfer the software, may not use it except in connec-
tion with a specific or a single CPU and, often, a laptop, may not
transmit it, distribute it, or load it onto a computer network, may not
reverse engineer or decompile the program's object code or otherwise
attempt to discern the source code, and may not modify, adapt, or
otherwise create derivative works in any way."15 In short, from doctri-
112. The early practice of shrinkwrap licensing is described in detail elsewhere. See,
e.g., David Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tear-Me-Open" Software License Agree-
ments, 67 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 509, 509 (1985) (discussing terms commonly
contained in "shrink-wrap" license agreements); Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed
Software: The Legality of the Form License Agreement, 48 La. L. Rev. 87, 95-126
(1987) (analyzing the legality of major software agreement provisions); David W.
Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License: Old Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 J. Copyright
Soc'y 292, 293 (1987) (examining "the validity of the statutes that purport to make
shrink-wrap licenses enforceable").
113. See Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1241-48. For a description
of the risks with which software publishers were initially concerned and to which
shrinkwrap initially responded, see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
115. Shrinkwrap licenses for computer software itself may be substantially more
exacting (and, from a doctrinal perspective, may raise correspondingly more substan-
tial doubts about enforceability). McAfee Associates (now Network Associates) has
required acknowledgment that users will not publish reviews of its products without
McAfee's prior consent. See Network Associates, Software Programs from the Mc-
Afee Mall (visited Sept. 25, 1998) <http://www.mcafeemall.com/mall/mcafee/
vssxpur.html>.
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nal and conventional standpoints, the software may not be used at all
except insofar as the software publisher declares that the user may do
SO.
Temporarily setting aside networked distribution of information
products, use of any given computer system today involves a myriad
of such shrinkwrap "relationships." The path of a piece of software
from developer to end-user now takes any number of routes. A small,
independent developer may license its code to a larger, integrated
firm located in Redmond, Washington, for example. That firm may, in
turn, license a bundle of programs that it controls for distribution with
personal computers sold by a large PC vendor located in, perhaps,
Texas or South Dakota. The computer software may arrive at the end
user's location already loaded onto the computer's hard drive, may
arrive in the form of floppy disks or CD-ROMs encoded with the
products, or both. The small, independent developer and the large,
integrated firm may separately distribute its products individually or
in small or large bundles, over the telephone, through catalogs, in
computer software stores, toy stores, and business supply stores.1 16
Each point in these chains has the opportunity to, and often does,
impose separate sets of terms and conditions that are passed on to the
next step and ultimately to the consumer, in effect "shrinkwrapping"
its contribution to the project as a whole.117 For example, if I order a
personal computer from Dell Computer Corporation, I may receive a
CPU, monitor, keyboard, mouse, speakers, and modem, together with
pre-loaded and diskette or CD-ROM copies of operating system
software and applications proprietary to Dell, to Microsoft, to firms
supplying code to Microsoft, and to other third parties dealing directly
with Dell. Along with my computer, I receive a stack of "license"
cards, legends, notices, inserts in user's manuals, and wrappers ema-
nating from each of these sources, formally made effective, according
to their terms, by opening packages, breaking seals, and installing and
using software. 118
Software distribution via the Internet in effect digitizes each of the
"analog" business models implicit in the foregoing summary and, as a
result, "digitizes" use regulation by publishers. Bits and pieces of dif-
116. The preface to the current draft of Article 2B (the "Draft") of the UCC con-
tains a useful primer on distribution methods for computer programs and other infor-
mation products. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Commercial Code Softvare Contracts and Licenses of Information (visited
Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.law.uh.edulucc2b/0801981080198.html> (August 1, 1998
draft).
117. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 28, at 346-50 (arguing that end-
user license agreements offer cost and information benefits for consumers).
118. Not to mention the "web-wrap" agreement that governs my access to and use
of the Dell website from which I ordered the computer in the first place. See infra
notes 137-45 and accompanying text. The bundling of this software and hardware, of
course, makes effective "rejection" of any particular shrinkwrap license extremely dif-
ficult as a practical matter.
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ferent business strategies can be swiftly and relatively cheaply aggre-
gated, disaggregated, and re-aggregated to respond to changing
market conditions." 9 While the paradigm license-card-in-a-box-of-
software model still exists, so many other models have been devel-
oped that the shrinkwrap form is now as much metaphor as it is literal
reality. For much computer software, the "license" exists not in paper
form at all but as part of the "boot-up" process for the software 20 or
as part of a script included with the installation instructions for the
program, or both. Suppose, for example, that I download an execut-
able program from a server connected to the Internet, or I merely
purchase a program that comes on a floppy disk in a box. To install
the program on my computer, I locate the fie containing the execut-
able code and click on it. Before the program will install itself on my
computer, I must click on a screen icon that says "I Agree" and that
refers me to a "ReadMe" file or otherwise to a dense set of "license"
terms, which I may read if I so desire. Downloading the code in the
first place may also require clicking on an "I Agree" icon.' 2 ' The
terms "keywrap," "clickwrap," and "click-on" license have been
coined from these various improvements on the original shrinkwrap
concept. Officially, such licenses are often entitled "End User License
Agreements"' 2 to distinguish them from master licenses between de-
velopers and OEMs and to mitigate the harsher aural implications of
"shrinkwrap."
2. Beyond Software: Shrinkwrap Expanded
Shrinkwrap licenses for computer software typically include specific
terms that support their proponents' attempts to re-characterize infor-
mation norms.'a 3 Deployed more broadly, shrinkwrap may be simi-
119. Speaking of "publishers' interests" or a "publisher community" is thus even
more of an overstatement than is commonly observed. Cf. Perritt, Property and Inno-
vation, supra note 6, at 262 (arguing that law should not simply defer to the "owner's"
wishes).
120. Each time I use my copy of WinZip, a popular file compression program, a
screen pops up demanding that "I Agree" to a short list of license terms before I can
access the program's functions. DOS-based programs often include an initial or
"boot" screen that flashes on the screen for a moment, then automatically disappears,
that states certain basic information thought necessary to preserve copyright, trade
secret, and license rights.
121. Similar techniques are employed for other purposes. Qualcomm, which dis-
tributes its Eudora Pro and Eudora Lite electronic mail software across the Internet,
has required prospective users and downloaders to obtain a download password by
filling out an on-line questionnaire that verifies U.S. citizenship and the user's inten-
tion to use the software only domestically. Eudora is bundled with encryption
software; the questionnaire is designed to satisfy Qualcomm's burden of demonstrat-
ing that it is taking adequate measures to comply with applicable federal export
regulations.
122. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 28, at 336-37.
123. See id. at 340-41.
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larly shifting the user's' 24 conventional sense of "appropriate" use of
all works of information more closely to the publisher's private expec-
tations concerning that use. Increasingly, use-defining terms accom-
pany information, access to information, and the creation of
information without explicitly anticipating any individual acquies-
cence, beyond that assent inferred from the acquisition, use, or crea-
tion of the product or information itself. Resulting norms and
conventions define the scope of disputes, and the resolution of such
disputes defines, for all practical purposes, public and private expres-
sions of "open space."'" Use-defining shrinkwrap, through license
and notice alike, is laying the groundwork not only for introducing
new contract-based, use-controlling regimes, but for formalizing copy-
right policy doctrine, and convention that presumes that the copyright
holder is entitled to control all use of the work, regardless of license or
notice terms. If that happens, then what remains of "open space" dis-
appears. The new dimensions of shrinkwrap include:"2 6
a. "Copyright management" systems, sometimes known as "trusted
systems," and labeled by at least one scholar as systems of "automated
rights management,112 7 which have been referred to as "the ultimate
124. As the discussion of shrinkwrap broadens here beyond computer software, I
continue to employ this terminology for convenience, despite three linguistic connota-
tions with which I am uncomfortable: first, that readers, listeners, viewers, etc. merely
"use" the "thing" that publishers produce, in a narrow instrumental sense, second,
that such "use" is regular or habitual, and third, that only one person may "use" a
work at a given time.
125. See infra Part IV.A.
126. The following categorizes new shrinkwrap forms based on media and technol-
ogy rather than on types of work or information. There may be profit in analyzing the
frequency with which the new forms are attached to different species of information,
by different types of actors. The examples below suggest, I think, that while differ-
ences in detail may be evolving, the idea of new shrinkwrap practice, of legal-ware, is
rapidly becoming a universal phenomenon.
127. Bell, supra note 27, at 560 (describing "automated rights management"); see
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 28, at 983-89; Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace, supra note 18 (manuscript at 11); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How
Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publish-
ing, 12 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 137, 139-40 (1997); Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. Am.,
March 1997, at 78, 79. The broader term "copyright protection" appears in various
legislative proposals to regulate the technology. See infra note 438 and accompanying
text. As a counter to the benign characterization of these technologies as "trusted"
systems, one might describe them as "copyright surveillance" or "copyright control"
systems. The technologies vary, from codes attached to pieces of individual content
that report their status and form a foundation for commercial transactions, see, eg.,
Merges, End of Friction, supra note 28, at 117 (describing how self-reporting content
systems could lower costs associated with information exchanges); The International
DOI Foundation, The Digital Identifier (DOI) System (last modified Sept. 22, 1998)
<http://www.doi.org> (describing the Digital Object Identifier System), to "Things,"
object-oriented programming tools for the World Wide Web, see Parable, ThingMaker
(visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http'/wwv.thingwvorld.com/hello/thingmakerl.html>, to
"cryptolopes," secure virtual containers to safeguard information, access to which can
be metered, see IBM, IBM Network Computing (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'//
www.software.ibm.com/security/cryptolope>, and other implementations of encryp-
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shrink-wrap,"' 2 not only anticipate and often implement non-negotia-
ble terms that the user must accept in connection with access to the
information, but also may operate as invisibly and as automatically as
the flow of electrons that constitute the digital information itself,12 9
making and accepting offers, bargaining over terms, and asserting and
enforcing rights to payment-all in accordance with instructions pro-
vided earlier and with learned behavior. 130 The substance that the
technology protects is in a sense immaterial. Such systems are equally
adept at managing distribution of and access to copyrighted works,
such as computer programs, uncopyrightable works, such as unpro-
tected databases, and unpatented processes and formulas, such as
trade secrets.
"Trusted systems" raise difficult questions concerning the extent to
which private regulation via technology ought to be constrained by
public law,131 but the specter of such systems displacing "real-space"
human behavior governed by legal rules may be overestimated. First,
tion algorithms, to proposals for network architectures that claim to facilitate client-
to-client (human or automated) "bargaining" over access to and use of information.
The American Bar Association has launched a "Software Agents Project" to study
the legal ramifications of using "electronic agents" for business purposes. See Martin
R6scheisen, FIRM: A Network-Centric Design for Relationship-Based Rights Man-
agement (1997) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University), available at <http:/I
pcd.stanford.edu/rmr/thesis>; Electronic Contracts Work Group, American Bar Asso-
ciation, Software Agents and the Law (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.tiac.net/biz/
danielg/agents>. The concept also embraces such technologies as digital watermark-
ing, see, e.g., Digimarc Corp., It's What You Don't See That Counts (visited Nov 30,
1998) <http://www.digimarc.com/> (discussing "Digimarc-enhanced" imaging, a com-
puter "message," not visible to the naked eye, embedded in an image), and "stream-
ing" of code and data, downloading bits of information across a network as they are
used, which may incorporate encrypted data that is used to monitor re-use of the
downloaded material, see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 5 n.9, on file with
author) [hereinafter, Cohen, Self-Help].
128. Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 292 n.121; see also Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 28, at 1002 (referring to copyright manage-
ment systems as "standardized adhesion contracts in digital form").
129. In yet another sense, then, a system of protection designed in large part to
promote human interaction and endeavor ends up in the service of virtual systems
and beings. Cf. Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a text derived from the thoughts received from celestial beings is enti-
tled to copyright protection).
130. This species of software is known as "intelligent agents," or "Distributed Arti-
ficial Intelligences." See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelli-
gences, 11 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 147, 152 (1996).
131. Compare Cohen, Self-Help, supra note 127 (manuscript at 43-52) (discussing
the way the public/private distinction mediates the relationship between copyright
and contract), and Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 18, at 86 (arguing that
"private ordering necessarily presupposes a prior public commitment to recognizing
and enforcing a particular distribution of entitlement"), with Bell, supra note 27, at
581-90 (arguing that trusted systems are consistent with the social welfare function
assumed by copyright law) and Mark Gimbel, Note, Some Thoughts on the Implica-
tions of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1671 (1998)
(arguing in favor of trusted systems from a copyright perspective).
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use of any of these technologies requires some "opt-in" by the user.
To use IBM Cryptolope technology, I must download cryptolope
software; to use Marimba's streaming software, I must download the
Marimba "tuner"; before I can access the secure Cisco Systems "Cisco
Connection" network of support services, I must be a Cisco Systems
customer and register with the company. 132 When I do so, I still en-
counter a text-based shrinkwrap form, a sort of meta-shrinkwrap, to
be sure, but an opportunity to exercise a choice and for the legal sys-
tem to examine and regulate human behavior rather than technol-
ogy. 133 Second, as an empirical matter, the extent to which any
substantial amount of information is available solely in digital form or
via a digital computer network, access to which is mediated by a
mandatory automated licensing system, is unclear. Networked stor-
age of digital information has vastly reduced the cost of locating, re-
trieving, and accessing large quantities of information. Books and
other information in physical form, however, continue to play an im-
portant role."3 We may be headed toward a world of "open" and
"closed" information systems. 35 That is not the same as a world of
purely private information, or public information managed solely
under privately dictated terms that lie beyond the reach of public law.
Such a division does appear to preserve the continuing validity of ex-
amining, through public law, the extent to which information space
should remain open.'36
132. See Cisco, Cisco CCO Non-Disclosure Agreement (visited Sept. 25, 1998)
<http://www.cisco.com/public/docstnda.html>.
133. The extent to which this will continue to be true is technologically driven. As
such systems are embedded in other products and electronic services, the opportunity
functionally to opt-in or opt-out of the monitoring technology may be reduced or
even disappear. See also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (forbidding tampering with copy protection technologies); infra note
438 (discussing the Act).
134. See Geoffrey Nunberg, The Places of Books in the Age of Electronic Reproduc-
tion, Representations, Spring 1993, at 13, 13-16.
135. See Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 79, at 1407-11 (describing the po-
tential for, and pitfalls of, cyberspace zoning); O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra
note 51, at 701-04 (anticipating the use of "fencing" technologies in cyberspace); Per-
ritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 323-24 (noting possible differences in
protection of intellectual property in open and closed systems). So far, at least, there
seems to be a significant public component to the types of information that lies largely
(at least potentially) within a more or less technologically "closed" sphere. Perhaps
the largest closed networks in existence at present, the WESTLAW and Lexis-Nexis
information databases, consist almost entirely of information that is either published
elsewhere or that lie, as a matter of law, in the public domain. Both, moreover, con-
tinue to move away from the pure closed, proprietary network architecture that char-
acterized each of them initially and toward more open, Internet-based platforms
where text-based shrinkwrap continues to play an important role. See Reed Elsevier
Inc., Lexis-Nexis (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; West Group,
Westlaw.com (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http.//vww.westlaw.com>.
136. One might legitimately question whether this argument adequately responds
to private restraints on the distribution of and access to scientific research. See
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 152-55 (arguing for special attention to ac-
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b. "Web-wrap" or "net-wrap" notices and agreements consist of
sets of terms and conditions posted on sites on the World Wide Web
that purport to govern use of information found within the site and
the conduct of visitors. Under some circumstances, the web-wrap is
designed by analogy to "key-wrap" or "click-wrap" agreements.
Before proceeding further into the site, the user is prompted to view a
screen of terms and must click "I Agree.' 1 37 For other sites, the web-
wrap looks and acts more like a copyright notice for a book. Through
a page of text that is accessible through a link or notice located some-
where on the site's home page (but that usually is not available in full
on the home page itself), visitors to the site are deemed, 38 by virtue
of entering the site or remaining on it, to have consented to whatever
terms the site owner posts.
Specific terms vary in their definitions of appropriate use of web-
sites or information such cites contain. Law firms may disclaim any
intention to form an attorney-client or other confidential relation-
ship.'39 Commercial and non-commercial sites use their web-wrap
cess of scientific and educational information in an intellectual property regime con-
cerning the legal protection of databases). With respect to published research, this
objection falls within the scope of the shrinkwrap problem as this Article as a whole
considers it. With respect to unpublished research, the primary issue seems not to be
private institutional restrictions on public use of research results, but instead the cir-
cumstances under which such data ought to be the subject of commercial exploitation.
137. This is perhaps most common for websites with "adult" content and is largely
both a legacy of the Communications Decency Act, which, prior to its being substan-
tially invalidated by the Supreme Court, see Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2348
(1997), provided a defense to operators of "indecent" and "obscene" websites based
on good faith efforts to limit access to their sites by minors, and a practice that antici-
pates further attempts to regulate the Internet based on the extent to which it makes
sexually explicit material available to children.
138. To "deem" is "to treat [a thing] as being something that it is not, or as possess-
ing certain qualities that it does not possess." Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Mod-
ern Legal Usage 254 (2d ed. 1995). But see Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (noting the probable validity of a
breach of contract claim based on a "click-wrap" agreement).
139. See, e.g., Debevoise & Plimpton, The Law Firm of Debevoise & Plimpton (vis-
ited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.debevoise.com> ("The information provided to you
at this site does not create an attorney-client relationship with D&P, nor does it sub-
stitute for the provision of legal advice."). Perhaps it should not be a surprise that
examples drawn from law firms offer a blend of ambiguous drafting and preoccupa-
tion with the commercial dimensions of law practice. The Debevoise & Plimpton
website further states: "End users may view and use the contents of this site for per-
sonal uses only. All other uses are prohibited." Id. Morrison & Foerster provides its
World Wide Web site "for informational purposes only." Morrison & Foerster LLP,
Morrison & Foerster (visited Sept. 24, 1997) <http://www.mofo.com/mofo/home/copy-
right.html>. Others take a less restrictive approach. Dorsey & Whitney "encourages
you to copy documents and information published on its home page for your usage,
provided that the above copyright notice and any other proprietary notices, including
this permission notice, appear. All other rights reserved." Dorsey & Whitney LLP,
Dorsey & Whitney (visited Feb. 11, 1998) <http://www.dorseylaw.com/copy.html>.
Morrison & Foerster, however, "disclaims any implied warranties, including warran-
ties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose." Morrison & Foerster,
supra. Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati states: "This web site is not intended to be
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terms to limit commercial use or other re-use of both factual, that is,
non-copyrightable, and arguably "creative" or "expressive," that is,
copyrightable, material posted on the sites.'40 Ticketmaster, for exam-
ple, which has been embroiled in a dispute with Microsoft over
Microsoft's attempts to maintain a "hyperlink" between a Microsoft-
owned website containing entertainment information and Tick-
etmaster's ticket-selling site, now posts a web-vrap notice that, among
other things, restricts visitors to the Ticketmaster site from maintain-
ing such links.'41 Strict limits on commercial re-use in particular are
advertising and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati does not wish to represent anyone
desiring representation based upon viewing this website in a state where this website
fails to comply with all laws and ethical rules of that state." Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
& Rosati, About the Firm (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'J/www.%%,sgr.com/disclaim.htm>.
140. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.comn (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http'//
www.amazon.com/exec/obidoslsubst/misc/copyright.html> (on-line bookseller) ("Per-
mission is granted to electronically copy and to print in hard copy portions of this
Web site for the sole purpose of placing an order with Amazon.com or using this Veb
site as a shopping resource."); Cable News Network, Inc., CNN Interactive Service
Agreement (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'//vwwv.cnn.com/interactive-legal.html> ("CNN
owns a copyright in the selection, coordination, arrangement and enhancement of
such content, as well as in the content original to it.... Subscriber may download
copyrighted material for Subscriber's personal use only."); Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., Consumer Reports Online (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http'/www.consumer-re-
ports.org/visnot.html> ("This site is available only for your personal, noncommercial
use."). Consider, as well, this shrinkwrap:
All content on this Service is copyrighted as a collective work of
[ZiffDavis] pursuant to applicable copyright law... Users of the Service
may use the Content only for their personal, noncommercial use.
You may not modify, publish, transmit, transfer or sell, reproduce, create
derivative works from, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit any
of the Content, in whole or in part, except as expressly permitted in the
Agreement.
ZDNet, Chumbocom (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http:/wwwv.zdnet.com/findititerms.html>
(Internet services and software distributor).
141. See Ticketmaster Corporation, Tickniaster Online (visited Sept. 24, 1998)
<http://www.ticketmaster.com> ("Use of this site is subject to express terms and con-
ditions. By continuing past this page, you expressly agree to be bound by those terms
and conditions."); see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP
(C.D. Cal. filed May 9, 1997) (alleging that Microsoft has established unauthorized
links to Ticketmaster's Web page); O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary, supra note 53,
at 634-37 (describing the Ticketmaster/Microsoft litigation); Ticketmaster Corpora-
tion, 7Tcketmaster Online Terms and Conditions (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http:/I
www.ticketmaster.com/terms2.html> (stating Ticketmaster's acceptable use agree-
ment). A similar case was brought by the owners of ExpertPages.com. See Advice &
Counsel, Expert Pages (last modified September 24, 1998) <http://expertpages.com/
anti-webpiracylbuckalew.htm> ("By accessing Expert Pages for Free, visitor confirms
that his/her use is for purposes of retaining an expert or evaluating this site and agrees
that s/he will not use any information on this site for marketing or solicitation."); see
also Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-96-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 1997) (dismissing a complaint against a competing website owner who
copied material from Expert Pages for lack of personal jurisdiction). Not all web-
wrap notices are so formal. See, e.g., CBS Worldwide Inc., Copyright: The Golden
Rules of the CBS Site (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http:l/Vwv.cbs.com/prdl/nowcopy-
right.copyl> ("Here's the scoop... straight from the home office in New York, New
York!!!"). In another location, CBS changes its tone, but not its tune. See CBS
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often associated with websites that provide data or information that is
primarily factual and thus likely benefits from little or no copyright
protection. 142 Websites that more clearly contain significant amounts
of copyrightable material may often contain equally or more restric-
tive legends concerning their use. Salon Magazine, an on-line maga-
zine, confines its notice to the simple statement that "[r]reproduction
of material from any Salon pages without written permission is strictly
prohibited.' 1 43 Disney posts a particularly onerous set of terms, which
includes the proviso that
No material from DISNEY.COM or any Web site owned, operated,
licensed, or controlled by DISNEY may be copied, reproduced, re-
published, uploaded, posted, transmitted, or distributed in any way,
except that you may download one copy of the materials on any
single computer for your personal, non-commercial home use only
Worldwide Inc., Copyright (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http:Ilwww.cbs.comlprdllnowl
copyright.copy2> ("[Y]our access and use of the Site is subject to the following terms
and conditions ... and all applicable laws. By accessing and browsing the Site, you
accept, without limitation or qualification, the Terms and Conditions.").
142. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier Inc., Martindale-Hubbell Terms & Conditions (visited
Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.martindale.com/sitelterms.html> (regarding its list of
attorneys).
[A] nonexclusive, nontransferable, limited license to view, reproduce, print,
and distribute insignificant portions of materials retrieved from this Site [is
granted] provided (a) it is used only for informational, non-commercial pur-
poses.... Except as expressly provided above, no part of this Site, including
but not limited to materials retrieved therefrom and the underlying code,
may be reproduced, republished, copied, transmitted, or distributed in any
form or by any means. In no event shall materials from this Site be stored in
any information storage and retrieval system without prior written permis-
sion from Martindale-Hubbell.
Id.; see Dell Computer Corporation, Dell Products (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://
www.dell.com/dell/legal/disclwww.htm> (manufacturer of computer equipment);
Fisher Scientific Company, Fisher Scientific-Legal Notices (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http:/
/www.fisherl.com/notice.html> (catalog of scientific instruments) ("'These materials
are provided by Fisher Scientific as a service to the public and are to be used for
personal informational purposes only. Reproduction without the express written per-
mission of Fisher Scientific is strictly prohibited."). Dell specifically states:
Except as stated herein, none of the material may be copied, reproduced,
distributed, republished, downloaded, displayed, posted or transmitted in
any form or by any means, including, but not limited to, electronic, mechani-
cal, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permis-
sion of Dell or the copyright owner. Permission is granted to display, copy,
distribute and download the materials on this Site for personal, non-com-
mercial use only provided you do not modify the materials ....
Dell Computer Corporation, supra.
143. Salon Internet Inc., Salon Magazine (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http:l
www.salonmagazine.com>. Compare this with Salon's rival, Slate, owned by
Microsoft. Slate's copyright notice links to the all-purpose license agreement applica-
ble to material on all Microsoft servers, including those which supply copies of
Microsoft program code. See Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Information on Terms
of Use (visited Mar. 13, 1998) <http://www.microsoft.com/MISC/COPY-
RIGHT.HTM>; Slate, Slate-BoilerSlate (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://
www.slate.com/Services/BoilerSlate/BoilerSlate.asp>.
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.... For purposes of these terms, the use of any such material on
any other Web site or networked computer environment is
prohibited. 1"
In addition, website owners, whether protecting expressive or factual
information, may try to create "rights" in their information that exist
neither under the Copyright Act nor at common law. The San Jose
Mercury News, the leading daily newspaper in the Silicon Valley, posts
a notice on the home page of its website stating: "The information
you receive online from Mercury Center is protected by the copyright
laws of the United States. The copyright laws prohibit any copying,
redistributing, re-transmitting, or re-purposing of any copyright-pro-
tected material."'145
c. Books and other printed works, the most traditional of copy-
righted works, are increasingly accompanied by copyright notices that
not merely state the identity of the copyright owner but that purport
to restrict unauthorized re-use of the copyrighted material.1 46 Con-
sider the following representative language, found in a recent
casebook on intellectual property law: "No part of this publication
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, elec-
tronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any informa-
tion storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from
144. Disney, Terms and Conditions of Use (last modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http'//
www.disney.com/Legal/conditions_of_use.html>.
145. San Jose Mercury News, Mercury Center (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http.//
www.sjmercury.com/>. The print version of the newspaper does not carry a similar
notice.
146. A restrictive notice has an advantage over a purported license in that it is
intended to apply against all possessors of the work, not merely against those to
whom the work is transferred. Digital shrinkwrap is supposed to operate the same
way. If a computer program contains a pop-up license screen that requires acknowl-
edgment before the program will proceed, anyone who uses that program and ac-
knowledges the screen is, in theory, bound to the license. Traditional distinctions in
copyright doctrine between (nonbinding) notices and (binding) licenses, see Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908), likely still have doctrinal vitality. In
Bobbs-Merrill, a publisher inserted a notice in a book that any retail sale of the book
at a price less than one dollar constituted copyright infringement. See id. at 341. The
Supreme Court held that the notice was unenforceable; the initial sale of each volume
of the book exhausted the publisher's rights in that volume and barred the publisher
from enforcing any post-sale restrictions. See id. at 350-51. The Court thus established
the first sale doctrine, distinguishing this case from one involving a license, involving
covenants to which the acquirer would assent. See supra note 45 and accompanying
text (noting the continued vitality of the "first sale" doctrine). The prevalence and
terms of shrinkwrap notices as well as licenses suggest that those distinctions are erod-
ing in practice. Under ProCD, such erosion may increasingly be reflected in doctrine.
This concern may not be new, see Leon R. Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. Chi. L
Rev. 203, 203 (1954) (suspecting that restrictive copyright notices cause writers to be
"cowed into the belief that a reasonable use of copyrighted materials of others... is
not safe without permission from the owners of the copyright ...."), but it is un-
doubtedly much more substantial now than ever.
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the publisher. 14 7 Similar restrictions are likely to become increas-
ingly common and prominent, with musical and pre-recorded visual
147. Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age at
iv (1997). Restrictive legends hold powerful sway over all authors, including those
such as Professors Lemley and Merges, two of the authors of this casebook, who have
written thoughtfully and at length about the problems that shrinkwrap licenses pose
for copyright law. As with the web-wraps cited above, the intended or anticipated
audience for the work plays some part in calculating the type of notice to use. From
another casebook, Cyberlaw:
This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the
written permission of the publisher ... except for brief excerpts in connec-
tion with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of
information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software,
or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed
is forbidden.
Jonathan Rosenoer, Cyberlaw: The Law of the Internet at iv (1996). Like an increas-
ing number of law reviews, the law review of the University of Wisconsin includes the
following notice on its title page:
Wisconsin Law Review articles in which the University of Wisconsin holds
copyright may be duplicated for classroom use, provided that (1) each copy
is distributed at or below cost, (2) the author and the Wisconsin Law Review
are identified, (3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy, and (4)
the Wisconsin Law Review is promptly notified of the use.
1997 Wis. L. Rev. 865 (title page of the issue). Works of literature posted in digital
format may call for an intermediate form of notice: "Texts may be printed out or
saved for teaching or research, providing that the rights of original copyright holders
are not infringed. Such copyrights are clearly identified in the database." Chadwyck-
Healey Ltd., Literature Online, Terms and Conditions (visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http://
lion.chadwyck.com/frames/html/copyrite.htm>. Evolving norms for books are typi-
fied by copyright notices for three books written by Professor Edward Tufte of Yale
University. The first two, Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Infor-
mation (1983) and Edward R. Tufte, Envisioning Information (1990), originally bore
"standard" copyright notices. The third, Edward R. Tlfte, Visual Explanations
(1997), bore a new notice:
This work may not be copied, reproduced, or translated in whole or in part
without written permission of the publisher, except for brief excerpts in con-
nection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use with any form of information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation or whatever, computer software,
or by similar or dissimilar methods now known or developed in the future is
also strictly forbidden without the written permission of the publisher.
Id. Compare, as well, notices in different editions of Douglas Adams's science fiction.
The following is from the original Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (1979): "All
rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any
form whatsoever." From Six Stories by Douglas Adams: The Ultimate Hitchhiker's
Guide (1996) (collecting and reprinting the entire series): "No part of this book may
be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical
including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval sys-
tem, without permission in writing from the publisher." In both cases, the change
seems clearly to respond to, and to discourage, the likelihood that the text would be
scanned onto computers.
1066 [Vol. 67
recordings,"4s which, like books, have traditionally been distributed
publicly through sales rather than licenses.'49
The absence of privity has in principle presented book publishers
with the same problem faced by computer software developers. The
relatively clear distinctions in technology and resulting norms of
books were confirmed in different license and notice practices of
software publishers and book publishers. The uses of digital technol-
ogy are changing the print environment in at least two ways. First, the
possibility that printed works will be cheaply converted to digital form
without the consent of the copyright holder means that free riding and
piracy costs for print publishers approach those faced by software
publishers. Second, in a different sense, the print community is wel-
coming digital technology. Authors, particularly novelists, increas-
ingly sell books not just to print publishers but simultaneously to
movie producers and computer game developers, exploiting digital
markets for their works as part of the initial exchange of intellectual
property rights. Magazines and newspapers publish digital archives of
back issues on the World Wide Web, often charging for access to the
back issues, but not for access to recent versions. For most printed
works, at present, existing distribution processes limit the publisher's
ability to refine a contractual mechanism as primitive as a shrinkwrap
148. Digital technology is changing the prior conditions that made restrictive no-
tices or licenses unnecessary. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L Rev.
281,299-300 (1970) [hereinafter Breyer, Uneasy Case for Copyright] (noting that lead-
time advantages and strategic pricing may give the publisher adequate incentive to
introduce new works).
149. Cassette decks raised the specter of large scale piracy of pre-recorded music
long before digital technology appeared, leading to prompt statutory regulation of
digital recording technology itself. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). So while no-
tices of use limitations on digital music media may be lagging behind, rather than
ahead of, the threat of piracy in the digital environment, producers may be recovering
their investments, and profiting, via statutory royalties. The Rolling Stones's 1997
Bridges to Babylon compact disc, for example, notes in very small print: "Unauthor-
ized reproduction of this recording is prohibited by Federal law and subject [sic] to
criminal prosecution." The Rolling Stones, Bridges to Babylon (Virgin Records
America, Inc. 1997) (back cover of the CD cover). The notice is visible but readable
(though only with a magnifying glass) through the exterior clear packaging of the
product. Similar notices are sometimes printed on the compact disk itself. The in-
creasing availability of recorded music via the World Wide Web, however, has pro-
duced web-wrap notices comparable to those quoted above. This is, in short,
shrinkwrap radio. See, eg., broadcast.com inc., Broadcast.Com Ternms and Conditions
(visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http-//wwv.broadcast.com/about/terms.html> (providing
"streamed" radio broadcasts and claiming that "[m]aterial from the Site or any Web
site owned, operated, licensed, or controlled by broadcast.com may not be copied,
reproduced, republished, uploaded, posted, transmitted, or distributed in any way").
Shrinkwrap television may not be far behind. The technologies of digital, pay-per-
view, and other forms of both broadcast and cable television could easily be adapted
to support shrinkwrap use regulation. As the FCC considers regulation of technical
standards for digital set-top boxes, copy protection-shrinkwrap television-is on its
agenda. See Carriage of Transmissions of the Digital Television Broadcast Stations, 13
F.C.C.R. 15092 (1998).
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license. The restrictive notice, however, is no less effective than
software shrinkwrap in conveying the message that use prerogatives
concerning this information remain with the publisher. 150 The in-
tended impact on conventions of information use is clear. The pub-
lisher is no longer merely declaring its rights (the right not to have the
book scanned onto a network server, or the right to adapt the novel as
a computer game). Instead, it is attempting to enlist the user or
reader in an involuntary bargain 15 to protect those rights. With the
spread of digital technology and the extension of shrinkwrap that
emerged with original digital content, computer software, books, mu-
sic, and fims1 z are in effect being "licensed" to users153 through
shrinkwrap.
150. The Economist, for example, includes the following legend on the Table of
Contents page of its printed version: "No reproduction is permitted in whole or part
without the express consent of The Economist Newspaper Limited." The Economist,
Sept. 19-25, 1998, at 7, 7. The electronic edition of the magazine includes the follow-
ing notice:
Unless otherwise stated, the copyright and similar rights in all material pub-
lished on the Site are owned by The Economist or its licensors. You are
permitted to print or download extracts from this material for your personal
use only. None of this material may be used for any commercial or public
use. No part of the Site or any material appearing on the Site may be repro-
duced on, stored in or transmitted to any other web site. No material ap-
pearing on the Site may be disseminated in any form, either electronic or
non-electronic, nor included in any retrieval system or service without the
prior written permission of The Economist and the payment of a specified
fee.
The Economist Newspaper Limited, The Economist (visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http://
www.economist.com>. Other publishers use the opposite model. The most recent
edition is available only to subscribers; back issues are available for free.
151. Not a legal bargain, but a bargain concerning the scope of the convention con-
cerning acceptable use.
152. Pre-recorded videotapes typically bear a notice that the film is "licensed for
home [or personal] use/exhibition only." But see Robert A. Rosenbloum, The Rental
Rights Directive: A Step in the Right and Wrong Directions, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J.
547, 567 n.108 (1995) (describing and quoting the 1983 congressional testimony of
Walt Disney Attorney Peter Nolan to the effect that "shrinkwrapping" videotapes is
not feasible); see also infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing how con-
ventions of protection change over time with use and re-use).
153. The more elaborate and custom-written the notice, the more it may feel like a
"legitimate," "legal," or "negotiated" license. The author draws the reader into the
fiction of a unique, one-to-one relationship. Consider the following:
No part of this book may be reproduced, replicated, reiterated, duplicated,
conduplicated, retyped, transcribed by hand (manuscript or cursive), read
aloud and recorded on audio tape, platter, or disk, lipsynched, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including ge-
netic, chemical, mechanical, optical, xerographic, holographic, electronic,
stereophonic, ceramic, acrylic, or telepathic (except for that copying permit-
ted by Sections 107 and 108 of U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers
for the public press who promise to read the book painstakingly all the way
through before writing their reviews) without prior written permission from
the Publisher.
Hillel Schwartz, The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsim-
iles 4 (1996). This is amusing, particularly given the subject matter of the book-the
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d. Database access, information service, and interactive World
Wide Web service agreements make shrinkwrap applicable to compi-
lations of fact and to expression generated, not by the publishers pro-
viding the information or services, but by the users themselves.
Combining these categories illustrates how shrinkwrap is being used
to establish private definitions and conventions of appropriate use re-
garding the input and output of the material covered so far. Access to
a compilation of fact was the context of ProCD. In that case, the
plaintiff had created a compilation of telephone numbers and distrib-
uted it on a CD-ROM accompanied by a notice that appeared on the
user's screen that, in part, prohibited noncommercial use of this
data.'" West's WESTMATE soft-vare, which a researcher must use
to access the WESTLAW database (largely a compilation of fact), 55
comes in a shrinkwrap package that contains a "no reverse engineer-
ing" restriction.'56 The WESTLAW database itself, moreover, con-
tains the following restriction: "No part of a WESTLAW transmission
may be copied, downloaded, stored in a retrieval system, further
transmitted or otherwise reproduced, stored, disseminated, trans-
ferred or used, in any form or by any means, except as permitted in
the WESTLAW Subscriber Agreement or with West's prior written
agreement.' 1 57 Note that this language acts and reads like a copyright
notice for a book more than it operates like a shrinkwrap form for
cultural meaning of "twins" of various types. When all is said and done, Schwartz's
reader still literally has "fair use" rights, even under this notice. But is that the under-
standing that this text is intended to generate?
154. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
155. The scope of Vest's proprietary interest in the public materials that it makes
available is the subject of much litigation and legislative attention. Most recently, a
panel of the Second Circuit held that West's copyright in its compilations of reported
decisions did not extend beyond the arrangement, indices, headnotes, and selection of
cases, that is, the information created or contributed by Vest. See Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F/3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir 1998).
156. See West Publishing Corp., WESTLAW Software License Agreement (1997)
(on file with author) ("User may not loan, lease, distribute or transfer the Software or
copies thereof to third parties, nor reverse engineer or otherwise attempt to discern
the source code of the Software.").
157. See West Publishing Corp., Westmate 6.1 Copyright Notice (1996) (on file with
author). The Subscriber Agreement does, however, expressly allow "fair use" under
the Copyright Act, but one must observe not only what the service says, but what it
does: the shrinkwrap "contractual" use restriction is coupled with the mandate that
the WESTLAW subscriber access the database via the WESTMATE software, the use
of which is limited to possessors of passwords. Thus, both code and contract act as
gatekeepers for material that, at most, has limited proprietary content and that, much
of the time, consists of public domain information. In ProCD, ProCD similarly tried
to protect its nonproprietary database of telephone numbers by bundling it with a
proprietary computer program that was used to access the database. See supra notes
82-93 and accompanying text. The data, however, were formatted in a way that pro-
ducing a different, but also effective, computer program to search the data was rela-
tively uncomplicated. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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software. 158 To control the risk of piracy, WESTLAW instead relies
on its technology. Apart from questions of enforceability, the notice
is a marker that signals the reader that WESTLAW has defined and
maintains control over use of the information. 59
For intermediaries and access providers, who control the means of
accessing data but do not create data themselves, shrinkwrap works in
reverse. Control over information or data use lies not in the hands of
the author and creator, but in the hands of the service provider. Thus,
for example, Erol's, an Internet Service Provider, includes the follow-
ing in its "Internet Access Agreement":
You agree that by posting or transmitting Content to any public
area (such as public chat rooms, message boards, newsgroups, web-
space or software libraries) you are requesting Erol's to make that
material available to other Internet users and that such access will
result in copies of your Content being transmitted to others. In or-
der to permit Erol's to publish your Content, you automatically
grant, or represent that the owner of any such Content has expressly
authorized you to grant, Erol's a royalty-free, perpetual, irrevoca-
ble, non-exclusive right and license to reproduce, publish, distribute,
perform and display such Content (in whole or in part) worldwide
to service your request.' 60
158. There may be, in other words, no requirement (as there was in ProCD) that
the user of a factual database acknowledge the restricted rights or expanded obliga-
tion. Advances in mechanisms of technological monitoring of information use may
moot the need for the second layer of legal form. The "open space" implications of
this development thus overlap with rather than only lead to arguments over the de-
gree to which the law should intervene to cure "market failure" that arguably impedes
investment in the creation of valuable databases. Compare Reichman & Samuelson,
supra note 8, at 137-62 (proposing a market protective legal regime for databases),
with Laura D'Andrea Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Statutory Protection for Databases:
Economic & Public Policy Issues (visited Sept. 25, 1998) <http://www.infoindustry.
org/ppgrc/doclib/grdocOl5.htm> (arguing in favor of database protection legislation).
In 1998, the House of Representatives considered a version of the "Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act" that would, among other things, forbid extracting or using "in
commerce, all or a substantial part ... of a collection of information gathered...
through the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause
harm to the actual or potential market... for a product or service that incorporates
that collection of information .... ." H.R. 2281, § 1302, 105th Cong. (1998). The Sen-
ate's version of this legislation did not include this protection for factual databases,
see S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998), and it was omitted from the bill signed by President
Clinton, see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998).
159. The notice, of course, serves a practical protective note vis-A-vis a particular
"user" as well as this more abstract function.
160. Erol's Internet, Erol's Internet Access Agreement (visited Nov. 19, 1997)
<http://www.erols.com/erols/index/agreement.htm>; see Netcom On-Line Communi-
cations Services, Inc., NETCOM On-Line Communication Services, Inc. Terms and
Conditions for Netcom Services (last modified Apr. 1, 1998) <http://www.netcom.com/
netcom/terms.html> (reserving Netcom's right to access and disclose information, in-
cluding "personal electronic communication passing through its network and any
other information it deems necessary or appropriate").
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Instead of accepting a license by using the software, here a user of
the service involuntarily grants a license. Because the default is public
distribution, one might argue that this outcome is better than that pro-
duced by "traditional" shrinkwrap. It is the same. Private parties de-
clare the scope of the public interest in the information. They assume
the privilege that was historically reserved to public institutions to ar-
ticulate what is "public," that is, free of control, and what is "pri-
vate."16' The form endorses and promotes the convention that it is
appropriate to document and define all permitted uses of the
material.162
Interactive services, the third of the three examples listed above,
make this concern even clearer. An increasing number of websites
allow or encourage visitors to post messages or files of various types
as part of the business conducted through the website or as a means of
encouraging discussion among visitors mediated by the site. Such sites
often post "conditions" of use that either require the poster to warrant
that if copyright interests are at stake, then the poster has obtained
express consent from relevant copyright owners for the material to be
posted, or appropriate the poster's proprietary interest in the posting
itself. ESPN's SportsZone site, for example, which includes "chat"
161. The role of public institutions has been not merely to declare a priori what
should be reserved as "public," but also to confirm social understandings of "public"
use. See Rose, Comedy, supra note 21, at 774-81 (arguing that law responds to evolv-
ing norms of "commerce" and "socializing behavior" in determining definitions of
"inherently public property").
162. Efforts by database providers to maximize control over the terms of access to
data are linked to efforts by access providers to distance themselves from data. The
terms of the ISP agreement likely respond to Religious Technology Center r. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), in which
the court held that an ISP would not be liable for hosting material that possibly in-
fringed copyrights owned by a third party, absent notice of possible infringement. See
id. at 1374. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act in effect codifies the Netcom rul-
ing. See supra note 158.
One traditional method of severing this connection, and preserving -the public do-
main," has been to assert a privilege for the reverse engineering of computer software
that acts as a gatekeeper as a means of preserving public access to unprotectable
information. Whether reverse engineering of computer software object code is "fair
use" of the code is a question answered generally in the affirmative. See, eg., Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
disassembly of programs is a fair use of a copyrighted work when it is the only way "to
gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer
program" and there is a legitimate need for access); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832,843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that "reverse engineering
object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is fair use"
(citation omitted)). Reverse engineering of computer code is, however, an expensive,
time-consuming, and difficult means of creating competitive and compatible software
programs. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Softvare Reverse Engineering in the Real
World, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 843, 843 (1994). As a practical matter, preserving the
ability to reverse engineer may not be enough to secure a viable "open space." The
defendant in ProCD was able to access ProCD's data even without reverse engineer-
ing ProCD's program. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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areas for visitor discussions, posts "Terms of Service" that state,
among other things,
Copyrighted material, including without limitation text, photo-
graphs, sound, video and music, may not be placed on the Service
without the express permission of the author or owner of the copy-
right of the material. Customer acknowledges that only the owner
or someone authorized by the owner to post the material may do
SO.
1 6 3
Disney posts this daunting statement:
If ... despite our request that you not send us any ... creative
materials, you send us creative suggestions, ideas, notes, drawings,
concepts, or other information (collectively, the "Submissions"), the
Submissions shall be deemed, and shall remain, the property of
DISNEY. None of the Submissions shall be subject to any obliga-
tion of confidence on the part of DISNEY, and DISNEY shall not
be liable for any use or disclosure of any Submissions. Without lim-
itation of the foregoing, DISNEY shall exclusively own all now
known or hereafter existing rights to the Submissions of every kind
and nature throughout the universe and shall be entitled to un-
restricted use of the Submissions for any purpose whatsoever, com-
mercial or otherwise, without compensation to the provider of theSubmissions."6
NBC television is equally explicit:
By posting messages, uploading files, inputting data, or engaging in
any other form of communication (a "Communication") through
this service, you are granting NBC a royalty free, perpetual, non-
exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to:
1. Use, copy, sublicense, adapt, transmit, publicly perform or dis-
play any such Communication; and
2. Sublicense to third parties the unrestricted right to exercise
any of the foregoing rights granted with respect to the
Communication.
The foregoing grants shall include the right to exploit any proprie-
tary rights in such Communication, including but not limited to
rights under copyright, trademark, servicemark, or patent laws
under any relevant jurisdiction.' 65
163. ESPN/Starwave Partners d/b/a ESPN Internet Ventures, Starwave Terms of
Service Agreement (last modified Jan. 12, 1998) <http://ESPN.SportsZone.com/
sitetools/terms.html>; see also Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft® Expedia® WebSite
Terms, Conditions, and Notices (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://expedia.msn.com/daily/
home/legal.htm> (posting, by an Internet travel agency, a similar statement).
164. Disney, Terms and Conditions of Use (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.dis-
ney.com/Legal/conditionsof_use.html>. These terms seem to far exceed those neces-
sary to defeat a claim concerning misappropriation or an implied contract to pay for
the poster's ideas. See Grubb v. NFL Properties, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1995),
affd, 88 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., 529 F. Supp. 1204(E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982).
165. National Broadcasting Company, NBC Terms of Use Agreement (visited Mar.
13, 1998) <http://www.nbc.com/nbc/disclaimer.nbc>.
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Until recently, individual readers and writers have had little reason
to suspect that publishers of existing works would be watching (liter-
ally or figuratively) to limit the re-use of small amounts of material in
new works. At worst, intermediaries (libraries, research centers,
photocopiers) were subject to increased monitoring. Those in-
termediaries did their best to shift the risks of copyright compliance to
the individual.166 Absent digitization of expression on a wide scale,
however, there remained more than a little room for uncontrolled,
unmonitored re-use. Digital technology heralds not a demise of these
intermediaries,167 but changes of their form and function and corre-
sponding changes to how copyright operates on the "user." Monitor-
ing technology-software and hardware-potentially decreases the
amount of uncontrolled use. Conceptual intermediaries-legal-
ware-figuratively monitor that which the technology does not liter-
ally monitor. Even where the intended result of the legal form is wide
distribution of the information or product, the use of shrinkwrap de-
clares that private use control, rather than publicly determined norms
of distribution and use, is the norm against which any particular use or
claim of infringement is measured.1"s The intermediate form is thus
166. For example, unsupervised photocopy machines in libraries are commonly la-
beled with a notice warning users of potential copyright infringement. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 108(d)(2), (e)(2) (1994) (providing for signs warning of copyright infringe-
ment in libraries and archive copy centers); 37 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1998) (same). These
sections enable certain libraries and archives to make photocopies of copyrighted
works from their collections at the request of library patrons, so long as the library's
photocopy center displays a notice warning patrons of potential infringement. More-
over, 17 U.S.C. § 108(f) states:
Nothing in this section (1) shall be construed to impose liability for copyright
infringement upon a library or archives or its employees for the un-
supervised use of reproducing equipment located on its premises: Provided,
that such equipment displays a notice that the making of a copy may be
subject to the copyright law.
17 U.S.C. § 108(f); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding the bulletin board oper-
ator not liable for copyright infringement due to lack of notice); Perritt, Property and
Innovation, supra note 6, at 314-18 (addressing the possibility of statutory immunity
for electronic intermediaries).
167. Digital technology may in fact heighten the power of intermediate firms and
organizations. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Anendment Intermediaries in the
Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1653, 1674-77 (1998) (noting the possibilities
that the Internet creates for user-directed re-intermediation); Joe Nickell, Samples
Silence Negativiand (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) <http:/www.wvired.cominesvneVs
email/explode-infobeat/culture/story/14765.html> (discussing the refusal of a CD
manufacturer to press a band's CD because of concern over copyright infringement
via music samples; the manufacturer's policy was based on "CD Plant Good-Business
Practices" issued by the Recording Industry Association of America).
168. The Free Software Foundation, which takes as its charter the proposition that
computer software should be free of anti-copying restrictions, uses a shrinkwrap form
for its GNU software that confirms how this proposition is implemented. See Free
Software Foundation, Inc., GNU General Public License (last modified Feb. 16, 1998)
<http://www.fsf.orgtcopyleft/gpl.htm>, reprinted in Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Li-
censing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 Stan. L Rev. 1487, 1515 (1997).
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not merely a distribution method, but a bearer of a normative
message: open space is, or at least should be, disallowed.
Looking at these forms not as such, but taking account of their spe-
cific terms, yields a similar conclusion. Shrinkwrap in its original form
and in its new expressions increasingly share a mechanism by which
the user formally accepts the terms proffered by the publisher or
agrees to return the work, a definition of the product or information
to which the terms apply, a full-blown enabling license (what the user
may do) as well as a restrictive license (what the user may not do),
transfer restrictions, and-most important here-risk allocation (war-
ranty and liability) provisions. 169 From the standpoint of the user, via
specific shrinkwrap terms, books are becoming software not only tech-
nologically and from the standpoint of relevant conventions of use
and re-use, 70 but conceptually as well.
That is, risk allocation provisions (limitations of warranty and liabil-
ity) are increasingly appearing in works of information other than
computer programs, particularly in websites and in books.171 This
For an argument that use of licenses, like the one promulgated by the Free Software
Foundation, ought to be encouraged, see Heffan, supra, at 1511-14.
169. See Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1242-48 (summarizing the
principal elements of most shrinkwrap licenses).
170. The collapse (intended by publishers) of cultural distinctions between "books"
and "programs" is perhaps best illustrated by the sample shrinkwrap license from
Borland International reproduced in Nimmer on Copyright:
[Y]ou must treat this software just like a book, except that you may copy it
onto a computer to be used and you may make archival copies of the
software for the sole purpose of backing-up our software and protecting
your investment from loss.
By saying, "just like a book," Borland means, for example, that this
software may be used by any number of people and may be freely moved
from one computer location to another, so long as there is no possibility of it
being used at one location while it's being used at another or on a computer
network by more than one user at one location. Just like a book can't be
read by two different people in two different places at the same time, neither
can the software be used by two different people in two different places at
the same time. (Unless, of course, Borland's copyright has been violated or
the use is on a computer network by up to the number of users authorized by
additional Borland licenses .... ).
5 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 27.02[B], at 27-14 to -15 (quoting Borland). The
notable text here is not Borland's restriction on how its software is used, but Bor-
land's not-so-subtle shift in the definition of the appropriate way to "use" a book.
Consider the effect, under this model, of the following possible notice: "You may
read this book silently, to yourself... and quote brief passages from it in reviews, but
do nothing else. You may transfer this book to another person so long as that person
expressly agrees to the foregoing restriction." Software publishers have been accused
of manipulating conventional understandings of information so that computer pro-
grams seem less like "machines" and more like "books" in order to justify treating
software as a proper subject matter of copyright. It is equally, if not more, the case
that publishers are manipulating those conventions to make books seem more like
machines. See infra note 174. In Borland's world, I envision examining copyright no-
tices to see whether I am permitted to read books aloud to my children.
171. Morrison & Foerster's website includes a notice that disclaims implied warran-
ties of fitness and merchantability. See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 139. CNN's
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may be so in part because the expansion of information distribution
across computer networks diminishes publishers' ability to control risk
based on distribution or marketing practices alone."7 It is difficult,
for example, to target the "audience" for a website in the same way
that modem advertising and marketing techniques can target products
to certain audiences.17 3 As a result, a publisher and its consumers are
unlikely to share any understanding about the "intended" use and
scope of acceptable re-use of the published information.17 4 Caps on
warranty and liability attempt, among other things, to shift the risk
associated with that gap from the publisher to the user. In addition,
however, applying risk-shifting terms to other works of information
re-values the information content itself, making it a commodity. 75 Li-
ability disclaimers attached to copies of software at least appear to
preserve the distinction between damage caused by the "thing" (the
disk, for example) embodying the information and the information it-
self. When that disclaimer appears on a "thing" that necessarily, of
itself, cannot likely do any damage-a book, a website-clearly the
implication is if the information itself is misused by a third party, such
misuse may cause harm.1
76
website does likewise. See Cable News Network, Inc., supra note 140. The American
Bar Association has worked out a recommended notice for inclusion in professional
texts that disclaims any intention to provide legal or other advice. It is a short step to
the more widespread inclusion of notices limiting liability in books, beginning with
"how to" manuals and guides, and on copies of pre-recorded movies or
videocassettes.
172. See Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 307-10 (describing possi-
ble non-legal alternatives for publishers to use to recapture such control); see also
Breyer, Uneasy Case for Copyright, supra note 148, at 294-300 (discussing the benefits
conferred on publishers by traditional distribution model).
173. Internet marketers, however, are striving to develop effective techniques to do
so. See, e.g., Firefly Network, Inc., Personalize Your Network (visited Mar. 23, 1998)
<http'//www.flrefly.net> (advertising a web service offering personalized content,
community, and services).
174. See ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (describ-
ing the use of shrinkwrap licenses as a device to segregate consumer and professional
markets).
175. See Radin, supra note 9, at 520-21 (arguing that socially commodified classes
of "fungible" information is an empirical proposition to be tested).
176. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc., Disclainer (visited Jan. 5, 1997) <http'J/wwv.yahoo.com/
docs/pr/disclaimer.html> ("Yahoo disclaims any liability for any damage arising out of
use of the Yahoo directory."). Some information, if "misused," arguably can cause
harm. See, e.g., Waller v. Osbourn, 763 F.Supp. 1144, 1153 (M.D. Ga. 1991), 763 F.
Supp. at 1153 (granting summary judgment against an allegation that the recording of
a song by Ozzy Osbourne incited the plaintiffs son to commit suicide), affd mere.,
958 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990,
1000 (W.D. Wis.) (granting a preliminary injunction against the publication of an arti-
cle describing instructions for the hydrogen bomb), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819
(7th Cir. 1979). Defamation law is constructed on the premise that under some cir-
cumstances, protected expression can be causatively linked to compensable injury.
Given the context of the disclaimers described in the text, it is doubtful that it is this
sort of liability that the publishers' counsel had in mind. The harm attributable to
defamation is harm inflicted by the publisher. The liability disclaimed under these
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Thus, these terms may reinforce the publisher's more explicit at-
tempts in shrinkwrap to define what amounts to the "intended" or
"appropriate" use of the information. If "information" is a "product"
in the sense intended by risk-shifting provisions, then the user of that
product expects and accepts instructions regarding its use, that is, the
enabling and disabling features of the license. Conceptually (though
not literally), this is a framework for rights and duties based not in
copyright but in tort, where the foreseeability of the harm governs the
scope of the tortfeasor's duty and where potential defendants can em-
ploy warnings concerning appropriate use to avoid or reduce their lia-
bility for damages.' 77  Shrinkwrap implicitly argues that
nonconsensual use constitutes a tort against the copyright holder.
Conventionally, dissemination and acceptance of that premise encour-
ages what shrinkwrap sets forth as, and what is therefore understood
to be appropriate and, by extension, law-abiding behavior, framed as
the "right" way to use the product. 78 This is a question that concerns
fundamentally private interests, not public values. My argument is
that over time, and applied more broadly and deeply, the practice of
legal-ware itself confirms this premise and thus defines the conven-
tions of copyright. Copyright is declared to be "about" the use and
distribution of information, not "about" the normative values associ-
ated with authors, creators, disclosure, and dissemination of creativity
and expression, nor anything else.
II. SOCIAL CONVENTIONS AND THE CONTEXT OF
COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT
The editorial page of the New York Times published a piece entitled
Deport the Bear! in which the author Edmund Morris offered wry ob-
servations on a request by the British government for the repatriation
shrinkwrap forms is liability inflicted by third parties using the published expression
as a tool.
177. The content vs. thing dichotomy harks back to ongoing ambiguity under copy-
right law concerning the copyright status of computer programs themselves. See Wein-
reb, Functional Expression, supra note 64, at 1180-93 (noting the tension between
"books," which are within copyright's scope, and "machines," which generally are
not). Rather than bringing computer programs closer to the sense of copyrightable
"books," from this standpoint shrinkwrap pushes other works of information toward
characterization as "machines." The effect is to legitimize the private ordering of
rights concerning those "machines." The extreme implications of this argument are
more troubling, as it leads toward principles of product liability and the extent to
which manufacturers may by contract shift to consumers the risks inherent in their
products. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986) (noting that strict liability arose from the policy judgment that consumers need
more protection from dangerous products than that provided by the law of warranty).
178. The objection will be made that no one reads shrinkwrap licenses anyway, let
alone understands them. There is little doubt, however, that users are aware that
shrinkwrap exists (even if most do not refer to it as such). The fact of shrinkwrap-
legal-ware, to repeat the metaphor-constrains as much as the particular terms
themselves.
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of the original stuffed Winnie-the-Pooh, Tigger, Kanga, and Eeyore
from a library in New York. He noted evidence that the animals had
been brought to the United States under questionable circum-
stances-"[b]y a publisher, no less-clear evidence of moral turpi-
tude"-and quoted four lines from a poem by Delmore Schwartz that
(Morris surmises) may have encouraged A.A. Milne's son to so dis-
pose of Pooh. The text that surprises, however, appears at the end of
the piece: "Delmore Schwartz excerpt (c) 1959 reprinted by permis-
sion of New Directions Publishing Corporation."' 179 The willingness
of The New York Times to obtain express permission for the use of
four lines of poetry in an opinion piece that pokes gentle fun at pub-
lishers, among other things, illustrates that more than just black letter
law and economic theory are involved in analyzing incentives to cre-
ate expressive works and providing opportunities to access and re-use
those works.'8 0 The discussion in part I concerning shrinkwrap prac-
tices and their impacts is below put into the context of the modem
copyright regime.
The proposition that copyright law consists of a balance of interests
is largely uncontested.' The traditional and still perhaps majority
179. Edmund Morris, Deport the Bear!, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1998, at A19. The
Tunes itself carries a notice, usually buried somewhere in the first few pages of the
newspaper, that states "The Associated Press is entitled exclusively to the use for
republication of all news dispatches credited to it or not otherwise credited in this
paper and local news of spontaneous origin published herein. Rights for republica-
tion of all other matter herein are also reserved." N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1998, at A4.
The on-line version of the Tunes includes a considerably more restrictive notice:
All materials contained on this site are protected by United States copyright
law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, pub-
lished or broadcast without the prior written permission of The New York
-unes Company....
However, you may download material from The New York Times on the
Web (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your
personal, noncommercial use only.
The New York Tunes Company, The New York Tnmes, Copyright Notice (visited Mar.
13, 1998) <httpJ/www.nytimes.com/subscribe/help/copyright.html>.
180. See I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1
Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2 (April 17, 1995) <http'J/wvw.urich.edu/-joit/vlil/hardy.html>
[hereinafter Hardy, Digitial World]; Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217 [hereinafter Hardy, Property (and Copyright)];
Perritt, Property and Innovation, supra note 6, at 272, 279 (noting features of markets
that may provide returns to information producers, without formal copyright
protection).
181. The constitutional provisions for copyright and patent protection includes ex-
press, but vague, limits on congressional authority: Congress may adopt legislation to
promote "the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies." U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 'iis authority must concurrently be balanced with
the demands of the First Amendment. Descriptively, the characterization of the re-
sult varies. See, eg., Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhigh-
way": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum L Rev. 1466, 1468
(1995) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway") (ar-
guing that fostering authorship remains a primary goal of copyright law, while the
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view of intellectual property law holds that the Copyright Act, 182 the
Patent Act,18 3 and related federal statutory regimes' 84 alone represent
unalterable congressionally-determined balances between the public
interest in access to the fruits of invention and creation and the appro-
priate private incentive for generating that invention and creation. 85
The constitutional grant of authority to enact legislation protecting in-
tellectual property delineates what is patentable and copyrightable
subject matter. It outlines what is within the scope of federal intellec-
tual property law, and to some extent, defines what intangible prop-
erty is legally protectable under any legal regime 186 and what must
rights of users remain secondary, because without authors, there would be no works);
Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1009, 1020-26 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits] (discussing how in the Copyright Act Congress
determined a balance between original and later authors); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The challenge of copyright is to strike the difficult balance between the interests of
authors.., and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas."); Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (balancing the interests
of authors with society's interest in the "free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce").
182. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
183. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
184. See, e.g., Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914
(granting protection, subject to limitations, to mask works in a semiconductor chip
product as well as exclusive, limited rights to a mask works owner).
185. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) ("[It is not our role to alter the
delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.").
186. The scope of federal preemption of state anti-copying and unfair competition
laws by the Patent Act remains less than settled. State "anti-copying" legislation is
preempted by federal law if it attempts to extend patent-like protection to subject
matter that lies beyond the scope of the Patent Act. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 229-31 (1964). The Patent Act does not, however, prevent the states from grant-
ing protection via trade secret law to unpatented processes. See Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974). Specialized state anti-copying protection
for unpatentable processes may be preempted. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-68 (1989). Under some circumstances, private
parties may contract around patent law, see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257, 261-62 (1979), and in some circumstances they may not, see, e.g., Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (holding that the contract doctrine of estoppel
could not prevent a party from asserting the invalidity of a patent as a defense); Bru-
lotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (stating that the contracts at issue were "a
bald attempt to exact the same terms ... after the patents had expired"); Everex Sys.
Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
federal law is binding in the assignment of patent licenses). In patent law, however,
preemption is a constitutional question. The Patent Act itself is silent as to its pre-
emptive effect. The Copyright Act contains an express preemption section. See 17
U.S.C. § 301. The reach of the preemptive effect of the Copyright Act, as a constitu-
tional matter, remains unclear. The Supreme Court has held in the copyright context
that the Constitution does not confer on Congress the exclusive power to legislate on
intellectual property matters. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973).
That case, however, was decided before the present Copyright Act was enacted in
1976. Did Congress, in the Copyright Act, intend to assert that the statute preempts
all that it constitutionally might? For arguments that non-statutory, constitutional
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remain part of the public domain. Within the confines of these two
statutes, the relatively short term of patent protection and high stan-
dards for obtaining a patent,8 7 the longer term of copyright protec-
tion, combined with the lower standard of copyrightability, and the
doctrine of fair use and other limitations on copyright owners' exclu-
sive rights,188 are the factors that define the outlines of appropriate
intellectual property equilibria.8 9 Private contracts and state law doc-
trines may assign rights within, but not beyond, the limits set by Con-
gress. For copyright law, the levers of public policy-expansion and
contraction of the public domain, of the term of protection, and of fair
use and other access rules-are the legitimate means for adjusting the
incentive/access equation to bring creative output and social welfare
into closer alignment.19 Applying this framework to shrinkwrap
leads to an argument that software developers and other publishers
have no legitimate claim to public enforcement of contracts that limit
access to facts within the public domain or that limit statutory fair use
of copyrighted works.
This formulation assumes that the Copyright Act accurately cali-
brates and implements the "right" social welfare function, the "bal-
ance," that our copyright system ought to serve. It is increasingly
apparent, however, that neither supposition likely holds. The "con-
ventions" that part I described are important components of the copy-
right "system," and a complete account of that "system" needs to
address how those conventions operate.' 91 More precisely, for exam-
preemption exists for copyright law, see Dan L. Burk, Protection of Trade Secrets in
Outer Space Activity: A Study in Federal Preemption, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 560, 593-
608 (1993), Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 78, at 365-66, and Karjala, Federal
Preemption, supra note 2, at 533-34. Even if such constitutional preemption exists,
however, its scope is unclear. See infra note 438 and accompanying text. 'he court in
ProCD analyzed the preemptive effect of the Copyright Act on use-restrictive terms
of the shrinkwrap license in question only under § 301 and (some would argue point-
edly) omitted considering possible constitutional arguments. See supra notes 82-93
and accompanying text.
187. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (stating conditions for issuance of patent); id. § 154
(creating the contents and term of a patent).
188. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (stating the subject matter of copyright); id. §§ 107-
112 (providing examples of limitations on exclusive rights); id. § 302 (describing the
duration of copyright for works created after January 1, 1978).
189. See, e.g., Dan Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38
U. Miami L. Rev. 769,785 (1984) ("The task [in copyright law] is not one of striking a
new balance between private and public interests. Rather, it is determining how new
machines fit into the existing balance.").
190. See, e.g., Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 Minn. L Rev. 417,440-
42 (1985) (setting out a four-part test to demonstrate that the public would benefit
from proposed legislative action concerning intellectual property).
191. Others take the constitutional and statutory framework of intellectual prop-
erty rights as a baseline from which publishers and consumers may, by contrast, de-
part. The scholarship illustrates how debating whether copyright rules are "default"
or "mandatory" rules is inevitably inconclusive. See, e.g., Karjala, Federal Preemption,
supra note 2, at 521 (arguing that copyright law cannot be a default position, at least
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ple, in the context of digital works, Professor Trotter Hardy has ar-
gued that the scope of intellectual property protection afforded the
publisher of a copyrightable work is a function of four things. First is
the extent of the protection afforded by the formal, public legal re-
gime. Second is the extent to which the publisher can secure protec-
tion via bilateral contract. Third is the sophistication of the
technology available to inhibit unauthorized reproduction of the work
(anti-free riding technology)." Finally, the fourth is the sophistica-
tion of reproduction technology itself (the technology of piracy). 193
Professor Hardy argues that as more expressive works are created or
made available in digital form, the increasing sophistication of the
technology of piracy and, in opposition, of anti-free riding technology,
will foster an increasing number of disputes between those who can
and want to opt out of a public intellectual property system in favor of
private, technological regulation and those who view copyright law as
for widely distributed works); O'Rourke, Market-Based Approach, supra note 5, at 86
(concluding that the better view is that of copyright as a set of default rules); Rice,
Digital Information, supra note 10, at 636-38 (arguing that the nature of computer
program code and the social interest in decompiling that code to discover "ideas"
embedded in computer programs dictate mandatory preemption of contract terms
that forbid reverse engineering or decompiling computer programs); Gary H. Moore
& J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution: New Life for 'Shrinkwrap'
Licenses?, Computer Law., Apr. 1996, at 1, 6 (stating that legislative history shows
that § 109 (first sale doctrine) and § 117 (rights of owners of computer programs) of
the Copyright Act were meant to be default rules). Default and mandatory rules
literature in general has recognized the need to examine that distinction in context
rather than in the abstract. See Ian Ayres, Comment, Preliminary Thoughts on Opti-
mal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 15-18 (1993) (stating that
the choice between rule and standard is related to parties' ability to contract around
legal principle); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 127 (1989) (noting that gap-
filling rules should respond to reasons for gaps in contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Social
Structure, Legal Structure, and Default Rules: A Comment, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 19,
24-28 (1993) [hereinafter Rakoff, Social Structure] (arguing that the default/
mandatory distinction needs to account for social construction of the context of the
legal principle).
192. For computer software, such technology includes older "copy protection" sys-
tems, which required that "authorized" computer users use a separate computer pro-
gram to "unlock" the program that they wanted to use, and recent "copyright
management" systems, which include a variety of software-based technologies to de-
fine the class of users authorized to access and use restricted information. See David
M. Hornik, Combating Software Piracy: The Softlifting Problem, 7 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
377, 413-14 (1994) (describing the failures of original copy protection schemes); supra
notes 127-38 and accompanying text. This class of measures also encompasses "archi-
tectural" solutions to the problems of free-riding and piracy. See Perritt, Property and
Innovation, supra note 6, at 290-93 (suggesting that in certain computer network envi-
ronments, technological features may increase "private" characteristics of copyright-
able works and reduce the need for legal entitlements to protect them).
193. See Hardy, Digital World, supra note 180, 6-7; see also Lessig, The Constitu-
tion of Code, supra note 81, at 185 (arguing that legal, technological, and social means
of regulating cyberspace are not necessarily interchangeable).
1080 [Vol. 67
LEGAL-WARE
embodying certain ideals of the public interest that neither producers
nor consumers may avoid.
194
Generally, such a transactional explanation of intellectual property
law and of copyright law in particular normatively tends to relegate
what I have called open-space concerns to a secondary role. At worst,
it erases those concerns altogether. 95 Open space is what remains,
rhetorically, conceptually, and doctrinally speaking, after the transac-
tors (and courts that affirm their transactions) have departed the
field.19 6 This perspective tends to assume that the "bargains" that
constrain or extend given intellectual property rights are purposeful,
voluntary, and genuine. No one uses or may use intellectual property
rights who is not a knowing transactor in them. In other words, we
are all self-aware potential free-riders, if not potential pirates, or both,
living on the edge between (licensed) legitimacy and (unlicensed) un-
certainty, or malfeasance.
This is not, however, how the world actually works. These are not
the assumptions upon which works of information are universally cre-
ated and used. Vast quantities of intellectual property and especially
copyright "rights" are acquired on a daily basis by readers, viewers,
listeners, and users who have only the vaguest idea that they are ac-
quiring something more than a mere book, newspaper, or computer
program.197 Intellectual property rights are in transit on a vast scale,
yet wholesale or partial copying (or other forbidden re-use) does not,
as a rule, occur. 198 More than either formal publicly declared rights or
194. Professor Hardy predicts that as a result of the increase of the sophistication of
reproduction technology, conflicts between intellectual property protection via con-
tract and intellectual property protection via legal rule-manifested in litigation over
federal preemption-is likely to increase. See Hardy, Digital World, supra note 180,
91 47-48. Elsewhere, Professor Hardy's views about the correct results in such cases
are made clear. He argues that copyright law ought not to limit copyright owners'
rights to expand their copyright monopoly via contract. See Hardy, Property (and
Copyright), supra note 180, at 224.
195. See Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 28, at 994-96.
196. The degree to which a licensing market exists or might exist for a copyrighted
work increasingly weighs against a finding of nonconsensual fair use. See American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a
loss of potential licensing revenue weighs against a finding of fair use); infra Part
II.B.1.
197. This is equally true, if not more so, with respect to patents, but patent law
includes no provision for "fair use" during the life of a patent to which an idea of
open space might attach.
198. This statement skirts the debate concerning the consequences of case law that
suggests that mere use of a computer program involves the creation of a "copy" that,
unless expressly authorized by the copyright owner, infringes. See Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). See generally I. Trotter Hardy,
Computer RAM "Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical Perspectives on Caching as a Mi-
crocosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. Dayton L Rev. 423, 426-29 (1997)
(arguing that the implications of MAI and Triad should be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act addresses this problem in part by
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transaction rules are involved in the copyright regime; behaviors and
understandings abet legal and technological protections from free-rid-
ing and piracy. These understandings assure creators an appropriate
return, 99 or provide other incentives to produce works of informa-
tion, and assure that the information they contain and their manner of
expression remain open and accessible. Works of information may be
produced and published even without the expectation or promise of
financial reward.200 This is true of much of the information available
on the Internet. It is also true of data collected and distributed by the
federal government.2 0'
Works of information are protected through self-enforcement by
consumers or users, an internalized discipline of non-violation (that is,
of non-reproduction or non-infringement)202 or of voluntary compen-
sation for use.203 These beliefs and behaviors concern what one ought
granting immunity from infringement liability to ISPs who merely create and transmit
"cache" copies of web pages. See sources cited supra note 158.
199. The social context of copyright has not gone unnoticed; the federal govern-
ment proposed that it be appropriated and folded wholesale into the transactional
analysis. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights 204-10 (1995) [hereinafter White Paper] (advocating the develop-
ment of education curricula concerning intellectual property, to provide cultural
norms discouraging unauthorized use). In some cases, private industry is employing a
similar strategy. See Recording Industry Association of America, Soundbyting (visited
Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.Soundbyting.com/html> (stating that the website, admin-
istered by the Recording Industry Association of America, is attempting to "educate"
students about the importance of respecting copyrighted sound recordings in
cyberspace).
200. See Lessig, Constitution of Code, supra note 81, at 183-84 (asserting that sets of
understanding constrain behavior in cyberspace just as they do in real space, but argu-
ing generally that among law, norms, and "nature," or technology, regulation of
cyberspace by technology (nature) is of greater importance than regulation of real
space); Radin, supra note 9, at 515-16 (noting the vast amount of free information
available on the World Wide Web and observing the software development overseen
by the Free Software Foundation). Shareware lies between works published without
any financial incentive and those published only upon that premise, the value of
which is based on an informal compliance norm. Shareware is computer software
released without advance payment of a purchase price or license fee. It is typically
accompanied by a statement that payment should be made on an "honor system."
The success of McAfee Associates (now Network Associates), publisher of anti-virus
software and other computer and network maintenance tools and a company founded
on a shareware model, suggests that such a norm may sustain a viable intellectual
property-based business at least long enough to allow the "norm-based" model to be
converted to a fee-for-product model.
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (requiring no copyright in U.S. government works).
202. See Mark A. Fischer, Reserving All Rights Beyond Copyright: Nonstatutory
Restrictive Notices, 34 J. Copyright Soc'y 249, 250 (1987) (stating that the power of
new technology is unmatched by an individual or collective sense of responsibility in
its use); Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 48, at 578 (noting the ineffective-
ness of a legal regime that is "out of touch" with the way the world works).
203. "Social norms" are usually defined as existing only in the context of some ex
post sanctioning power, with the source and extent of that authority embedded in
other social phenomena. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neigh-
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not to do with certain works. Others concern what one should, or at
least may, do. Together with other legal, technological, and economic
constraints, they are part of the equation that attempts to define
whether creators are receiving excessive or insufficient rewards. They
are what I refer to as copyright "conventions." In those conventions is
the variety and nuance that amounts to the raw material of fair use
and the public domain, of our conceptual open space.'
Such conventions touch on but do not necessarily incorporate the
whole of the technical requirements of the law. More generally, they
apply what is "right," or ethical, for those among us (in the population
at large and within particular communities) who believe we honor
copyright law. 3 5 At least in relatively stable circumstances, copyright
bors Settle Disputes 177-80 (1991); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 914-28.
This is the sense in which most discussion of the regulation of cyberspace via norms
has proceeded. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 72, at 1387-91 (discussing
whether responsible self-regulating structures will emerge on the Internet); Radin,
supra note 9, at 525-26 (suggesting that self-regulation on the Internet partly depends
on the continuing strength of an underlying cyberspace culture). This Article does
not attempt to sort out the identities and workings of those phenomena in this con-
text. It is not clear, in any case, that social factors do not inhibit copying even in the
absence of some informal sanctioning mechanisms. The Article avoids "norms" as
such and speaks instead of conventions.
Social phenomena of this sort are generally believed to respond to collective action
problems. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 955. The particular mecha-
nisms through which they arise are not well-understood. See Robert Cooter, Norma-
tive Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947, 975-77 (1997) (illustrating the role
of law in solving a "public goods" problem in supply of norms, by modulating the
supply of respect and disdain). Two attempts to describe economic models of norm
creation are Robert D. Cooter's Decentralized Law for a Comple Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 1643,
1657-77 (1996), and Eric A. Posner's Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1713-19 (1996). Cognitive limitations on individuals' abilities to
understand and follow the prescriptions of legal forms generate conflicting opinions
regarding how the law should respond to those limits. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L Rev. 211,213-16
(1995) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Limits of Cognition] (discussing limitations based on
rationality, disposition, and detective capability); Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warn-
ings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193, 1206-57 (1994)
(arguing that there are numerous reasons why consumers fail to read product warn-
ings); Kenneth Ian Weissman, A "Comment J" Parry to Howard Latin's "Good"
Warnings, Bad Products, and "Cognitive Linitations," 70 St. John's L Rev. 629, 638-
43 (1996) (challenging the behavioral paradigms underlying Professor Latin's criticism
of ineffective product warnings). There is little doubt that those limits nonetheless
allow, as they must, that an awareness of the existence and purpose of forms has a
substantive effect. Cf Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 468-70 (1997) (arguing that compliance with law depends in part
on an internalized moral sense).
204. For a discussion of the doctrines of fair use and the public domain and the
different conceptions of those doctrines expressed in the case law and scholarship, see
infra Part III.
205. See Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of
the Cathedral, 83 Va. L. Rev. 837, 861-62 (1997) (distinguishing between "law-abiders"
and recalcitrants among citizens, and criticizing some interpretations of entitlement
theory for assuming that all citizens are recalcitrants); see also Lloyd L Weinreb,
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consumers possess a vocabulary of appropriate behaviors or under-
standings concerning a given market or technology.20 6 For traditional
copyrighted works, such as books, there is some understanding among
consumers that photocopying, quoting, or otherwise using some
amount of the text is permissible (or at least is not illegal so long as no
personal, financial reward is anticipated on account of the use).207 For
such works, informal approximations of the legal doctrines concerning
improper use and access have been "close enough" to maintain a so-
cially acceptable balance between protection and nonconsensual
use.208 In new or nontraditional markets, such conventions may not
exist, or multiple sets of proto-conventions may be competing with
one another. For example, many Internet users believe that anything
posted to the World Wide Web is intended to be, and therefore is, fair
game to be copied and redistributed. This view competes with, among
other things, the belief elsewhere that mere nonconsensual "linking"
Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1161 (1990)
[hereinafter Weinreb, Fair's Fair] (stating that fair use gives effect to established com-
munity practices and understandings concerning what is "fair"). The crudity of the
description also roughly corresponds to the inability in economic perspectives on
copyright law to determine the incentive and reward effects of formal copyright law.
See Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copy-
right, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 655, 657 (1996) (noting the absence of empirical
research addressing the efficacy of formal copyright entitlements in generating works
of expression); see also Weinreb, Functional Expression, supra note 64, at 1252-54
(observing that copyright as a whole may be considered to be a convention).
206. Cues may be based on tangible things, on behaviors, on language, and on com-
binations thereof. See Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 16, at 956-62 (discussing the
types and uses of social meanings). Professor Lessig's article is primarily directed
toward understanding another dimension of public regulation of behavior, see id. at
1019, but much of his argument may be extended to regulation by private actors.
207. Direct evidence of such an understanding is difficult to come by. Indirect evi-
dence exists, perhaps, in the fact that until recently, book publishers took few steps,
beyond a statutory copyright notice, to inhibit copying of the copies they sold. That
practice is changing. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text; see also Lemley,
Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 48, at 577-78 (giving examples of popular short-
hand for "fair use" concerning books and songs). Particular communities provide
somewhat better data on related behaviors. See Ellickson, supra note 203, at 258-64
(describing academic photocopying governed by norms rather than by copyright law);
see also Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 Or. L.
Rev. 19, 48 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Information Age] (noting that copyright law is
not popularly understood as applying to non-commercial use).
208. Conventions, by definition, work imperfectly. They do not make fair use liti-
gation disappear entirely. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-
94 (1994) (discussing the fair use conflict between rap music group 2 Live Crew and
the publisher of the song Oh, Pretty Woman). Even with respect to more "tradi-
tional" works, moreover, these approximations do nothing more than offer guidance
on what "may" be done. There is no similar vocabulary guiding what ought to be
done. Moreover, there are no similar norms derived from copyright law promoting
fair use or the free exchange of information as an affirmative good.
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by one website to another is at least inappropriate and arguably
unlawful. °9
Conventions depend on context. To the extent that context
changes-or can be changed-conventions may change as well.2 10
This proposition underscores the two-fold importance of these phe-
nomena. First, they may have a substantive regulatory effect. If my
account in part I of "the acceptable uses" of a book2 1 1 is widely
shared, then book publishers avoid losses through piracy and free-rid-
ing partly on account of this social discipline. Second, the existence of
this discipline itself affects the extent to which the edges of permissi-
ble copying and re-use are tested. Thus, conventions define the
choices that create the disputes that ultimately lead to the evolution of
legal doctrine. If and when the context changes-technological condi-
tions, social conditions, economic conditions, and market conditions
being the more obvious factors-conventions are subject to change.
When the conventions change, the nature of the disputes within the
legal system is likely to change as well. Conventions form an impor-
tant part of a jurisprudential feedback loop: the "system" provides
the parameters that define the scope of disputes while the resolution
of these disputes refines the parameters of the "system.' '21
Before returning to the shrinkwrap context, this feedback relation-
ship can be illustrated with two recent, relatively well-known exam-
ples involving copyright law, new transactional practice, and new
technologies: home use of videocassette recorders, and distribution of
academic "coursepacks." In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
209. See O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 51, at 631-40 (describing -link-
ing" litigation); broadcast.corn inc., supra note 120 (containing a web-wrTap notice stat-
ing that unauthorized linking to streamed audio content is forbidden).
210. But see Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 16, at 993-97 (summarizing
problems of collective action as obstacles to evolution of social meanings). Conven-
tions of information use and re-use expressed through copyright law have historically
both been context specific and vague, often simultaneously. See infra Part III.B.1
(describing recent fair use decisions). Broad but shallow, and narrow but deep con-
ventions are poorly suited to resist technological or other transactional incursions on
unregulated "open space." Judgments concerning whether and the extent to which
we should resist such incursions depend on determining the proper scope of public
and private "space" in the first place.
Professor Lessig argues that the "plasticity" of computer code distinguishes it from
other regulatory agents, see Lessig, Constitution of Code, supra note 81, at 183-84, and
that this characteristic of the technology limits the regulatory power of law and
norms. Code can be easily changed; code-dependent behavior can be easily modified.
The proposition rests on an empirical judgment of the extent to which society, or any
particular medium, or (for works of information) type of work is subject to regulation
via private technology. This judgment, in turn, rests on the degree to which there is a
robust convention of information use or re-use that resists the technology.
211. See supra Part I.A.
212. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 203, at 132, 240-64 (anticipating the operation of
feedback loops among different "controllers," or the source of rules of behavior and
sanctions that back up rules).
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Studios, Inc.,213 the Supreme Court held that "time-shifting" of broad-
cast television programs by home users of videotape players consti-
tutes fair use.214 The litigation arose and the decision was published at
a point when the videotape players' popularity as home entertainment
devices was starting to grow. Given the relative novelty of the tech-
nology, therefore, it was not clear whether any social convention regu-
lated home taping to any significant degree. The argument focused on
the present and potential economic effects of VCR use on the produc-
tion of television programs, perceived to be the primary source of
"content" for VCR users. If the case arose for the first time today,
one wonders whether time-shifting would again dominate the analysis
of home use of videotape players. Sales and rentals of pre-recorded
videocassettes have exploded.215 Playback of pre-recorded tapes and
home movies now constitutes the bulk of VCR usage. 16 One might
argue that by exploiting the videotape rental market, television and
film producers in effect changed the VCR socially, making it a play-
back device far more than a recording device. It achieved a goal
through behavioral change that could not be accomplished through
the legal system. In retrospect, the Court's holding stalled the devel-
opment of a doctrinal or statutory framework regulating VCR use and
213. 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From
Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 143-58 (1994) [hereinafter Goldstein, Copyright's
Highway] (summarizing the political and industrial context of the "Betamax"
litigation).
214. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 456. "Time-shifting" is the consumer practice of
using a VCR to record a television program, watching it once at a later time, and
erasing the recording at a later time. See id. at 423.
215. Sales and rentals of pre-recorded videotapes now represent the largest single
revenue source for United States movie studios. See Annual Assessment of the Status
of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, II Communica-
tions Reg. (P & F) 147, 185 (1998).
The argument is necessarily incomplete. First, having created a market for pre-
recorded videotapes, producers created a huge market for pirated tapes. Home tap-
ing is no longer the major bugaboo for film producers. Large scale tape-to-tape copy-
ing is. Producers also believe they have a largely effective solution: Macrovision, a
technology that interferes with the signal from the source tape to an extent that the
copy is not of commercial grade. Second, VCR manufacturers did not literally re-
move the Record button from the VCR, and they did not conceal it or disable it. The
"VCR as playback device" convention, to the extent it exists, is elastic. A generation
trained to download material from computer networks may in time revise its elders'
abandonment of the Record function, though the function likely would assume its
new role in the context of a networked, digital device.
216. See Seonsu Lee & James R. Lumpkin, Differences in Attitudes Toward TV Ad-
vertising: VCR Usage as a Moderator, 11 Int'l J. Advertising 333, 334 (1992) (noting
that surveys of VCR purchasers from the early 1980s found that a large majority iden-
tified record and playback as most significant features); The Radio Advertising Bu-
reau, Media Facts (visited Aug. 28, 1998) <http://rab.comlstation/mediafactl
mftv.html> (stating that by 1994, VCRs were used twice as much for playback as for
recording (citing a 1994 American Association of Advertising Agencies Television
Production Cost Survey)).
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may have allowed such a convention to develop.217 A healthy com-
munity of time-shifters and home tapers of broadcast content persists,
but a potential convention supporting time-shifting and home archiv-
ing on a vast scale has been largely supplanted by the ready and inex-
pensive supply of pre-recorded videotapes of motion pictures and
television programs. The causal link may be impressionistic, but the
result is clear: home videotaping disputes have disappeared from the
legal stage.
"Coursepack" caselaw, which condemns nonconsensual reproduc-
tion of articles for distribution to students by university faculty,"'8 de-
veloped despite, rather than in the absence of, a relevant social norm.
Notwithstanding norms of "reciprocal fair use" that Professor Ellick-
son describes, publishers determined that targeting photocopy shops
with infringement claims would further deter what the publishers be-
lieved to be illegitimate re-use.2 19 "Coursepack" disputes have not
disappeared, but as practices of coursepack creation and distribution
have developed in response to judicial decisions, the scope and nature
of subsequent disputes have, not surprisingly, narrowed. The question
is no longer whether faculties are subject to rules rather than norms
regarding fair use. The question is, in light of licensing collectives that
owe their creation to coursepack caselaw, in what situations do the
relevant rules precisely control, and in what situations may scholars
and teachers continue to rely on fair use.'
What should we make of such conventions and shrinkwrap? In the
digital age, conventions throughout information law are in dispute."'
217. Many scholars state this point differently, arguing that the Court correctly held
off interfering with the development of a new copying technology. Professor Gold-
stein, on the other hand, suggests that appropriately nuanced legislation would have
produced a better result. See Goldstein, Copyright's Highway, supra note 213, at 146.
218. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1384 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
219. Professor Ellickson notes that a "reciprocal fair use" norm effects transaction
cost savings; he also observes that the norm is supported by academic norms that
encourage the free exchange of information. See Ellickson, supra note 203, at 258-64.
220. Licensing collectives and the imperatives of copy facilities leave little or no
room for faculty judgments concerning acceptable nonconsensual use. Even if schol-
ars more aggressively retain the copyrights to their published research, however, the
game may not be over: norms may be reasserted in the academic sphere. See Lisa
Guernsey, A Provost Challenges His Faculty to Retain Copyright on Articles, Chron.
Higher Educ., Sept. 18, 1998, at A29 (discussing the provost at Cal Tech, who is en-
couraging scholars not to assign copyrights to journal articles).
221. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 9, at 522-26 (arguing that preserving an early
cyberspace vision of openness depends upon the continuing strength of the culture of
early cyberspace). Recent trademark and right of publicity litigation provide exam-
ples of how intellectual property law continues to use and respond to conventions in
flux. In Washington Post Co. v. TotalNews, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y.
filed Feb. 28,1997), the plaintiff argued that the defendant's use of "framing" technol-
ogy on its website confused Web suffers as to the origins of the plaintiffs content.
Whether such confusion in fact existed is very much open to debate. The case sug-
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How social structures should relate to law generally is debated."' 2 If
my proposition concerning a feedback relationship is correct, how-
ever, then the evidence of broadening shrinkwrap practice described
in part I suggests a changing convention with broad implications. His-
torically, consumer users of computer programs commonly under-
stood that they were "buying" those programs, 2 3 thereby effectively
substituting a set of conventions for software developers' attempts to
constrain re-use via shrinkwrap license.
The deployment of all types of digital information creates a frame-
work for a convention that increasingly rejects this historic under-
standing and accepts the propriety of the "use" model that these
licenses and notices-reinforced by ProCD-promote. The resulting
doctrinal raw material-the source of the disputes that, when liti-
gated, create the backdrop for further information production-is
more likely to turn solely on whether the "use" is expressly author-
ized, without any equivalent or corresponding evolution of social con-
ventions for information that preserve a social and intellectual open
space. 24 The only such "convention" is the Copyright Act itself,
gests, however, how one class of Web residents is using the legal process to establish
the terms upon which such an understanding might be based in the absence of a
shared understanding of acceptable behavior concerning frames and links. See
O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace, supra note 51, at 641-45 (evaluating "netiquette" as a
basis for determining the appropriate rule for linking). Changing perceptions of tele-
vision technology and its derivatives were at issue in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). In this right of publicity decision, the court reversed an
order granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See id. at 814. The
norm at stake was Norm himself, the fictitious television character played by George
Wendt on the Cheers television series. Wendt and Ratzenberger sued the developer
of a bar based on the Cheers series. The bar incorporated robots that adopted the
function, but not the appearance, of Wendt's and Ratzenberger's Cheers characters.
Wendt and Ratzenberger argue, in effect, that they are entitled to control an associa-
tive value-a legally cognizable right of publicity-that exists in the fictitious per-
sonae they helped to create. Whether that is so depends in part on whether the
"situations" in situation comedies have progressed (or regressed) to the point that
they are legally indistinguishable from reality. What are the relevant conventions that
define Norm Peterson and Cliff Claven-or "Norm's norms?"
222. Compare Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 947-66 (describing grounds
that may warrant government regulation of social norms), with Bernstein, supra note
28, at 1795 (reviewing efficiency losses from codifying commercial trade practices),
and Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model
of Decentralized Law, 14 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 215,226 (1994) (noting that the obliga-
tion of the state is to elevate efficient commercial norms to the level of law), and
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 26, at 1372-85 (stating that the
law should facilitate the development of private collective rights organizations for
repeat transactions in intellectual property rights), and Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1239 ("[I]f we bring social structure too directly within the
ken of the law, we will end up specifying the structure by law in a way that under-
mines the ability of manifold centers of power to thwart the possibly threatening de-
signs of government.").
223. See Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1244 n.23.
224. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1129, 1145-50 (1986) (discussing the role of law in shaping individual preferences
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which, outside of its attempts to vaguely delimit what is fair use' and
what works are uncopyrightable, 2 6 neither supports nor encourages
conventions concerning information use and re-use that translate
readily across forms, formats, technologies, and species of works322
7
For the vast majority of works, shrinkwrap is itself becoming a (or
perhaps "the") convention of information use. What is "fair" in fair-
use debates ends up being defined in terms of what the convention
allows. The normative content of open space flows from an ongoing
debate concerning the proper scope of fair use and the public domain.
To the extent that the terms of that debate are set by shrinkwrap, the
use-related convention that shrinkwrap encourages disrupts the de-
bate and distorts the outcome. The outcome, of course, reinforces the
convention. The resulting feedback loop may ultimately drive out
open space altogether.
Two examples, both cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, illustrate how this loop may be reflected in judicial
practice. In 1982, an attorney in New York, John Diamond, wrote a
letter to the editor of American Lawyer correcting certain facts about
him published in an issue of the magazine. The letter stated, among
other things, "You are authorized to publish this letter but only in its
entirety."'  American Lawyer published the letter in edited form.
Diamond sued the magazine for copyright infringement and for inva-
sion of privacy, defamation, and improper use of his name.229 The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
ruling that the publication of the edited letter constituted "fair use."
Diamond did not assert, it appears, that his stated qualification on the
and values); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 939-47 (describing choices as
functions of norms, meanings, and social roles).
225. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
226. See id. § 102(b).
227. First Amendment law, of course, is premised largely on the social benefits gen-
erated by the broadest possible dissemination of ideas. The distinction in copyright
law between protectable "expression" and unprotectable "ideas" is, among other
things, designed to separate copyright law from First Amendment constraints. See
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The First Amendment, in other words, generally is understood to stand in contrast to
the Copyright Act, rather than in sympathy with it. See Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra
note 78, at 385-86 (stating that the co-existence of copyright law and the First Amend-
ment requires a context-specific rather than a categorical approach); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 Vand. L
Rev. 217, 232 n.48, 299 n.322 (1998); infra note 447 and accompanying text. Doctri-
nally, for example, although fair use is characterized by statute as a class of use that is
not infringing, see 17 U.S.C. § 107, in copyright litigation fair use is raised as an af-
firmative defense, not as an element of the plaintiffs claim of infringement, see Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
561.
228. Diamond v. Am-Law Pub'g Corp., No. 82-6273C, 1984 WL 2121, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4), affd, 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
229. See id at *2.
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magazine's right to publish the letter constituted an offer of a contract
or a restrictive notice or license that bound American Lawyer when it
published the letter. Nonetheless, the court wrote: "Although plain-
tiff purported to set forth the condition in his letter that only the en-
tire letter could be published, it would appear clear that plaintiff had
no right to impose such a condition."" 0  The court of appeals af-
firmed. The court reviewed the four fair use factors stated in the
Copyright Act"' in light of the editorial changes made by American
Lawyer.232 The court made no mention of Diamond's qualification,
other than in its quotation of the letter itself. The author's attempt to
bind a user of his work with a primitive shrinkwrap license (really, a
notice) so little troubled the court either conceptually or doctrinally
that the issue was peremptorily dismissed.13
The second case arose in a very different context. The plaintiff in
Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.23 4 created a "story
quilt," an image of which was reproduced on a poster that the creator
had licensed. The defendants produced a television series that used a
copy of the poster in the set for their program. The poster was visible
in the background of a single scene of one episode. The episode itself
was broadcast several times. Ringgold sued for copyright infringe-
ment and unfair competition. The district court granted the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that use of the poster
constituted fair use of the plaintiff's copyrighted quilt.2 5 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded. The details of the appellate court's
analysis of the four statutory fair use factors are not particularly useful
in drawing comparisons with Diamond, as the nature of the work and
the nature of the nonconsensual use are quite different. The instruc-
tive contrast with Diamond arises, rather, in the rhetorical (in other
230. Id. at *3.
231. The Copyright Act states in relevant part:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
232. See Diamond, 745 F.2d at 147-48.
233. Of course, Diamond's notice was not a shrinkwrap license in any traditional
sense and, as a doctrinal matter, the proposition that the notice constituted an "offer"
that the magazine "accepted" is highly debatable. What is notable, rather, is Dia-
mond's effort to invoke the convention that he, the author, had the power to control
the terms of publication, and the court's quick conclusion that the convention did not
exist.
234. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
235. See id. at 73.
1090 [Vol. 67
LEGAL-WARE
words, conventional) posture of Ringgold's claim and the court's will-
ingness to accept that characterization. The Copyright Act, the court
wrote, created a "licensing right" in the copyright owner.2  The es-
sence of Ringgold's claim was "exploitation of the copyrighted mate-
rial without paying the customary price." 7
Notwithstanding the risk of reading too much into illustrations pro-
vided by these two cases, particularly where the factual settings differ
as much as these do, the courts' different treatments of the possibility
that the creator might legitimately and unilaterally impose restrictions
on the character of the use of the work is compelling. In Diamond,
the plaintiff did not stand on this theory and the district court dis-
missed its premise as untenable without discussion of authority. In
Ringgold, the same premise represented the core of the plaintiffs case
and of the court's decision that the plaintiff was entitled to a trial on
the merits."3 Not only are the conventions of information use moving
toward a baseline that begins with the copyright owner's exclusive
right to define the appropriate terms of use of the work, but litigated
disputes over unauthorized re-use are adopting the terms of the con-
vention thus framed. The example from the New York Times with
which this part began may seem trivial, but it is emblematic of how
this baseline is moving out of the cases and into everyday information
236. See id. ("In the absence of defenses, these exclusive rights normally give a
copyright owner the right to seek royalties from others who wish to use the copy-
righted work.").
237. Id at 81 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 562 (1985) (emphasis added) ("The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price.")). Harper & Row held that the unauthorized publication of excerpts of Presi-
dent Ford's memoirs by The Nation magazine did not constitute fair use under the
Copyright Act. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 570.
238. The connection between these two cases is drawn into sharper focus by the
extensive reliance by the court in Ringgold on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row, which in turn heavily relied on the right of first publication that be-
longed to the author under common law copyright. Conceptually, in other words,
apart from the type of work and type of use at issue, the court in Ringgold gives
substantially greater weight to the creator's right to define privately the scope of any
subsequent use. What was "customary" to the Court in Harper & Row was the crea-
tor's collecting a license fee or royalty if one were set. To the court in Ringgold, it was
"customary" for no use to be made of a work without a fee being paid. See Karjala,
Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 524 (arguing that the Copyright Act should im-
plement the "right of first publication" concept by giving greater discretion to authors
of narrowly distributed works to contract privately for limited use of their works).
The scope of the copyright holder's right to license, and the holder's ability to dictate
the terms on which it will license or refuse to license its work, presents a closely
related issue. See, ag., LucasArts Entertainment Co. v. Humongous Entertainment
Co., 870 F. Supp. 285, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1993) ("[T]he essence of a copyright interest is
the power to exclude use of the copyrighted work by those who did not originate it or
who are not authorized to use it. The right to license a patent or copyright ... is the
'untrammeled right' of the intellectual property owner." (citations omitted)); infra
notes 382-83 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of "copyright misuse").
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practice. ProCD does not mark the boundary between Diamond and
Ringgold. Within copyright doctrine, credit for the conceptual shift
toward the effect of licensing and markets on fair use doctrine belongs
to Harper & Row and to Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.239
ProCD takes that concept from copyright law, however, and gives it
significant additional doctrinal and practical heft, supporting and en-
couraging the idea that the "balance" between the creator's incentive
to create, and the public interest in access to and use of the work, is a
question of purely private definition. That proposition and its conse-
quences are defining what is, or should be, open space. How and why
that is a problem is considered next.
III. FAIR USE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND THE
CONSTRUCrION OF "OPEN SPACE"
This Article refers to fair use under the Copyright Act and to the
public domain as the doctrinal representations of open space, but it
has not, so far, explained what those concepts might represent or how
disputed and disparate copyright conventions of open space, and the
ways in which those conventions find public expression in the law, ex-
pose the vulnerability of copyright law to legal-ware. This, in a nut-
shell, is the problem: the Constitution and Congress each suppose
that something approximating what this Article refers to as "open
space" does and should exist. Neither provides much in the way of
specifics regarding its contours and content, and its very existence has
been under attack from one quarter or another. The existence of
ongoing debates about fair use and the public domain may have been
sufficient, until recently, to preserve a substantive open space. Shrink-
wrap threatens to short circuit or terminate those debates. If we have
239. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In Campbell, the Supreme Court clarified the suggestion
in Harper & Row that the central feature of fair use analysis was the character of the
copyright holder's interest, and restored, at least formally, a fair use standard that
gives equal weight to each of the four statutory factors. See id. at 583-86 (stating that it
was error for the court of appeals to conclude that nonconsensual commercial re-use
of a song lyric rendered such re-use presumptively unfair); Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer
Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1449, 1465-66 (1997) [hereinafter Leval,
Nimmer Lecture] (arguing that Campbell properly focuses the fair use inquiry on the
dichotomy between transformative and superseding use). Campbell's statement of
fair use principles recast rather than rejected prior cases that explicitly placed greater
weight on the extent to which the "fair" use tapped markets for the originals, by
acknowledging that "transformative" uses were more likely to be "fair" in part be-
cause there would likely be no market in "transformative" uses for the copyright
holder to exploit. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-
31 (2d Cir. 1995); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1061 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of
Improvement] (noting that a refusal to license parodic works may not constitute true
market failure). If the Supreme Court intended to put to rest the notion that com-
mercial re-use of copyrighted works is presumptively unfair, however, it may need to
speak to the point again, more directly. Cf Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d
1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding commercial re-use presumptively unfair).
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not figured out what fair use and the public domain are about, then
we must identify a process that will enable us to do so in order to
resist the inimical effect of shrinkwrap.
A. The Ideas of Fair Use and the Public Domain
The 1976 Copyright Act took a judicially-crafted doctrine of "fair
use" of copyrighted works and wrote it explicitly into the United
States Code.24 For a little more than twenty years since, determina-
tions of nonconsensual fair use have been primarily questions of inter-
pretation of the four "non-exclusive" factors stated in the statute.2 4'
Whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is "fair" and, there-
fore, does not constitute infringement, is determined by evaluating,
among other things: (i) the nature of the fair use; (ii) the nature of the
underlying work; (iii) the extent of the work taken for the use; and
(iv) the effect of the second use on the market for the original.2 "4 List-
ing these four factors, despite their explicitly non-exclusive character,
has led to different degrees of emphasis among courts and scholars on
the relative weight accorded to each listed factor, the extent to which
their non-exclusive character opens the door for broader ap-
proaches,2 43 and the degree to which fair use analysis can, or should,
be understood or informed by a conceptual analysis of copyright law
as a whole. There are multiple "ideas" of fair use that conflict and
overlap with one another. The nature and extent of the conflict with
public values created by shrinkwrap, and the extent to which practice
norms are pushing those values aside, vary depending on the theory
advanced. This section briefly summarizes the leading scholarly, and
some of the judicial, attempts to rationalize fair use doctrine and its
cousin, the public domain. The balance of this part describes how,
notwithstanding continuing diversity in the debate over the role of fair
use and the public domain, courts generate and reflect norms and con-
ventions of use that support the type of private use regulation de-
scribed above.
A number of scholars view fair use (and all of copyright law) pri-
marily in economic terms. A somewhat simplified version of the argu-
ment is this: the goal of copyright law is the efficient creation and
distribution of rights in creative works. Private holders are best situ-
240. See Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994)); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,575-78 (1994)
(reviewing the evolution of the statutory fair use doctrine).
241. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
242. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The statute specifically states that "fair use of a
copyrighted work... is not an infringement of copyright" and provides illustrations of
types of uses that likely would be considered "fair": "[Cjriticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, .. . scholarship, or research." Id.
243. See, e.g., Educational Testing Serv. v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educ. Ctr., Ltd., 965
F. Supp. 731, 736 (D. Md. 1997) (dispensing with a factor-by-factor analysis of fair use
and relying on the "broader perspective" of alleged unfairness of copying).
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ated to maximize the welfare gains associated with distribution of
their works. Licensing of copyrighted works is encouraged because it
promotes efficiency, that is, the ability of the creator to generate reve-
nue by licensing particular uses, and because it promotes the genera-
tion and distribution of creative works that otherwise might not
exist. 44 Certain transfers of rights concerning copyrighted works are
efficient but do not occur because of market failure: transaction costs
of one type or another interfere with the transfers. In some cases,
rights holders object to proposed uses and attempt to collect dispro-
portionately high license fees or refuse to license material altogether.
In other cases, costs of identifying appropriate parties, of negotiating,
or of enforcing what are often one-shot deals vastly exceed the eco-
nomic and social benefits anticipated on account of a license. Fair use
is disfavored, then, if it interferes with the operation of an actual or
potential market for the work. 45 When such markets do not exist,
fair use enables users of copyrighted works to use those works without
securing prior permission from the copyright holders; it permits these
transfers to occur, curing market failure. 46 One might extend the
point to suggest that, as an affirmative proposition, fair use should be
favored when it promotes the distribution of works that otherwise
would not occur.2 47
Other scholars and some courts characterize these "failures to li-
cense" wholly or partly as opportunities to support one or more essen-
tially redistributive goals rather than opportunities to act where the
244. Representative examples of this argument can be found in 2 Paul Goldstein,
Copyright § 10.1.1, at 10:4-10:7 (2d ed. 1998), and Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Mar-
ket Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Prede-
cessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1610-14 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure], and the argument is implicit in, among other things, copyright models
that embrace private copyright collective rights organizations as means of overcoming
transaction cost barriers to efficient licensing. See Merges, Contracting into Liability
Rules, supra note 26, at 1390-91. Professor Cohen points out that "economic" argu-
ments for copyright encompass a variety of what might be better referred to as "utili-
tarian" approaches; what the text describes is a generalized version of modern neo-
classical economic analysis of copyright. See Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra
note 18 (manuscript at 55).
245. Some recent cases have adopted this approach. For example, one Second Cir-
cuit case stated that:
[I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when
the means for paying for such a use is made easier.... [I]t is sensible that a
particular unauthorized use should be considered "more fair" when there is
no ready market or means to pay for the use . . . . The vice of circular
reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive against fair
use.
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1995).
246. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Its Substitutes, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 865, 866.
247. But see Jonathan Dowell, Comment, Bytes and Pieces: Fragmented Copies,
Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 843, 876-77 (1998) (arguing
that the market failure premise for fair use does not necessarily lead in all cases to a
denial of fair use privilege even if the market exists).
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market does not or cannot.24 Fair use under this approach is
designed to privilege or subsidize certain uses that society normatively
values, whether in connection with producing additional creative
works or with subsidizing other valuable behaviors, independent of
the extent to which such works are, or may be, undervalued by the
market.24 9 There is, however, disagreement as to which types of ac-
cess and use ought to receive such special treatment. Such privileges
may extend to scientific and educational research,2" "transformative"
uses, such as parody and criticism,25' use that furthers or supports
"democratic values" of informed citizenship and political participa-
tion.' "personal" use," "non-commercial" use,' or "environmen-
248. See, e.g., Merges, End of Friction, supra note 28, at 134-35 (arguing that legisla-
tion should more explicitly address redistributive features of copyright).
249. The redistributive argument goes beyond the market failure argument and
suggests that certain uses should be privileged even if a market for the transactions in
fact exists. One construction of the Diamond decision described in part II, and the
proposition that fact-oriented works lend themselves more readily to fair use, see Dia-
mond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984), is that in this context,
fair use most closely resembles the First Amendment in supporting unconstrained
public discourse.
250. See Goldstein, Copyright's Highway, supra note 213, at 230. Other commenta-
tors write:
The important question is how to recreate a "fair use" zone in cyberspace
that protects the strong public interest in ensuring that certain uses and cer-
tain users, notably the scientific and educational communities, are not priced
out of the market or forced to cut back upon the kind of basic research that
has heretofore played a crucial role in U.S. economic and technological
growth.
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 101 n.216.
251. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994); Micro
Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that transforma-
tive use is entitled to broader deference); Gordon, Jurispnidence of Benefits, supra
note 181, at 1034-35 (arguing that copyright law may need to create safe harbors for
"hostile" uses); Yankwich, supra note 146, at 214 (suggesting that publishing a work
constitutes, in part, an invitation to consume for purpose of criticism). Judge Leval
believes that the Campbell decision restores a normatively and prescriptively appro-
priate equilibrium to fair use jurisprudence as a whole. See Leval, Nimmer Lecture,
supra note 239, at 1464-66; see also Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra note 4, at
1077-83 (arguing that the existing fair use doctrine should be construed to protect
"radical improvements" wrought by the transformative user). Post-Campbell caselaw,
however, shows that the case has not succeeded in unifying fair use jurisprudence. See
infra Part II.B.
252. See Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 28, at 1036-38 (arguing
that law should be amended to address privacy concerns of individuals in using copy-
righted networked materials); Fisher, supra note 72, at 1762-66 (suggesting that copy-
right laws may be linked, under certain circumstances, to promoting access to a better
life); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale I.
283, 364-82 (1996) (linking copyright policy to political foundations of liberal society).
253. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change" A Democratic Ap-
proach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ. 215, 283-89
(1996) (discussing whether personal use is fair use).
254. See, eg., Litman, Information Age, supra note 207, at 40-44 (discussing the
difference between using copyrighted material for commercial and non-commercial
purposes). Professor Karjala proposes a variation on exemptions for "non-commer-
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tal" concerns that derive neither from the nature of the original work
nor from the nature of the re-use, but from the context or texture of
the information itself.15 The number of competitors and the vigor of
the present debate lead to only one conclusion, which is that what fair
use means, and what it should mean, is not clear as a policy matter. In
practice, the only way to deal with the indeterminacy is to approach
disputes on a highly contextualized basis.256
The phrase "public domain" raises questions and problems similar
to those raised by fair use, but does so with respect to a different class
of works, and without a constitutional or affirmative statutory text
from which to work. The public domain is primarily a negative con-
cept.257 Works and portions of works that do not meet both constitu-
tional and statutory requirements for copyrightability, but that fall
within the "subject matter of copyright," lie in the public domain.-"
Similarly, works that have fallen out of copyright because the term of
copyright protection has expired because former statutory prerequi-
sites for obtaining or renewing copyright were not met, because they
cial" use: a distinction between "widely distributed" and "narrowly distributed"
works. See Kaijala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 522-25.
255. Some argue that "cyberspace" is a separate "place" that deserves its own body
of doctrine independent of the rules that govern "real" (tangible) space. See Johnson
& Post. supra note 72, at 1378-87. An increasingly frequent response is that if "real"
or tangible space may be zoned, then no principled distinction exists to suggest that
"cyberspace," a broad term that might be considered inclusive of all digital informa-
tion, may not similarly be zoned into, among other things, public (free and fair use)
and private zones. See Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 79, at 1408-10. Theo-
ries of zoning may illuminate this debate, see, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Com-
munity, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1081-1107 (1996) (proposing a radical revision of urban
zoning policies to build communities), and, by extension, the fair use question as a
whole. Fair use may be a route not to facilitating certain types of uses and transac-
tions that otherwise would be under-represented, but to assuring that the "informa-
tion content" of the modem world is broad, rich, and diverse. Cf Frug, supra, at 1075-
77 (arguing that cities should teach people how to interact with strangers). In a simi-
lar vein is Professor Yen's argument that copyright decisions are inevitably informed
by aesthetic judgments. See Yen, The Legacy of Feist, supra note 78, at 1343-48.
256. Cf Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105
(1990) (criticizing courts for failing to develop a consistent set of principles or values
to govern fair use); Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 205, at 1152-53 (arguing that fair
use represents a community sense of "fairness," but not explaining how such a sense
might arise and extend beyond a particular case).
257. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 977-94 (1990)
[hereinafter Litman, Public Domain] (describing the development of copyright law as
shaping the contours of the public domain).
258. These works lie in the public domain because they lack the necessary constitu-
tional "originality," see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345 (1991), or fail one or more of the statutory requirements for copyrightability:
originality, work, authorship, fixation, "tangible medium of expression ... from which
[the work] can be perceived, reproduced, or . .. communicated," excluding ideas,
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discov-
eries, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1994).
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were created before statutory copyright schemes arose,259 or because
Congress has declared that no copyright exists in them2r ° lie in the
public domain and in principle are available for use and re-use by all
without restriction. Nevertheless, it is common for publishers to col-
lect and publish these works, or the information they contain, and
charge readers and users for their use.261 If a work lies in the public
domain, either because Congress has declared that it is not (or is no
longer) copyrightable, or because the Constitution dictates that it may
not be copyrighted, how do we conceive of the "public domain" in a
meaningful way that allows that result to restrain, to a socially accept-
able degree, privately-adopted measures such as shrinkwrap that
might limit access to this material?
As a cousin of fair use, the public domain attracts similar arguments
concerning its function. Nominally, the public domain provides essen-
tial raw material for adoption and use by authors and other creators.
The public domain is an essential component of the original "author-
ship," and without it copyright cannot arise.262 The public domain
may do more: it provides a common reference library of publicly ac-
cessible facts and ideas-an intellectual commons-that gives our di-
verse polity the vocabulary and syntax necessary to engage in a variety
of political and social debates and to function at some level as a single
community.263 Questions concerning the scope of the public domain
may not, in theory, draw forth debates over distinctions among con-
text-specific types or species of use. In copyright law, material either
lies within the public domain, because it constitutes "ideas" or "facts,"
or it does not, because it is "expression." 2" Like fair use, however,
259. Sections 302 through 304 state the term of copyright for works created at dif-
ferent times and under different U.S. copyright regimes, including requirements for
renewal of copyright for works created prior to January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302-304.
260. See id. § 105.
261. It is accepted that to some degree, absent the ability to charge for access, some
number of works either would not be created (because the costs of assembling the
information could not be recovered by the publisher) or would not be as broadly
distributed. That, among other things, is the rationale underlying ProCD. What is
hotly disputed is the extent to which depriving publishers of the ability to charge for
access would simultaneously deprive them of the needed incentive to publish the
information.
262. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 257, at 965-67.
263. See Lange, supra note 14, at 163-65 (discussing the preemption "by default" of
individual rights in the public domain); Netanel, Copyright Alienability, supra note 72,
at 423-24 (describing communitarian aspects of copyright law); see also Peter A. Jaszi,
Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitution-
ally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
595, 600-01 (1996). This broader political or social function of the public domain is
part of what I have tried to capture in the phrase "open space."
264. This traditional formulation, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing that
copyright protection does not extend to ideas, procedures, concepts, or principles),
dates from the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). This
point, and the discussion that foUows, refers in broad terms to material that is ex-
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conflicts in these general statements of policy or purpose demand a
contextualized approach to the public domain as doctrine.
As Professor Litman has persuasively argued,265 virtually the only
conceptual framework in which some normative vision of "the public
domain" may be expressed as a function of newly created works is
provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications v. Ru-
ral Telephone Service,2 66 which held that a work must be "original" to
be "copyrightable" and to qualify for protection under the Copyright
Act.267 Feist concerned the copyrightability of a telephone directory
compilation of addresses and telephone numbers. The Court held
that the Constitution requires at least a nominal amount of "original-
ity" to support the "authorship" constitutionally required for copy-
right protection. 268 "Originality" and "authorship" are necessary to
provide some basis for distinguishing copyrightable from uncopyright-
able material. Nevertheless, they are fuzzy and manipulable as pre-
scriptive concepts,269 and they do not fit comfortably within any of the
candidate "public domain" concepts summarized above. Like argu-
ments over fair use, there is nothing in the arguments over the scope
of the public domain, even from the point of view of those who urge
that greater attention be paid to the doctrine, which suggests that we
are close to figuring out what the public domain does or should
mean.
270
cluded from copyright protection, rather than material that has fallen out of copyright
protection.
265. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 257, at 1000-12.
266. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
267. See id. at 345.
268. See id. at 348-51.
269. See Litman, Public Domain, supra note 257, at 1019. Professor Ginsburg
pointed out shortly after Feist that the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to
distinguish as a statutory matter between works of "high" expression, works that dis-
play a significant investment of creative effort and are relatively widely distributed,
and those of "low" expression, works of minimal creativity and little distribution. See
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 78, at 340-41. The effect of Feist, however, is to
lump all works into "high" copyright analysis. That standard, when coupled with the
low "originality" threshold that Feist established for entry into the halls of "high"
copyright, opens the door for "authorship" inquiries in which courts either perform
strange contortions to bring works within the scope of federal copyright law rather
than expose publishers to the risks of the public domain, see, e.g., American Dental
Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (determining that
taxonomy of dental procedures is copyrightable); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114
F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding authorship despite a disclaimer of authorship by
the copyright holder); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Southern Software, Inc., No. C 95-20710
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1998) (order granting in part plaintiff Adobe's motion for summary
judgment on copyright claims) (on file with author) (stating that machine-generated
computer program code is copyrightable under Feist), or avoid the question alto-
gether by focusing on private contract, as in ProCD.
270. On the one hand lie admonishments to restore some vision of the public do-
main as an institutional safety valve, see Litman, Public Domain, supra note 257, at
1023 (finding substantial legal public policy bases to support the idea that computer
program algorithms are unpatentable), and on the other hand lie explicit appeals to
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B. Fair Use and the Public Domain in Action
For fair use and public domain concepts, disagreements among
scholars are mirrored, to a large degree, in disagreements and con-
flicts within the cases. There are ongoing divisions concerning the cor-
rect jurisprudential approach to fair use and public domain disputes.
The correct outcome of such disputes might be of less concern, how-
ever, were it not for the suggestion in the cases, ProCD in particular,
that shrinkwrap seems to be pushing conventions or practices of copy-
right and information use that preempt (in a colloquial sense)271 dis-
politics and deal-making, see, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 160 ("Ide-
ally, the database legislation should institutionalize these and other fair-use related
issues, together with an overall dispute-resolution mechanism, within the larger
framework of an apposite collection society, which would mediate between funders,
providers, distributors, and users."). Neither course seems likely to produce a robust
or stable result.
271. This section argues that judicial decision-making provides the right lens
through which the impact of ProCD should be examined. Both markets and legisla-
tures present legitimate institutional claims for addressing this issue. The market ap-
proach is that of ProCD itself. Its weaknesses have been alluded to here and are
addressed in greater detail in the next part. See infra Part IV.A. The failings of legis-
latures and legislative processes in responding to social, technological, and market
changes affecting intellectual property have been well-documented elsewhere. See,
e.g., Jessica D. Litman, Copyrigh Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L
Rev. 857 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright Compromise] (documenting the in-
volvement of interest groups in the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act);
Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. Sch. L Rev.
477, 478-82 (1977) (discussing extensive legislative compromises involved in passing
the Copyright Act of 1976). Other scholars are more willing to entrust Congress with
such judgments. See Goldstein, Copyright's Highway, supra note 213, at 216-25;
Merges, End of Friction, supra note 28, at 134-35. Ongoing legislative or quasi-legisla-
tive attempts to deal with fair use issues perpetuate a paradigm, however, similar to
that implemented by shrinkwrap, that defines "appropriate" use before the normative
dimensions of that use have been fully explored. See, e.g., Working Group on Intellec-
tual Property, Report to the Commissioner on the Conclusion of the First Phase of
the Conference on Fair Use 18-20 1997 (developing "guidelines" for fair use for use of
digital images, distance learning, educational multimedia, electronic reserve systems,
interlibrary loan, document delivery, and software in libraries); Mark D. Rosen, What
Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American Codifications, and Their Im-
pact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 Wis. L Rev.
1119, 1199-1252 [hereinafter Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?] (dis-
cussing how the codification of a body of law frames the normatively acceptable terms
of further discourse regarding legal evolution). As matters of copyright doctrine and
tradition, fair use and "copyrightability" have been judicial creations because what is
"fair" in any particular context, or what constitutes an "idea" rather than "expres-
sion," is likely to be highly fact and context-specific. Legislation that might imple-
ment a more precise rule yet remain cognizant of the variety of disputes that might
likely arise would merely restate rather than resolve the present difficulty. See, e.g.,
Cate, supra note 33, at 1052-54, 1064-65 (discussing the effects of technological con-
vergence on the need for reform in regulation of telephone companies by legislatures
and courts); Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 239, at 1077-83 (arguing
that existing fair use doctrine should be construed to protect "radical improvements"
wrought by a transformative user).
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putes about the proper scope of open space.272 This section suggests
how this is so. First, it reviews recent caselaw on the application of the
fair use doctrine and analyses of "copyrightability ' '1 73 in copyright in-
fringement disputes. Second, it surveys applications of the ProCD
case itself in intellectual property litigation.
1. A Snapshot of Fair Use and of the Public Domain
Simple searches on WESTLAW for recent cases adjudicating fair
use and copyrightability disputes yielded thirteen of the former and
ten of the latter.274 Such a small number of available opinions on each
issue can yield but a few observations. In this context, only the follow-
ing emerges from these cases. There is no grand unifying theory of
open space in place or in the works. Courts and particular judges
adopt a number of different approaches to analyzing these problems.
It is difficult to predict the approach that will control in a particular
case.
a. Fair Use
Recent fair use decisions should be understood in the context of
two important propositions, one substantive, the other procedural.
Substantively, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,275 the Supreme
Court attempted to confirm that the general jurisprudential approach
to fair use decisions ought to remain that of "case-by-case analysis,"
272. The ultimate success of such a result would reflect the power of the conven-
tional authority of the practice, not the normative strength of ProCD's market theory.
From a theoretical standpoint, the difficulty with current market failure explanations
of copyright is that they either assume the normative value of the market rather than
demonstrate it, or they have no normative content at all-in a pure market-driven
world, as transaction costs reduce to zero, fair use is necessary, if at all, for non-
market reasons. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 27, at 592-95 (acknowledging that in a world
of zero transaction costs, fair use might nonetheless protect "objectionable" use).
273. This is the modern category into which "public domain" analysis falls. See infra
Part III.B.1.
274. Search of WESTLAW, ALLCASES Database (March 11, 1998) (using search
terms "'fair use' and date (aft 1996)"); search of WESTLAW, ALLCASES Database
(March 11, 1998) (using search terms "copyright and 102(b) and date (aft 1996) but
not 'fair use"'). Admittedly, the methodology is crude. I define "recent" for these
purposes arbitrarily: decisions released between January 1, 1996 and March 1, 1998.
The results include published and unpublished opinions, and decisions of trial and
appellate courts, but not opinions by state courts. Cases that cite ProCD are excluded
from both sets of results. The Article separately deals with them below. As a barom-
eter of "trends" in the law, the sample is too small. As a measure of how parties and
courts frame and resolve these disputes, the sample does not include cases resolved
on terms that do not find their way into the "ALLCASES" file in WESTLAW. I
argue merely that the snapshot provided by these opinions illustrates the status in
practice of the arguments about copyright law presented in the first section of this
part.
275. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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rather than application of "bright-line rules. '276 The Court further
emphasized that, especially in light of the legislative history of the
statutory version of the fair use doctrine, courts should "continue the
common law tradition of fair use adjudication"' that existed prior to
the enactment of the current Copyright Act in 1976.171 In the context
of Campbell, the Court's approach led to its conclusion that noncon-
sensual commercial re-use of a copyrighted work should not generate
a presumption that the use was unfair.2 7 9 Nor should the effect of the
re-use on the market for the copyrighted work dominate fair use anal-
ysis.280 Each of the four factors relating to fair use described in the
Copyright Act deserves consideration, and they should be considered
together.
The procedural proposition is that fair use has been found to be an
affirmative defense, to be pleaded and proven by the defendant,"
rather than an element of the plaintiff's claim of infringement. Even
though § 107 of the Copyright Act defines fair use of a copyrighted
work as "not an infringement of copyright,"'  the plaintiff need not
allege or prove that the defendant's allegedly infringing use does not
constitute fair use. The combination of these procedural hurdles and
the Supreme Court's admonition to apply common-law concepts sug-
gests the appropriateness of the Second Circuit's observation a decade
ago, that "[b]ecause the fair use question is so highly dependent on
the particular facts of each case, courts have usually found it appropri-
ate to allow the issue to proceed to trial,"'  ought to still be the case.
The opinions, however, belie the implication that fair use cases
should usually go to the factfinder. They also belie what some might
take to be the logical corollary of the "common law" approach con-
firmed in Campbell, the proposition that common law adjudication of
fair use issues should, and will, produce fair use "rules." The thirteen
fair use decisions referred to above break down roughly into two
276. See id. at 577. The four non-exclusive statutory fair use factors are listed at
supra note 242 and accompanying text.
277. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
278. See id. at 577-78. In his concurrence in Campbell, Justice Kennedy observed
that "[t]he common-law method instated by the fair use provision of the copyright
statute ... presumes that rules will emerge from the course of decisions." Id. at 596
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The concurrence highlights an ambigu-
ity in the formulation of the common-law tradition, which is explored in part V.
279. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-85.
280. See id. at 577-78; American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
926 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on the absence from Campbell of a statement, from Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,566 (1985), that market effect
of the re-use is the most significant of the four fair use factors).
281. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). But see Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532,
1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (identifying fair use as a "right" granted by the Copyright
Act).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
283. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258 (2d Cir. 1986).
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groups. Seven of the thirteen rely to some extent on reasoning by
analogy to other cases of a similar type, although categorization by
type correlates poorly with consistency of result. Leibovitz v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp."8 and Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc.28 5 involved fair use defenses to infringement claims brought
against publishers of parodies. In Leibovitz, the photographer, Annie
Leibovitz, challenged the parody of her photograph of the actress
Demi Moore used in an advertising campaign for the movie Naked
Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult. The court of appeals affirmed a judg-
ment granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on fair
use grounds, relying largely on Campbell, which concerned a parody
of Roy Orbison's Oh! Pretty Woman, and a fact-specific analysis of the
four fair use factors.2 86 In Dr. Seuss, the court affirmed a preliminary
injunction against the distribution of a parody of the criminal trial of
O.J. Simpson written in the style of Dr. Seuss, rejecting, under Camp-
bell and these same four factors, the defendants' fair use defense.28 7
Three cases deal with fair use of "facts" or "news." In Groden v.
Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc.,288 the court ruled that the defendants'
use in a book of "enhanced" images from the Zapruder film of the
Kennedy assassination constituted fair use, in part because the use it-
self was minimal and in part because the unusual historical value of
the Zapruder film, in previous cases, sustained fair use findings.28 9 In
Kulik Photography v. Cochran,290 the plaintiff challenged the use by
defense counsel for O.J. Simpson in the Simpson murder trial, and
Court TV's subsequent broadcast of that use, of the plaintiff's copy-
righted photograph. The court granted the defendants' motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction and noted that broadcast of the
photograph was presumptively fair as "news reporting."2 91 In Los
Angeles News Service v. KCAL-TV Channel 9,292 the district court
granted the motion for summary judgment of a television station ac-
cused of improperly broadcasting plaintiff's videotape of a beating
during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The court of appeals reversed the
judgment and remanded for trial. Even though the videotape was
"factual" and undoubtedly touched a matter of important public con-
cern, the court found that the defendant's use of the tape was arguably
284. 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
285. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1998).
286. See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 114-17.
287. See Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400-03.
288. No. 92 Civ. 8670 (LBS) (DFE), 1997 WL 739585 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1997).
289. See id. at *8.
290. 975 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Va. 1997).
291. See id. at 814. Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists several illustrations of
types of uses that might support fair use determinations. "News reporting" is one of
them. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
292. 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 81 (1998).
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unfair in light of the station's knowing evasion of a request by the
news service for payment of a license fee.2 93
The final two cases dealing with types of fair use are DSC Commit-
nications v. Pulse Communications Inc.2 94 and Sandoval v. New Line
Cinema Corp.2 95 In DSC Communications, the plaintiff, a producer of
computer technology, challenged the defendant's reverse engineering
of one of the plaintiff's products in order to obtain access to the
source code of plaintiff's software. On the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case at trial,
the court held that such reverse engineering constituted fair use be-
cause it represented the only method of obtaining access to ideas and
functional elements contained in the plaintiffs computer program. 96
In Sandoval, the plaintiff, a photographer, challenged use by the pro-
ducers of the movie Seven of certain photographs in the background
of one scene. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court
ruled that the use was fair, in part contrasting this case with other set
decoration cases.297
The balance of the fair use decisions in this sample avoid categories
and analogy, and instead address themselves almost exclusively to the
operation of the four statutory fair use factors in the context of the
particular case at hand. Equally important, they typically rely most
heavily on the fourth factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."298 The division be-
tween the cases that primarily rely on prior case law on the same or
related use and those that follow the four factors is not sharp. Several
of the cases above that deal with fair use in categories also discuss,
either briefly 299 or at length, the statutory factors and the market im-
pact of the re-use in particular. 3°0 This second group of cases from the
293. See id at 1123.
294. 976 F. Supp. 359 (E.D. Va. 1997).
295. 973 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
296. See DSC Communications, 976 F. Supp. at 363-64 (comparing this dispute with
those presented in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992),
and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), each
of which affirmed that reverse engineering of computer programs constituted fair
use). For a summary of reverse engineering authorities, see Lemley & McGowan,
supra note 55, at 525 n.197.
297. See Sandoval, 973 F. Supp. at 413-14. In affirming the judgment, the court of
appeals distinguished the case from Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), on the ground that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's photo-
graphs was de minimis. See Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217-18.
298. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
299. See Groden v. Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8670 (LBS) (DFE),
1997 WL 739585, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1997).
300. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122-23
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the market impact factor did not weigh in the defend-
ant's favor when a television station evaded an existing license offered by the plaintiff
news service for rights to use the videotape in question, thereby precluding summary
judgment on fair use grounds), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 81 (1998); Sandoval, 973 F.
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sample is notable, however, for the willingness of courts to reason
solely from the text of the statute and from the evidence presented by
the case.
Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.3" already has been
discussed for its emphasis on a paradigm of copyright law that focuses
on the right to license.302 Here, it is noteworthy in part for the fact
that the court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment grant-
ing the defendant's motion for summary judgment on fair use grounds
and in part for the fact that the court's review of the fair use issue was
limited to how the plaintiffs evidence related to the statute.30 3 In
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire and Equipment Distribu-
tors,3 °4 the court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
against the defendant who copied the entirety of the plaintiff's "clip
art" software portfolio onto a website and made that portfolio avail-
able for downloading. Not only did the court analyze the facts of the
case against the statutory fair use factors, but the court also applied
the proposition, rejected earlier by the Supreme Court in Campbell,
that the defendant's commercial re-use of the copyrighted work was
presumptively unfair.3 °5 In Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirk-
wood,30 6 the court granted summary judgment to the defendant, who
marketed "listen lines" that made radio broadcasts available across
telephone lines to individual and firm subscribers who wanted access
to the broadcasts for a variety of monitoring purposes. The absence
of any evidence of market harm appeared to persuade the court that
the defendant was engaged in a legitimate use under the circum-
stances. 307 In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group,
Inc.,308 the court held, on motion for summary judgment by the plain-
tiff, that the defendants' publication of a book of trivia concerning the
Seinfeld television show did not constitute fair use. The effect of such
a work on the market for a similar authorized work was dispositive of
the case because the court found the other three statutory fair use
factors did not clearly favor one party or the other.30 9 In Storm Im-
pact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club,31° the plaintiff produced
Supp. at 413 (holding that a "fleeting and obscured" use of the plaintiff's photographs
could not affect the market for the plaintiffs works).
301. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
302. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
303. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 78-81.
304. 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
305. See id. at 1175-76.
306. 965 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that the potential market impact of the defendant's use tipped the balance of
harms in the plaintiff's favor).
307. See id. at 560.
308. 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
309. See id. at 270.
310. 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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shareware computer games.31' The defendant compiled and sold a se-
ries of CD-ROMs containing a "best of" selection of such games, in-
cluding a game produced by the plaintiff. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court denied both motions concerning in-
fringement and fair use, ruling that material disputes of fact remained
concerning the nature of the fourth factor (effect of the re-use on the
market for the work) under the facts presented. The plaintiffs pro-
gram included a notice that purported to restrict commercial re-distri-
bution of the game. The court indicated that, in light of this notice, it
needed more evidence to assess the plaintiff's market, customs, and
practice concerning shareware generally.312
The last of the fair use cases in the sample, and the one that fits
neatly into neither of the previous categories, is Educational Testing
Service v. Stanley H. Kaplan, Educational Center, Ltd.313 Here, the
court expressly declined to analyze the defendant's "fair use" of the
plaintiff's standardized test under the four statutory factors because
such an analysis would be inconclusive. Instead, the court held that
fact questions remained concerning the defendant's conduct that pre-
cluded summary judgment, and it referred to the "common law" stan-
dard confirmed by the Supreme Court in Campbell and announced
that it would apply fair use as an "equitable rule of reason."3 '
b. Public Domain
Understanding the public domain cases requires notes similar to
those that preceded the fair use decisions. No statutory or Supreme
Court authority directly supports the proposition that determining
what lies in the public domain, or what divides "idea" from "expres-
sion," is a matter of common law or case-by-case adjudication. None-
theless, such a proposition is at least implicit in Feist's standard that, in
order to separate "idea" from "expression," only "original works of
authorship" may form the basis of an action for infringement of copy-
right.315 If copyrightability is questioned, then courts must inquire, for
311. See id at 1442-43.
312. See id. at 1446-47. The district court subsequently ruled that the defendant
could not rely on a "fair use" defense. See Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the
Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782,791 (N.D. Il. 1998) ("[E]xpress reservations of distri-
bution rights are valid, enforceable, and militate against a finding of fair use."). In so
ruling, the court relied heavily on testimony offered by the defendant's expert, who
noted that commercial re-distribution of shareware (i.e., in violation of a notice)
would not benefit the public. See id. Under the reasoning used by the court, tradi-
tional shrinkwrap licenses and restrictive notices are legally indistinguishable.
313. 965 F. Supp. 731 (D. Md. 1997).
314. Id at 736-37 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
315. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 347-49 (1991); see also Pe-
ter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (identi-
fying the division between "ideas" and "expression" as "inevitably ... ad hoc"). As
noted earlier, this discussion does not encompass material that, for one technical rea-
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any particular work, whether apparently factual material is "selected,
coordinated or arranged" in a way that renders the work creative or
original.316 Procedurally, the public domain operates, like fair use, as
an affirmative defense ("the work in question is not copyrightable") to
a claim of infringement.31 7 The case-by-case nature of copyright-
ability analysis, therefore, ought to be even more pronounced than
with fair use decisions, and one expects even less consistency than that
encountered above.
What the sample suggests, however, is that copyrightability or pub-
lic domain analysis is almost entirely a function of the "category" or
type of case to which a particular case is assigned. There is very little
generalized "copyrightabiity" jurisprudence among these cases aside
from bows to the "originality" standard from Feist itself. Three of the
ten cases apply the standards of Feist directly, dealing as Feist did, with
compilations of facts or data:318 American Delta Ass'n v. Delta Dental
Plans Ass'n,3 19 Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp. ,3M and
Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical
son or another, might be copyrighted but is not, see Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that the common law
copyright in Dr. King's civil rights speech was lost through publication), or falls out of
copyright, see Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. Copy-
right Soc'y 137, 151 (1993) (arguing that different categories of public domain mate-
rial require different analyses).
316. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358. This sets up the parallel with fair use jurisprudence.
"Originality," which is contingent, is an administrable proxy for the idea-expression
dichotomy, which assumes a static division between "fact" and "not fact." See id. at
358-59 (citing the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976: "The most impor-
tant point here is ... that... copyright... has no effect one way or the other on the
copyright or public domain status of the preexisting material."). Under Feist, the pub-
lic domain already exists and it awaits discovery. "Originality," however, like fair use,
may be determined. But see Litman, Public Domain, supra note 257, at 1019-22 (argu-
ing that "originality" does not provide a coherent basis on which to divide copyright-
able from uncopyrightable material).
317. Registration of the copyright is a prerequisite to maintaining a suit for in-
fringement, and a valid certificate of registration creates a rebuttable presumption
that the copyright is valid. See Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communi-
cations, Inc., 948 F.2d 1518, 1526 (10th Cir. 1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994)
(providing that a certificate of registration made within five years of the first publica-
tion constitutes prima facie evidence of validity of copyright). Functionally, there-
fore, lack of originality must be proved by the alleged infringer. The Registrar of
Copyrights may reject the application for registration, see id. § 410(b), but it only
infrequently does so, see Nelson R. Capes, The Software Copyright 'Super Patent,'
Computer Law., June 1, 1995, at 8, 12-13; Nancy H. McAleer, A Bird's Eye View of
Copyright Registration, N.J. Law., Feb. 15, 1993, at 15.
318. Compilations of data are specifically listed in the Copyright Act as a type of
work that falls within the subject matter of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) ("The
subject matter of copyright as specified by § 102 includes compilations and derivative
works .... "); id. § 103(b) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work .... ").
319. 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that taxonomy of dental procedures
is sufficiently original to be copyrightable and vacating summary judgment granted in
the defendant's favor).
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Ass'n.321 Two cases apply a specialized standard developed in the con-
text of computer programs to separate protectable "copyrightable" el-
ements of such programs from unprotected elements: Mitel, Inc. v.
Iqtel, Inc. 322 and Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communi-
cations, Inc.3 3 Two cases briefly dispose of copyrightability questions
by characterizing the works in question as formulas or sets of instruc-
tions:324 Lambing v. Godiva Chocolatier25 and Continental Micro,
Inc. v. HPC, Inc.326 Two specialized doctrines that deal with circum-
stances in which idea and expression are inextricably linked form the
core of one case apiece. In Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., z
the court rejected, on cross motions for summary judgment, the claim
that an advertising campaign infringed the copyright of singer Aaron
Tippin in the title to a song, because the lyric was a "common motto"
that could not be copyrighted.3 12 Although the court did not expressly
rely on the doctrine, its reasoning generally parallels that of the
"scenes d faire" doctrine, which denies copyright protection to expres-
sion that is indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given
topic. 329 In Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co.,3 0" the court
dismissed the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim in fish forms for
use in taxidermy.331 The court applied the doctrine of merger, under
which copyright protection is denied for expression of facts or ideas
320. 115 F.3d 1509, 1520-21 (11th Cir.) (vacating an injunction granted to the plain-
tiff because a selection of communities in a directory of cable television systems was
not original enough to be copyrightable); cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
321. 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the copyright in a directory of
medical procedure codes could not be enforced on the basis of copyright misuse and
reversing a preliminary injunction granted to the defendant publisher), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 40 (1998), and amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2367 (1998).
322. 124 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying the abstraction-filtration-
comparison standard for computer programs); see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining the abstraction-filtration-
comparison standard).
323. 118 F.3d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court erred by failing
to properly apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison standard), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1300 (1998).
324. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (providing that copyright protection does not
extend to procedures or systems, among other things).
325. No. 97-5697, 1998 WL 58050 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 1998) (involving a recipe and
design for chocolate truffles), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2372 (1998).
326. No. 95 C 3829, 1997 WL 309028 (N.D. IIl. June 4, 1997) (discussing code cards
that provide directions for locksmiths to cut keys).
327. 988 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
328. See id at 294-95. The result is also consistent with categorical treatment of
"common motto" or "ordinary phrase" cases.
329. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)
("Under the scenes a faire [sic] doctrine, we deny protection to those expressions that
are standard, stock, or common to a particular topic or that necessarily follow from a
common theme or setting.").
330. 967 F. Supp. 70 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd men., 152 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. 1998).
331. See id. at 73.
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that can be expressed in only one or a handful of ways.3 32 Alone
among the cases in this sample, only Great Importations, Inc. v. Caffco
International, Inc.3 33 deals with a copyrightability question in what
might be called a "common law" manner, or at least in a manner that
is not "category" dependent. At issue in that case were two sets of
three porcelain candleholders, consisting of the letters "J," "0," and
"Y" and decorated with holly and angels. The court granted the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the de-
fendants had not infringed copyrightable expression. 34 The court
reasoned by analogy, relying on cases involving the design of toys,
jewelry, hats, and sculpture, in reaching the conclusion that the plain-
tiff could not assert infringement claims against candleholders that
used the same elements, but not precisely as the plaintiff had done.335
2. The Progeny of ProCD
The manner in which courts handle public domain and fair use
cases, by "categorizing" some disputes and dealing with most others
strictly on a non-common law case-by-case basis, is not necessarily
surprising, nor is it, in the abstract, necessarily wrong. In light of the
decision in ProCD and the increasing prevalence of shrinkwrap and
other contract forms for transactions in information, however, the
courts' handling of these cases creates a risk that ProCD's analytic
vocabulary is not well-prepared to deal with conflicts between the in-
herently public nature of fair use and public domain doctrine and pri-
vate definitions or conventions of what may be protected and used.
As a general matter, the vocabulary of fair use and copyrightability,
whether that is the vocabulary of categories or of a priori application
of fair use factors, is not concerned with notices, licenses, and agree-
ments. A jurisprudence that suggests that the latter sweep aside con-
sideration of the former, then, presents considerable potential danger.
As with the cases summarized above concerning fair use and the
public domain itself, caselaw following ProCD and manifesting the
risk just described is somewhat sparse and, therefore, at best sugges-
tive. The suggestion, however, is that the risk is real. There is a hint
of the problem in Storm Impact.3 3 6 The court in that case determined
that assessing whether the defendant had made fair use of the plain-
tiff's shareware computer game depended, in part, on use-proscribing
norms both explicit and implicit in the shrinkwrap legend that the
plaintiff included with each copy of the game. The court, however,
made no reference to ProCD.
332. See id. at 72-73. Enforcing a copyright under such circumstances would be
tantamount to granting a copyright in the idea or facts themselves.
333. No. 95 Civ. 0514 MBM SEG, 1997 WL 414111 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1997).
334. See id. at *7.
335. See id. at *3-*7.
336. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
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There are more substantial hints in cases that refer to ProCD in
intellectual property contexts. Mainly, those cases have made clear
that, notwithstanding the fact that ProCD itself concerned shrinkwrap
applied to public domain material and technically concerned the ele-
ments of an enforceable license, its reasoning is being extended to
contexts involving copyrightable material and the assertion of so-
called "proprietary rights."
Three cases have relied explicitly on ProCD to support the proposi-
tion that contracts or licenses concerning works of information are
categorically distinct from rights under copyright law and, as a result,
state law enforcement of such contracts is not preempted under the
Copyright Act.337 Expediters International of Washington, Inc. v. Di-
rect Line Cargo Management Services, Inc.,33 involved claims for theft
of trade secrets, breach of contract, and copyright infringement arising
from the use of computer software by the defendant after a license
allegedly had expired. The court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment that argued the contract claims were preempted,
citing ProCD.33 9 In Lattie v. Murdach, " the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant in state court for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and
unfair competition. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, following
some negotiations with the plaintiff, appropriated public domain cata-
log materials and published them."4 The defendant removed the case
to federal court, asserting that the Copyright Act preempted the
claims. 34 2 The district court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand,
concluding, among other things, that under ProCD, the plaintiff's con-
tract claim was categorically different from a copyright claim and
could be tried in state court. 3 Finally, in Architectronics, Inc. v. Con-
trol Systems, Inc.,'" the court rejected the defendants' argument on
summary judgment that the Copyright Act preempted a breach of
contract claim by a software development firm against two joint ven-
turers.345 The court concluded that ProCD, among other cases, sup-
ported the proposition that rights in contract are categorically
different from rights under the federal copyright statute. 6
337. ProCD did not assert quite such a blunt proposition. See supra notes 99-101
and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of preemption of contract
claims under the Copyright Act, see infra note 434 and accompanying text.
338. 995 F. Supp. 468 (D.NJ. 1998).
339. See id. at 483-84.
340. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
341. See id. at 1241-42.
342. See id. at 1242-43.
343. See id. at 1244-45.
344. 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
345. See id. at 438-41.
346. See id. at 439; see also NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849-50 (2d Cir.
1997) (discussing ProCD in the context of preemption of a state law claim for misap-
propriation and noting that contract claims are not preempted under ProCD because
they do not lie within the "general scope" of copyright).
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ProCD's potential influence on analysis of claims concerning both
copyrightable and uncopyrightable material is even more clearly sug-
gested by two cases that, more directly than those above, implicate
restrictions on access and use of information. In Micro Star v.
FormGen, Inc.,"' the producers of a commercially distributed add-on
to a copyrighted computer game sued the manufacturers of the game
for a declaration that the add-on, and associated packaging and screen
savers, infringed neither copyright nor trademark.3 48 The defendant
moved for a preliminary injunction against distribution of the add-on,
and the court granted the motion regarding the packaging and screen
savers.349 The defendant expressly contemplated that users of the
game would construct add-ons for their own use, and it provided
software tools in the original game to enable users to do so."' With
the tools, however, the defendant included a "license.doc" file that
provided restrictions on the use of add-ons constructed with the tools
provided by the defendant, including restrictions on commercial sales
of such new code.35' The court declined to enforce the terms of the
"license.doc" file as a shrinkwrap license. The court noted, but did
not rule, that this notice was distinguishable from the license in
ProCD in its inaccessibility prior to the plaintiff's acquisition of the
game and in its relative lack of indicia that the plaintiff consented to
its terms. 2 The plaintiff's knowledge of the license prior to the distri-
bution of its add-on software, however, defeated its argument that the
plaintiff possessed an implied license commercially to distribute its
add-on code.353 The contractual framework of ProCD, in other
words, did not fit the specifics of the license form used by the software
producer in this case, but it encouraged the court to conclude that the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work was, colloquially
speaking, unfair.354
347. 942 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 154 F.3d 1107
(9th Cir. 1998).
348. See id. at 1314-15.
349. See id. at 1319-20.
350. These "add-ons" consisted of additional levels of play. See id. at 1315.
351. See id.
352. See id. at 1317-18.
353. See id. at 1318.
354. See id. Fair use as such was addressed by the court separately, but briefly. See
id. at 1317 (arguing that the application of the fourth fair use factor-impact on mar-
ket for work-compelled the conclusion that the fair use defense does not apply).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction as to the packaging and screen savers, and it
found that the software producer, FormGen, was entitled to a preliminary injunction
as to distribution of the add-on. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114
(9th Cir. 1998). The court stated in dicta that if FormGen's license were binding, it
forbade Micro Star's use. If the license were not binding, then FormGen had granted
no written license rights, and Micro Star's use was barred because it did not amount
to fair use. see id. at 1113.
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Tax Analysts v. United States3 55 provides the final and clearest ex-
ample of the way in which ProCD may be extended, how the compart-
mentalization to which public domain and fair use analysis are
susceptible may yield, in a most uncritical way, to legal-ware. In the
district court, a not-for-profit organization sought to enforce a Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA") request demanding disclosure of
the contents of the legal database used by the Department of Justice,
known as JURIS. JURIS is created and supplied to the Department
by West Publishing pursuant to a license agreement. The Department
had declined to produce its contents, and West, in intervention, had
objected to its production, in part on the ground that the terms of the
license prohibited the disclosure. 56 The district court declined to or-
der the production of the database, and on appeal, the court of ap-
peals affirmed.357 Relying almost entirely on the district court's
opinion, the court of appeals nonetheless added the following com-
ment: "To the extent that appellant argues that West could not assert
proprietary rights over a database of information from the public do-
main, it is wrong as a matter of law. 358 The court cited ProCD.359
IV. CONTRACT PARADIGMS AND THE DILEMMA OF OPEN SPACE
The preceding part suggested that, by relying heavily on analyses of
"types" of works and their uses or on ad hoc examinations of equita-
ble factors, existing analytic frameworks for dealing with fair use and
the public domain may not be up to the task of moderating the influ-
ence of ProCD and preserving a meaningful open space. There is no
synthetic open space approach that encourages courts to process copy-
right disputes in similar ways-notwithstanding the fact that shrink-
wrap conventions are breaking down the typology on which courts
and consumers have traditionally and typically relied. Shrinkwrap in-
creasingly makes copyright disputes look alike, though courts still deal
with them as unique phenomena. ProCD, moreover, implies that ex-
isting analytic frameworks are irrelevant, suggesting that any open
space (as I have called it) in the context of intellectual property licens-
355. No. 96-5109, 1997 WL 71746 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997).
356. See Tax Analysts v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 599, 603-04 (D.D.C. 1996),
affid menL, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997). The lower
court drew a distinction between the legal materials themselves-judicial opinions,
codes, and regulations-and arrangements of that material and supplemental material
supplied by West. See id. at 605. The latter, the court ruled, did not constitute a "rec-
ord" in the "control" of the Department, under the terms of a license that limited the
Department's right to transfer the material. See id. at 606-07.
357. See Tax Analysts, No. 96-5109, 1997 WL 71746, at *1 D.C. Cir. Jan. 21 1997)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997) (citation omitted).
358. Id. (citation omitted); see also Gilmore v. Department of Energy, 4 F. Supp. 2d
912 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (following the District Court's opinion in Tax Analysis in holding
that records relating to the Energy Department's CLERVER video conferencing
software were not subject to disclosure under FOIA).
359. See Tax Analysts, 1997 WL 71746, at *1.
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ing should and will be the product of private transactions, incorporat-
ing whatever regulation of those transactions (if any) that current
contract, commercial, and copyright law provide. This part assesses
the merits of ProCD's position and the possibility of building open
space using the terms that ProCD itself proffers. The court itself sug-
gests four different possibilities for different outcomes, and, thus, four
possibilities for continued dialogue on the extent of fair use and of the
public domain in the context of shrinkwrap.
First, there is the court's claim that firms will compete on terms of
use just as they compete on product price and features. Software
users may choose whether they wish to accept oppressive shrinkwrap
terms with cheap software or pay more for a product accompanied by
more liberal terms.360 More broadly, the court noted the pro-competi-
tive function of the shrinkwrap license in ProCD's market. ProCD's
selection of telephone and address listings removed no information
from the public domain. Arguably, the shrinkwrap license enhanced
the competitiveness of the information marketplace by providing an
incentive to ProCD to produce its CD-ROMs at a low price.36' Sec-
ond, the court noted that, arguably, users are coerced into accepting
unfair contract terms, a situation to which black letter contract law
itself and in particular the law of unconscionability may apply.362
Third, the court followed the proposition that commercial law should
generally specify background rules that adopt norms of commercial
practice and usage. ProCD strongly suggests that its outcome is con-
sistent with established patterns of marketing and distribution of com-
puter software and that parties should specifically bargain if they
desire a different result. 63 Fourth, the court's discussion of the doc-
trine of preemption of state law rights, and state contract law in partic-
ular, by federal copyright law suggests a final inquiry.364 Taking the
court at its word, the barrier to preemption of contracts concerning
intellectual property rights is not absolute. 365 To evaluate the possibil-
ity that the market may right itself, that ProCD and shrinkwrap prac-
360. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Terms of
use are no less a part of 'the product' than are the size of the database and the speed
with which the software compiles listings. Competition among vendors, not judicial
revision of a package's contents, is how consumers are protected in a market econ-
omy." (citation omitted)).
361. See id. at 1455 (explaining the pro-competitive merits of a license that facili-
tates distribution of object code while concealing the source code).
362. See id. at 1449 ("Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they vio-
late a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable).").
363. See id. at 1451-52 (noting that a majority of software sales take place in an
environment where a "terms first, sale second" framework would be impractical).
364. See id. at 1454-55.
365. See id. The limited evidence to date suggests that other courts have not read
ProCD so carefully, but the possibility remains that the doctrine might be more
refined.
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tice and doctrine might be leading us, after all, toward a satisfactory
accommodation of private ordering and public values, each of the
foregoing themes is briefly reviewed below.
A. The Market for Open Space
The Seventh Circuit's direct response to Zeidenberg, and to shrink-
wrap opponents, was the proposition that judicial interference in the
private market for contract forms is unwarranted, at least absent evi-
dence that this market is not functioning efficiently. "ProCD has ri-
vals," the court wrote, "which may elect to compete by offering
superior software, monthly updates, improved terms of use, lower
price, or a better compromise among these elements."3  If
Zeidenberg wanted the right to make fair use of a copyrighted work
or to access and distribute public domain material that is collected and
packaged by others, then he should be prepared to pay for it. It is also
reasonable to expect that firms will compete with one another, on
those terms, for his money.
The correctness of the court's economic theory may be debated,
although recent scholarship fairly persuades that such competition is
unlikely either to occur367 or be effective.3 s If the theory is correct,
however, the result is, effectively, a private, unregulated pricing re-
gime for fair use and the public domain. This Article has objected to
modes of information distribution that enable and encourage publish-
ers privately to determine norms and conventions of information use.
Leaving open space to the market plays to, rather than opposes, this
tendency.369 If courts ratify this premise by enforcing agreements that
366. Id at 1453. The court in ProCD relied on its decision in Digital Equipment
Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996), arguing that it
should defer to a competitive market rather than edit contract terms. The latter deci-
sion concerned an antitrust claim in a market for computer hardware. There, the
court wrote: "Computer manufacturers are vigorous rivals; prices drop daily; this is
one of our economy's most competitive sectors." Id. at 761. Computer hardware and
software markets may, in time, merge, but there seems to be little empirical justifica-
tion for the court's generalized "computer markets" analysis.
367. Arguably, in a competitive market with low elasticity of demand, firms may
compete on contract terms if they cannot compete on price. Regardless of elasticity
of demand, however, markets that rely on form contracts may evolve toward standard
terms and away from competition for terms, because of path dependence and network
effects, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 55, at 750-51, or "herd" tendencies implicit
in theories of cultural evolution, see Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evoltion of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. Legal Stud. 377, 378 (1997) (arguing that commercial norms
are likely to evolve efficiently but are also likely to cease evolving before they reach
socially optimal levels).
368. Cognitive phenomena may limit consumers' ability to discriminate between
forms offered by different firms in the same market. See Eisenberg, Limits of Cogni-
tion, supra note 203, at 243-44 (arguing that because of cognitive limitations on under-
standing form contract terms, competition is more likely to result in degradation of
form terms than in socially optimal terms).
369. In a more generalized property law context, Professor Nance suggests that if
one wants to encourage non-consensual takings, it is more effective to set a price. If
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parse access to open space before it is demonstrated that open space
ought to be dealt with in this way,37° then the private market for open
space becomes the public value.3 7 ' Open space becomes another di-
mension of the creator's ability to control the use of the work.
A broader reading of ProCD's market-based approach focuses not
only on the market for forms, but on shrinkwrap as a component of a
competitive market structure 372 that provides the incentive necessary
for ProCD to produce its CD-ROM. If the underlying product market
is not perfectly competitive, one could conceive of intervening on a
market failure premise to protect by fiat, among other things, open
space that by assumption a well-functioning market otherwise would
produce.
There are at least three variants of this possibility circulating in
copyright scholarship and case law. Professors Reichman and Samu-
elson argue that the "anti-copying" framework underlying intellectual
property law inadequately meliorates the costs of market failure. The
failure of market mechanisms to provide adequate incentives to pro-
duce works of information3 73 should be replaced by a "market-pre-
serving" framework, at least for uncopyrightable compilations of
fact.374 In their view, market failure depends on the assumption that
one wants to discourage such takings, it is more effective to set sanctions. See Nance,
supra note 205, at 880-81. Such strategies may fail adequately to account, either sub-
stantively or procedurally, for other, possibly public, values. See Robert W. Gordon,
The Path of the Lawyer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (1997) (stating that setting
prices for conduct undervalues law as embodying norms of the political community);
Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Com-
mon Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 29-36 (arguing that setting prices for environmental
conduct may undercut informal norms against polluting). Pricing open space for
works of information similarly undercuts conventions or norms that otherwise pro-
mote nonconsensual use as a social good. Cf. Heller, supra note 15, at 667-79 (arguing
that when multiple users are given legal entitlements to exclude others from a scarce
resource, an "anticommons" results, leading to under-use of common resources).
370. The ultimate definitions of fair use and the public domain await determination
through some process in which different approaches or concepts are heard and, one
hopes, eventually reconciled. See infra Part V.
371. Apart from their enforcement, the existence of such contracts may represent
welfare gains, so long as the contracts are genuine, rather than "conventional." See
Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 23, at 740-42 (arguing that social welfare gains
from private contracts may exist even in the absence of mandatory enforcement of
such contracts); Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract: Beyond the
Shadow of the Law, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 107, 110-22 (1995) (noting the importance of
nonjudicial interpretations of contracts and the contracting process in contract
theory).
372. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).
373. See supra notes 34-34 and accompanying text.
374. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 137-63. The earlier Manifesto of
Professor Samuelson and her colleagues sounded a similar theme for copyrightable
computer programs. See Pamela Samuelson et. al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2310-15 (1994); see also
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 222-29 (1992) (suggesting the development of a
"malcompetitive" or market destructive tort).
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absent some legal protection or incentive, compilers of fact, such as
scientists and other scholars, will have insufficient incentives to create
factual works.375 Legal frameworks based on anti-copying rules and
bilateral contracts, bolstered by copyright management technologies,
"over-protect" such compilations and leave insufficient room for so-
cially desirable re-use. Instead, a "market-based" framework should
be built into the law, with socially-determined "lead-times '376 as-
signed to certain markets that insulate data compilers from market-
destructive behavior by those who re-use the compiled data solely
during those "lead-times." In theory, a form of compulsory licensing
for intellectual works provides for incentive-ensuring returns based on
initial market advantage and allows for bilateral negotiation concern-
ing access and re-use.37 Until a comprehensive scheme can be
worked out, Professors Reichman and Samuelson recommend a case-
by-case analysis of anti-competitive or market destructive behavior
through nonconsensual use, using existing unfair competition
principles.378
A second variant is the call for increased reliance on or recognition
of unfair competition law,379 or on existing or a reformulated law of
trade secrets380 in protecting a competitive balance between the infor-
mation creator's right to protect or limit access to or use of the work
and open space. In both instances, as with the "lead-time" approach
375. The ease with which markets for such information might be appropriated cre-
ates the market failure. Creators and compilers cannot preserve their "lead-time"
advantage long enough to capture monopoly returns large enough to justify investing
in the initial compilation. But see Goldstein, Comments on a Manifesto, supra note 39,
at 2573-74 (arguing that the market failure argument that focuses on the inability to
capture a monopoly return undervalues market failure based on the indivisibility of
works of information).
376. The extent of any particular "lead-time" should be determined based on a
dialogue concerning a balance between incentives to produce and room for second-
comers. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 149 (stating that lead-times
should be the products of bargaining among various constituent groups).
377. See id. at 145-51. Thus, this approach has much in common with arguments
that conclude that accommodating re-use or access considerations is best accom-
plished in law by encouraging the creation of private collectives that facilitate bilat-
eral transactions in information rights. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules,
supra note 26, at 1391-93 (arguing that property rule entitlements are more likely than
compulsory licenses to encourage the formation of licensing collectives).
378. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 139-45.
379. See Perritt, Information Superhighway, supra note 33, §§ 10.1, 10.21, at 416-18,
455-57 (noting the importance of trade secret and unfair competition law). Unfair
competition law would contextualize the parties' allegedly unlawful behavior, as does
current fair use doctrine, see supra Part III.A, and accompanying text, without requir-
ing copyright's "reproduction" predicate. Under current law, to the extent that state
law unfair competition standards address anti-copying behavior regulated by copy-
right law, application of such standards is likely preempted by the Copyright Act. See
NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that a claim for the
general misappropriation of a broadcast of basketball games was preempted).
380. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2432, 2519-57 (1994).
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described above, the analysis focuses not on the manipulation of the
work itself, but on the market position of the plaintiff-the creator or
compiler of the work-and the need to protect that market position
from ethically or economically inappropriate behavior, either on an
individual or market-wide basis, in order to ensure the creation of the
work in the first place.38'
The emerging doctrine of "copyright misuse" is the third variant. A
defendant charged with infringement may assert that the copyright
holder's refusal to consent to the use (under any terms, or under terms
to which the defendant objects) is based not on a good faith effort to
obtain returns from exploiting the work, but on an unlawful scheme to
protect the holder's market from competition.3s The distinction be-
tween information law and antitrust law is tenuous. For this reason,
381. Trade secret law and the law concerning covenants not to compete look at the
problem as one of ex ante planning; unfair competition law looks at it as one of ex post
fairness. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 2 (manuscript at 55-57).
382. The handful of courts that have recognized the copyright misuse doctrine have
done so only as an affirmative defense. No case has recognized an affirmative claim
for relief based on the theory. See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a judgment against Kodak for
the anti-competitive refusal to license copyrighted manuals to third-party service or-
ganizations), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998); Practice Management Info. Corp. v.
Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting the rule that misuse is a
defense to copyright infringement), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 40 (1998), and amended by
133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2367 (1998); DSC Communications
Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the availability
of the copyright misuse defense); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64
F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the unilateral refusal to license copy-
righted work does not constitute copyright misuse); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (barring the enforcement of copyright where a
license restricted the right of a licensee to use a competitive product); In re Independ-
ent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1142-44 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding
that the copyright holder may deny access to products covered by the copyright even
if the exclusion raises antitrust issues); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp.,
845 F. Supp. 356, 368-69 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that selective software licensing is
acceptable to protect copyrighted works); see also Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 42-49) (suggesting that the copyright misuse doctrine may be
appropriately fine-grained for tailoring copyright incentives); James A.D. White, Mis-
use or Fair Use: That Is the Software Question, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 251, 272-88
(1997) (arguing in favor of an expanded role for the misuse doctrine, rather than the
fair use doctrine, in preserving access to copyrighted works); cf Juno Online Servs. v.
Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that no affirmative
claim exists for trademark misuse).
The doctrine of implied license is conceptually related to this defense. An unau-
thorized user charged with infringement may defend on the ground that the plaintiff
by its conduct and statements authorized the use in question. The copyright misuse
defense involuntarily limits the legitimate scope of the copyright owner's market; the
implied license defense involuntarily expands it. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d
768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996); 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 10.03[A][3], at 10-40 to
-41.
some have suggested that the two be formally collapsed into a single
approach.383
In the form most helpful to affirmative notions of open space, unfair
competition models make explicit the desire to preserve some area of
open space by curing market failure only to the extent necessary to
ensure the creation of works of information that otherwise would not
exist and, in the case of the proposal by Professors Reichman and
Samuelson, by attempting to make explicit provision for open space
for academic and scientific research. 3s Providing for publicly-defined
open space, however, is at best an assumption of this framework,
rather than its goal. Making open space an assumption rather than an
outcome renders it merely another condition of market failure, a mar-
ket feature that may legitimately be cured not by an expression of
public norms, but by private remedy. From the perspective of achiev-
ing an affirmative normative sense of open space, each of these unfair
competition variants suffers from the flaws inherent in their transac-
tional origins.385 Once market failures are cured, open space results
from efficient transactional norms.3s We return to, rather than es-
cape from, conventions that legitimize private definitions of all use. 3s
B. Unconscionability, Contracts of Adhesion, and Form Contracts
The second suggestion proffered by ProCD is general contract law
and, in particular, the law of unconscionability, which for standard or
form contracts traditionally restrains the focus of modern contract law
on "assent" as the keystone of enforceability of agreements. The im-
plication of ProCD is that shrinkwrap is special, that in a "take it or
leave it context" (but not one of so-called equal bargaining power) a
383. See O'Rourke, Drawing tie Boundary, supra note 53, at 555-58 (arguing that
form license terms should be preempted by federal copyright policy if their use cre-
ates "market power" in a relevant market). Proof of a "copyright misuse" defense
does not, however, require proof of an antitrust violation. See Practice Management
Info., 121 F.3d at 521; Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic
Vigilantism" Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1091, 1190-98 (1995) (arguing in favor of a misuse-based limit on both patented
and copyrighted "lock-out" devices that is distinct from an antitrust-based misuse de-
fense); id. at 1202 n.500 (surveying copyright misuse authorities and distinguishing
among those that require market power and those that do not).
384. One might substitute other privileged uses-criticism, news reporting, or par-
ody, for example-for these two, or collect a defined universe of such uses. In es-
sence, the analysis remains the same.
385. See supra Part III.
386. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 244, at 1602 (arguing that
the "fair use" doctrine best implements a balance between producers' and consumers'
interests); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 8, at 149-51 (arguing that a liability
rules approach together with private collection societies can efficiently process the
licensing needs of science and education at reasonable cost).
387. Cf. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 Harv. J.L &
Pub. Pol'y 325, 337 (1992) (noting that collective coordination is no solution to the
"commons" problem because coordination is the cause of the problem).
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restraint on re-use of information might not be enforced, under cer-
tain circumstances, as an unconscionable contract term.
Existing unconscionability doctrine, which is clearly what the Sev-
enth Circuit has in mind, focuses on unfairness in the process of con-
tract formation and on unfairness in substantive contract terms.
Typically, a plaintiff must prove both elements to prevail on an uncon-
scionability claim.388 It is commonly observed that a plaintiff who
seeks to avoid contractual liability on unconscionability grounds faces
a difficult challenge under any circumstances.389 Under ProCD, how-
ever, publishers have a roadmap to secure ground that relies solely on
the procedural half of the doctrine.390 Procedurally, the court's hold-
ing validates placing a notice of license term on the exterior of the
package, and the terms themselves inside the package (or even inside
the work), as a "fair" method of contracting. Anything more direct
and explicit, which places (even nominally) an "accept/reject" device
in the hands or in front of the eyes of the consumer, only enhances the
procedural fairness of the transaction.3 91 Not all firms will adapt their
388. "Procedural unconscionability consists of an absence of meaningful choice by
one party due to oppression and surprise. Substantive unconscionability occurs when
the contract terms result in overly harsh or one-sided results, or when the risks of the
bargain are allocated in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner." Pen-
nington's, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., No. 92-35243, 1993 WL 306155, at *2 (9th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1993) (citation omitted); see also Jones Distrib. Co. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1445, 1459-64 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (reviewing the unconscionability
law of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, among others).
389. The circumstances in which shrinkwrap licenses are "formed" are easily char-
acterized as adhesive. See Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina, What's All the Fuss
About Feist? The Sky is Not Falling on the Intellectual Property Rights of On Line
Database Proprietors, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 563, 572-74 (1992); James T. Peys, Note,
Commercial Law-The Enforceability of Computer "Box-Top" License Agreements
Under the U.C.C., 7 Whittier L. Rev. 881, 906-10 (1985). Particular terms may also be
unconscionable. These conclusions, however, have little practical effect given the low
probability that a person subject to an allegedly unconscionable contract term will
have the resources and interest to justify litigating the issue, and because courts rarely
uphold such claims. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1193-97 (not-
ing that courts are reluctant to relieve parties' of their obligations despite the expan-
sion of the adhesion contract doctrine).
390. The court in ProCD assumed away any question of the substantive fairness of
license terms by declaring that the fairness of the license terms was a question for the
market. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
391. A separate body of contract theory dealing with problems of the "assent"
model of contract, "relational" contract analysis, fares no better in dealing with "un-
fairness" in shrinkwrap. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and
External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 340, 343-45 (1983) (discussing relational patterns in con-
tracts); Perritt, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 366-72 (discussing "relational
contracts" in detail). The "relational" contract doctrine examines contracts as devices
that not only allocate risk between the parties, but also define a cooperative relation-
ship, ongoing over time; thus, the core enterprise of classical contract analysis, identi-
fying the basis of assent to an agreement, becomes less important than identifying and
regulating the ongoing obligations of both parties. See Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay,
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L.
Rev. 565. At present, it is difficult to see that, in most cases, those who "use" infor-
mation products do so regularly enough to characterize that use as a "relationship"
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forms equally to resemble contracts, but those that do adapt to
ProCD, and we have seen that many have and more are being en-
couraged to, will foreclose with new forms most of what is left of the
possibility of voiding a ProCD-type license on traditional unconscio-
nability grounds.
"Reconstructing" contract doctrine for form or adhesive contracts,
to focus more explicitly on the substantive fairness and efficiency of
the terms themselves in light of their transactional and institutional
contexts, 3" offers little help in analyzing the enforceability of use limi-
tations in shrinkwrap. Professor Rakoff argues that courts should sort
form contract terms into, and decide cases based on, what he describes
as "visible" and "invisible" categories. 393 "Visible" terms are those
terms that consumers "shop," or compare, when making purchases
(and as to which, accordingly, manufacturers may be more likely to
compete). Such terms would be subject to a presumption of enforce-
ability. "Invisible" terms are the balance; such terms would be subject
to an opposite presumption.394 Professor Slawson takes a different
approach, one that purports to supply a substantive answer to the
question raised by contract terms that cannot be enforced on public
policy grounds. In his view, contract terms, including form contract
terms, should be enforceable to the extent that the proponent (devel-
oper) of the form reasonably expects that the consumer understand
with the information producer or provider. See Perritt, Dispute Resohtion, supra note
21, at 366-72 (concluding that traditional contract models handle most issues arising
under computer network service agreements).
392. See W. David Slawson, Binding Promises: The Late 20th-Century Reforma-
tion of Contract Law 90-21 (1996); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at
1220-45.
393. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1248-83.
394. See id. at 1258-83. Evidence that the purpose of such "invisible" terms was
merely to promote or protect firms' interests in managing risk and disciplining their
organizations would fail to overcome the presumption. Professor Rakoff identifies a
number of internal firm benefits from the use of form contracts, beyond those gener-
ated by the use of forms possibly to reduce external transaction costs in connection
with mass distribution. Form contracts reduce the cost of contract formation and con-
summation. They minimize uncertainty and the potential liability it creates. They
impose a manageable structure for disputes that are not filtered out through routine
processing devices incorporated in the forms. By imposing a set of uniform decision-
making rules, forms reduce or even eliminate sources of discretion at lower levels of
the organization, thus both reducing the cost of policing variations from firm policy,
but also concentrating power (and wealth) in the organization at higher levels of man-
agement. See id. at 1221-22. In the context of the computer software developer, use of
a form license has an additional communicative purpose: the publisher can communi-
cate simultaneously and quickly to a number of audiences, see Gomulkiewicz & Vil-
liamson, supra note 28, at 341-52, and can express not only particular information
concerning the product, but also a set of shared values and norms. Firms use forms to
communicate information to the market and to individual consumers, information
about how the firm perceives and conceives of the market, information about what
technical, legal, and social matters the firm believes are relevant and irrelevant, infor-
mation about the product itself, the goals it is designed to accomplish, and how those
goals are implemented. See Slawson, supra note 392, at 69.
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the terms proffered.395 That is the point, he argues, at which the par-
ties and a reviewing court could legitimately locate true "assent" to an
agreement.396
Both models, however, leave aside the normative content of the law
that applies in the absence of the unenforced contract term. Professor
Rakoff suggests that courts apply a body of default principles, 397 but
he specifies neither what those are nor how they should be derived.3 98
At the least, his model functions best in a mature market, where a
distinction between "visible" and "invisible" terms is more accessible.
Professor Rakoff acknowledges that in a market in which interests and
contract forms are continuing to evolve, deferring to a particular con-
tract practice might well be preferable to building a legal rule around
that practice.399 Professor Slawson suggests that courts, rather than
legislatures, should guide the development of contractual norms, by
using common law techniques to develop specialized bodies of "rea-
sonable" standards to deal with classes of contracts. 40° For the use
regulation of works of information via shrinkwrap, that means that a
reconstructed doctrine for analyzing form contracts, without more, is,
at most, unlikely to be helpful in the challenge to find open space
within the terms of ProCD and is at least (given the implication that
under many conditions, deference to form developers is appropriate)
likely to continue to set the debate in unsatisfactory market terms.
395. See Slawson, supra note 392, at 49-68.
396. See id. at 51.
397. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1244.
398. See Friedrich Kessler et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials 275 (3d ed. 1986)(criticizing Professor Rakoff's argument for its failure to state a normatively appropri-
ate balance between commercial organizations and individuals).
399. Professor Rakoff has written that:
If enterprises are to go forward as independent sources of social practice,
they will have to invent new solutions to legal problems; that task cannot be
made so treacherous, so subject to the imposition of unexpected burdens,
that it stifles the necessary incentive. If firms are to establish new practices,
some legal force must be accorded to the very fact of that establishment.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1281. Professor Rakoff cautions
against "long-term" deference, see id. at 1283 n.335, but does not make clear how to
determine the point where a form has become sufficiently common to be adopted,
either judicially or legislatively, as a background rule that substitutes for invalidated
"invisible" terms.
400. See Slawson, supra note 392, at 66-68. Professor Rakoff criticizes this ap-
proach for inappropriately delegating to developers of form contracts the ability ini-
tially to set the terms from which the proper balance is derived. See Rakoff, Contracts
of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1213. In any particular context, however, it is not clear
that judges or legislators are institutionally superior to private parties in identifying
and implementing at least initially legitimate terms. The acknowledged premises of a
discourse inevitably reflect certain norms about its content. The discourse, however,
has to begin somewhere. See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture,
37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 13-17 (1984) (debating whether the constitutional text should be
the sole source of law for purposes of judicial review). This is particularly so if you
believe, as I do, that the discourse should be inductive rather than deductive.
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C. Trade Usage and the Codification of Commercial Norms
Professors Rakoff and Slawson do note that contract forms may
evolve benignly or even efficiently, apart from their enforcement by
courts, and it is conceivable that open space might be found within
such a social convention. In that possibility lies law that formally rec-
ognizes the third "take" on the reasoning of ProCD, which focuses on
the court's deferral to commercial practices. ProCD makes the fol-
lowing argument: Article Two of the UCC explicitly countenances
variations on standard commercial practices. Such variations may be
invalidated by certain special provisions of Article Two, but none of
the specialized substantive mandates of Article Two of the UCC ap-
plies to the terms at issue between Zeidenberg and ProCD. °1 The
ProCD license is consistent with commercial practices in the software
industry." 2 Modifying the UCC specifically to regulate shrinkwrap
licenses might be a bad idea,"3 but defenders of open space might
take to heart the possibility that a practice or usage concerning open
space might be specified in (legal) code, and if this were done, then
cases like ProCD might come out differently. Parties could contract
out of the practice only under limited circumstances, or not at all.
That implication-specification of a set of industry practices to
which transactions would default in the absence of other explicit
agreements-is the premise of the project to draft an Article 2B of the
UCC,4°5 a purportedly comprehensive set of rules dealing with
401. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
402. See id at 1451.
403. See id. at 1453 ("[A]djusting terms in buyers' favor... would lead to a re-
sponse, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as a whole worse off.").
404. Id. Trade usage is "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1983).
"[Flull recognition is ... available for... usages currently observed by the great
majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree."
Id § 1-205 cmt. 5.
405. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Commercial Code: Softvare Contracts and Licenses of Information (visited Nov. 30,
1998) <http://wvwv.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198.html> (August 1, 1998 draft). The
history and status of the Article 2B project are most readily available through several
sites on the World Wide Web. See National Conference of Commissioners, The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; Drafts of Uniform and
Model Acts (visited Sept. 27, 1998) <http'J/www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulculc.htn>
(official site); Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B Revision
Draft Download Site (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http.//vwv.la.uh.edu/ucc2b>; Carol
A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Law on Software Transactions: Draft UCC Article
2B-Licenses (visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http.//Vwv.Softwarelndustry.orgissues/guide>
(software industry site); The Consumer Project on Technology, Welcome to the Con-
sumer Project on Technology's Protest Page on: Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B
(visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http.//vww.cptech.org/uccucc.html>. The current schedule for
drafting and revising the project has the completed draft being submitted to the
American Law Institute membership in May 1999 and to the Annual Meeting of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws during the Summer of
1999.
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licenses in information. The overall thrust of Article 2B has been crit-
icized and defended in detail elsewhere.4 °6 For present purposes, the
question it raises, particularly as the draft addresses shrinkwrap, is
this: is codification of a norm for shrinkwrap (independent of the spe-
cific norm adopted) likely to protect consideration of open space is-
sues, by the market or otherwise, that ProCD otherwise discourages?
For codification efforts in general, the answer appears to be that
codification tends to limit innovation in forms and practices and, thus,
tends to freeze whatever welfare benefits or losses inhere in the un-
derlying practice reflected in the code.40 7 Whether that result is itself
welfare-enhancing depends on whom the code serves. Professor
Bernstein argues that in repeat player situations, legal rules that use
evidence of trade usage or trade practice to interpret written commer-
cial agreements frustrate rather than confirm parties' expectations
about their ability to plan and anticipate the rules that will actually
apply to their conduct, by limiting the extent to which they may devi-
ate from "normal" practice.408 She argues that a better regime of
commercial law should, instead, structure safe harbors for repeat mar-
ket participants, so that commercial parties could safely opt in to or
opt out of default legal rules that rely on evidence of "trade usage" to
406. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss & Jane Kaufman Winn, The Emerging Law of Elec-
tronic Commerce, 52 Bus. Law. 1469, 1469-70 (1997) (arguing in favor of the need for
a stable set of commercial rules for on-line transactions); Bryan G. Handlos, Drafting
and Negotiating Commercial Software Licenses: A Review of Selected Issues Raised by
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1189, 1191
(1997) (discussing the UCC draft proposal to limit the ability to vary certain provi-
sions of the Uniform Code); Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1263-92
(recommending modifications to the UCC proposal that would prevent licenses from
withholding certain rights from licensees); Rice, Digital Information, supra note 10, at
630-36 (criticizing the framework of Article 2B); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The
Future of Information Commerce Under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Prin-
ciples, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1639, 1670-73 (1997) (suggesting how the law of contract
and copyright may better protect the commercial exchange of information). The re-
sults of a symposium on the project held in the Spring of 1998 are available at Haas
School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, Intellectual Property & Con-
tract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://sims.berkeley.edu/BCLT/events/ucc2b/>.
407. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 28, at 289-305 (arguing that doctrines of implied
contract terms restrict, rather than expand, parties' freedom of contract); Elizabeth
Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexi-
ble Rule, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515, 541-46 (1981) (arguing that trade usage rules in
commercial law produce efficiency gains).
408. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 1782-87. Professor Bernstein uses transaction
cost analysis to suggest, by example, the efficiency of formal contractual statements
that restrict rights and warranties provided by a manufacturer (or a software devel-
oper). Such statements may, if interpreted strictly, enable the manufacturer to vary
its behavior in any particular case by providing broader services than encompassed in
the written contract without raising the risk that its conduct will establish a practice
that will be deemed to bind the manufacturer in all cases. Application of trade usage
norms to the end-game rules stated in the contract eliminates those transaction cost
savings. See id. at 1815-26. Professor Rakoff makes a similar argument from a non-
economic perspective. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 55, at 1221.
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interpret ambiguous contract provisions.4 0 9 For one-shot or occa-
sional market participants (such as consumers), the contextual ap-
proach of the UCC is preferred.410
Such arguments, applied to shrinkwrap, suggest the following
problems. First, a UCC-style response to the issues raised in ProCD
undermines rather than enhances the possibility that a market modi-
fied by commercial norms-as-legal-code may be an effective barome-
ter of both producer and consumer welfare concerning use
limitations.41' If market solutions to the problem of open space are
indeed feasible, then norms-as-code (refusing enforcement of use-re-
lated terms or dictating enforcement of use-related terms only on cer-
tain conditions) deters parties from evolving different, enforceable
solutions because courts are likely to view skeptically variations from
the norm. That, in turn, makes identifying the relevant commercial
norm even more critical than it is already in commercial law, and that
requires some method of distinguishing repeat actors (who can protect
themselves) from one-shot or occasional actors (who earn the protec-
tion of the code). The second problem, then, is that distinguishing one
from the other in any given market can be difficult empirically. In the
copyright (and especially digital) marketplace, doing so ex ante may
be impossible.412 Rather than declare a distinction in law, Professor
Bernstein recommends structuring "safe harbors" and allowing mar-
ket participants to sort themselves out: opt in, and producers may rely
on custom contract; fail to opt in, and (possibly consumer protective)
default rules will apply. "Safe harbors" (the default being unregulated
access, for example, in the shrinkwrap context), however, work no
better than the norms-as-code that they are designed to avoid. In
practice, the safe harbor becomes the default. If a "safe harbor" ex-
ists, then rational firms will opt into it.4 13 The distinction disappears.
409. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 1820-21; see also Douglas G. Baird & Robert
Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of Section 2-
207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217, 1261-62 (1982) (stating that formal rules tend to work better
than standards in preserving flexibility for merchants).
410. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 1820 n.168.
411. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 239, at 1065-67.
412. See ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996) (describ-
ing how producers use shrinkwrap limitations to try to segregate consumer and com-
mercial markets by price).
413. For standard form contracts, for example, it may be more efficient for firms to
adopt a single practice that permits relatively costless discretionary variance than to
police the boundaries between multiple, more finely grained policies. See Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 55, at 727-29. Professor Kraus's "cultural evolution" argument
leads to the same conclusion. See Kraus, supra note 367, at 406-07. Conceiving of
open space in the context of this Article as a "safe harbor" for nonconsensual use, see
Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 181, at 1034-35 (recommending -safe
harbors" within copyright law to preserve "hostile" uses that are important to cultural
vitality), confirms rather than challenges publishers' interests in private definitions
and conventions of use. What is "safe" from the user's standpoint is "safe," in the
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Both difficulties are manifested in the current draft of the proposed
Article 2B (and in particular in its treatment of shrinkwrap) in ways
that make particularly clear that commercial law does not lead the
way to open space. First, the project enforces the "license" as the
norm for all transactions in "information"4" 4 and "informational
rights" by defining license as
a contract that authorizes access to or use of information or of infor-
mational rights and expressly limits the contractual rights or permis-
sions granted, expressly prohibits, limits, or controls uses, or
expressly grants less than all informational rights in the information.
A contract may be a license whether the information or informa-
tional rights exist at the time of contract or are to be developed,
created, or compiled thereafter, and whether or not the contract
transfers title to a copy. "License" includes an access contract and,
for purposes of [the Uniform Commercial Code], a consignment of
a copy, but does not include a reservation or creation of a finan-
cier's interest.415
Regardless of the apparent form of a transaction in information,4 1 6
any grant or reservation of rights in "information" or "informational
rights" makes the transaction a "license" and thus subject to Article
2B. The very scope of Article 2B goes hand in hand with the argu-
ment implicit in ProCD that the core value to the producer in infor-
mation creation and distribution is the ability to constrain its re-use
and that this value should be determined in private markets. Given
the premise of Article 2B as a regime of commercial rules built on
commercial practice,417 there remains no incentive for market partici-
sense that expectations are secured in advance, from the point of view of the
publisher.
414. "Information" is defined in Section 2B-102(24) of the Draft as "data, text,
images, sounds, mask works or works of authorship." As only "works of authorship"
are copyrightable, the Draft is intentionally far broader in scope than the Copyright
Act. See Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 2 (manuscript at 15-21).
415. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Commercial Code: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information § 2B-102(28) (vis-
ited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198.html> (August 1,
1998 draft). "Informational rights" are defined as "all rights in information created
under laws governing patents, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets, trademarks, pub-
licity rights, or any other law that permits a person, independently of contract, to
control or preclude another person's use of the information on the basis of the rights
holder's interest in the information." Id. § 2B-102(27).
416. "Contract" is not separately defined by the Draft. Under the reasoning of
ProCD, however, there is only a narrow difference between a classic bargained-for
license in information and a notice reserving or limiting rights to use information. See
supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. Article 2B takes what little responsibility
courts retain to determine the correct characterization of a transaction as a "sale" or a
"license" under copyright law and assigns it wholesale to the information producer.
417. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Commercial Code: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information, Preface, Intro-
duction (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198.html>
(August 1, 1998 draft).
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pants to develop or employ distribution models not based on "use,"
even if the Article 2B Draft were to allow them to do so.4""
Moreover, having encouraged use-based norms for the substance of
information transactions, the Draft confirms a ProCD-like handling of
what it refers to as "mass-market" licenses (its approximation of a
class of what are referred to above as shrinkwrap" 9) from a proce-
418. The drafters note that using "information" as the intended scope of Article 2B
is intended not to interfere with choices by different publishers to sell, rather than
license, their works. See id. at Preface, pt. 2. In practice, however, works and media
that are conventionally "sold," such as books, magazines, and newspapers, already
frequently contain use restrictions that may qualify them as licensed materials under
Article 2B's definition, though the Draft tries to exclude ordinary sales of books,
magazines, and newspapers. See id. § 2B-103 reporter's notes 1 and 3. Article 2B is,
therefore, not truly anticipating continued diversity in distribution. It is embracing a
single distribution norm. If that development is troublesome, because it potentially
limits material subject to re-use via "fair use" or the public domain, then responding
to the challenge should include rules and devices that preserve different methods of
distributing and gaining access to works of information. The drafters of Article 2B
seem to agree that access to a broader range of sources and types of information, and
accommodating a diverse range of methods of access and use, are important public
policy goals. See id The first threshold issue the Draft presents, however, defeats
both.
Setting up a definition of "license" as (presumably) a state law matter also makes a
hash of things from a doctrinal perspective. In the context of Article 2B. the defini-
tion of "license" renders the distinction between "licenses" and "sales" finally a ques-
tion of state law, even if the limitation on use that distinguishes a license from a sale
may be unenforceable under federal law. The Draft itself explicitly acknowledges
that federal law prevails, as it must, in any conflict between the Draft and federal
intellectual property or antitrust statutes. See National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code. Softw'are Contracts and Licenses
of Information § 2B-105 (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http'J/www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/0S0198J
080198.html> (August 1, 1998 draft). For works within the subject matter of copy-
right, however, the scope and extent of the rights concerning that work are questions
of federal law. The definition thus creates a pragmatic problem. If issues concerning
copyright interests-that is, the validity of use limitations-are federal, then questions
of the scope of Article 2B-that is, "is this transaction a licese?,"-ought to be de-
cided by federal courts. In hearing such cases, federal judges would be interpreting
state law, that is, whether the transaction is a license under Article 2B, and in that role
would, at best, be guided by their beliefs about what state courts would do with such
questions. Because of exclusive federal jurisdiction over copyright cases, however, see
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994), state court judges may be barred from ruling on them.
Federal courts could only anticipate state law, but state courts would be barred from
interpreting that law. This morass appears to follow from the drafters' wholehearted
adoption of a characterization of information as "thing." See Rice, Digital Informa-
tion, supra note 10, at 643-48 (stating that the fundamental error of Article 2B is that
it assumes that the transfer of any copy of a work of intellectual property transfers
some right in the intellectual property itself, which the producer has the right to
control).
419. Section 2B-102(32) defines "mass-market license" as "a standard form that is
prepared for and used in a mass-market transaction." "Mass-market transaction" is
defined as
a transaction within this article that is a consumer transaction and, any other
transaction in information or informational rights directed to the general
public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the same informa-
tion with an end-user licensee. A transaction other than a consumer transac-
tion is a mass-market transaction only if the licensee acquires the
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dural perspective, excluding, as a practical matter, any possibility that
open space could be anything but a market phenomenon. 420  The
information or informational rights in a retail market transaction under
terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in that mar-
ket. A transaction other than a consumer transaction is not a mass-market
transaction if it is: (A) a contract for redistribution; (B) a contract for pub-
lic performance or public display of a copyrighted work; (C) a transaction in
which the information is customized or otherwise specially prepared by the
licensor for the licensee other than minor customization using a capability of
the information intended for that purpose; (D) a site license; or (E) an ac-
cess contract.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial
Code: Software Contracts and Licenses of Information § 2B-102(32) (visited Nov. 30,
1998) <http://www.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/080198/080198.html> (August 1, 1998 draft). The
Draft thus squarely straddles the distinction between commercial (or repeat-play) ac-
tors and one-shot or occasional market participants that supports substantive con-
sumer-protective rules.
420. Proposed Section 2B-208, "Mass Market Licenses," now reads:
(a) A party adopts the terms of a mass-market license for purposes of
Section 2B-207 only if the party agrees to the mass-market license, by mani-
festing assent or otherwise, before or during the initial performance or use
of, or access to, the information or informational rights. However, a term
does not become part of the contract:
(i) if it is unconscionable under Section 2B-110 or
(ii) subject to Section 2B-301 with regard to parol or extrinsic evidence, if
it conflicts with terms to which the parties to the license expressly agreed.
(b) If a party does not have an opportunity to review a mass-market li-
cense before becoming obligated to pay for the information and subse-
quently does not agree, by manifesting assent or otherwise, to the mass
market license after having that opportunity, the party has a right, on deliv-
ering all copies of the information or destroying the copies pursuant to in-
structions, to:
(1) a refund;
(2) reimbursement of any reasonable expenses incurred related to the re-
turn and complying with any instructions of the licensor for return or de-
struction of the information or, in the absence of instructions, return postage
or similar reasonable expenses in returning the information; and
(3) compensation for any foreseeable loss caused by the installation of
information in order to view the license, including any reasonable expenses
incurred in restoring the particular information processing system to its con-
dition before the required installation, if: (A) the information must be in-
stalled in an information processing system to enable review of the license;
and
(B) the installation alters that information processing system or informa-
tion contained in the system but does not return the system or information
to its previous condition when the installed information is removed due to
the rejection of the license.
Id. § 2B-208. Section 2B-207 currently provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-208, a party adopts the
terms of a record, including a standard form, if the party agrees, by manifest-
ing assent or otherwise, to the record:
(1) before or during the initial performance or use of or access to the
information or informational rights; or (2) at any time after the party has
had an opportunity to review the record, if at the time performance or use
commenced the party expected that the agreement would be represented in
whole or in party by a record if the parties agreed to the record, but the
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Draft thus (i) validates "mass-market" license terms that are not "un-
conscionable," (ii) allows negotiated licenses to take precedence over
mass-market license terms, and (iii) imposes a mandatory refund op-
tion for mass-market license terms that cannot be accessed or re-
viewed before the user pays for the "information." This is the
contract framework applied by the court in ProCD. The manner in
which the mandatory default is presented in this section assures, in
other words, that this section will reinforce rather than suspend the
trend in shrinkwrap practice to confirm private bilateral restrictions as
the norm for information use and distribution."a ' Article 2B rein-
forces as public policy the norm in practice that enforces copyright as
private definitions of "use" and undermines potentially countervailing
norms of open space in copyright or conventions. The question is not
what open space should be. The discipline encouraged by Article 2B
is asking producers whether open space should exist at all.'21
D. Preemption, "Extra Elements," and "Private Legislation"
The fourth and final source of possible open space in ProCD, and
the one best elaborated doctrinally in the case itself, is preemption
theory. This is the existing doctrinal hook for the proposition that
under some circumstances federal copyright interests in use and re-use
of information trump state created rights concerning information.4"
Of the doctrines considered in this part, only preemption deals explic-
itly with conflicts between federal intellectual property policy and
state law efforts to regulate intellectual property, including enforce-
ment of private contracts concerning copyright, patent, and trade se-
cret interests. The court in ProCD considered whether federal policy
would ever trigger preemption by federal law of enforcement of pri-
vate agreements concerning copyrighted, or copyrightable, works, and
it stopped barely short of declaring that such agreements always
would avoid preemption:
party did not have an opportunity to review the record or the record had not
been completed at the time the performance began or use commenced.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 2B-208, if a party adopts the
terms of a record, including a standard form, the terms of the record are the
terms of the contract without regard to the party's knowledge or understand-
ing of individual terms in the record. However, a term that fails to satisfy a
requirement of this article or other law for enforceability is not enforceable.
Id § 2B-207.
421. Earlier versions of this section relied explicitly on conformance with industry
practice to validate mass-market terms. See Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note
27, at 1259-63 (commenting on the Oct 8, 1994 draft). The current Draft tends to
propagate a single norm for "mass-market" licenses rather than accept and confirm
existing norms.
422. See Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?, supra note 271, at
1199-1253 (stating that codification enables parties to capture the terms of the polit-
ical market for future debate, shifting away from what is fair and just, and toward
what is "standard").
423. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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Just as § 301(a) [of the Copyright Act] does not itself interfere with
private transactions in intellectual property, so it does not prevent
states from respecting those transactions. Like the Supreme Court
in Wolens, we think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that
anything with the label "contract" is necessarily outside the preemp-
tion clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to
foresee.424
ProCD itself thus opens only a narrow passage to open space, via
preemption.425
Other versions of preemption theory might, conceptually, do more.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides that
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclu-
sive rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed
exclusively by this title.... [N]o person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or stat-
utes of any State.42 6
Because of its unclear text and even less clear legislative history,427
this section has had a tumultuous existence as applied to state statutes
and common law claims. Most recently, and perhaps notoriously, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that most of the law of
"misappropriation" of the State of New York is preempted under
§ 301.428 Shrinkwrap highlights the more complex question of when a
particular state law claim for breach of contract turns out to be, in
fact, a question of federal copyright law because the contract claim
consists of a right "equivalent" to a right within "the general scope of
copyright." For copyrighted works under § 301, courts have supplied
the "extra element" doctrine to distinguish copyright from contract
claims. 429 The majority formulation of that doctrine holds that if a
claim for relief requires proof of an "extra element" beyond those
required to establish liability under the Copyright Act, then the claim
is not preempted by federal law. For contract claims, proof of a bilat-
eral promise itself provides the "extra element." In effect, § 301
424. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
425. Later courts have interpreted ProCD as not leaving open even this narrow
passage. See supra notes 337-59 and accompanying text.
426. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
427. See Architectronics v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (citing, among other sources, Litman, Copyright Compromise, supra note 271,
at 860).
428. See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997).
429. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 3, § 1.01[B][1][a], at 1-15 to -22. A re-
lated question arises with respect to federal subject matter jurisdiction over claims for
breach of a license agreement for subject matter that lies within the scope of copy-
right law. See Lattie v. Murdach, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(applying the "extra element" standard and remanding to state court a breach of con-
tract claim concerning public domain material); James M. McCarthy, Comment, Fed-
eral Subject Matter Jurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving the Breach of a
Copyright Licensing Contract "Arise Under" the Copyright Act?, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev.
165 (1993).
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preempts virtually no breach of contract claims.4 30 Assuming a mean-
ingful threshold of proof for establishing an "agreement" under state
law,43' this standard presents few conceptual conflicts with federal
copyright policy.
432
Because under the majority approach the mandates of federal intel-
lectual property policy are explicitly subject to the states' power to
define a minimal threshold of proof of "assent" to an agreement, a
minority of courts take a more restrictive approach to the "extra ele-
ment" test. These courts preempt enforcement of a state contract law
claim unless the claim requires proof of an element that is both not
required by the Copyright Act (such as "an agreement") and goes to a
right or promise that is beyond the scope of the copyright holder's
rights enumerated in the Copyright Act. This minority approach, in
other words, tries to preserve the enumeration of the copyright
430. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Na-
tional Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 991 F.2d
426 (8th Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1490 (5th
Cir. 1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 925-26 (4th Cir. 1988)); see
also supra notes 93-101. But see Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., No. C-97-
20367-JF(EAI), 1998 WL 740798, at *14-*16 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1998) (holding that
the plaintiff's claim for unfair competition, which was based on the defendant's al-
leged breach of a "no reverse engineering" provision of a software license agreement,
was preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act). Professor Karjala correctly notes that
this rule creates the risk that states might define contract law in ways that fundamen-
tally alter federal copyright policy by, for example, enacting a statute that deems a
certain limitation on use to inhere in every contract or license that transfers rights to a
copyrightable work. See Karjala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 528 & nn.56-57.
He endorses a standard that favors preemption only of contracts or licenses that con-
cern widely-distributed works, as to which bargaining to determine the scope of the
distribution is less likely. See id. at 530-32. The waxing influence of ProCD substan-
tially lessens the already-low probability that courts will acknowledge this risk and
apply a more restrictive version of the extra element test. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copy-
right Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and
Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 166-67 (1997) [hereinafter Ginsburg. Protection of
Databases] (stating that the "extra element" test is not persuasive as applied to
shrinkwrap licenses if the result is that shrinkwrap creates an enforceable contract
with everyone).
431. By validating shrinkwrap that satisfies a de minimis standard of user acknowl-
edgment, one way to look at the proposed Article 2B of the UCC is that it substitutes
a legislative extra element test for a judicial one. See National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code: Softiare Contracts and
Licenses of Information § 2B-208 (visited Nov. 30, 1998) <http'J/wwv.law.uh.edu
ucc2b/080198/080198.html> (August 1, 1998 draft). Then again, a more aggressive
preemption approach (requiring more substantial evidence of an agreement) would
vitiate the Draft entirely.
432. This is so simply because, in theory, contract law would remain the framework
for governing obligations voluntarily assumed between parties who are in some rela-
tionship with one another, and copyright law would govern relations between and
among those who lack such a relationship. The voluntariness of the former likely
would eliminate or at least substantially reduce the extent of the problem identified in
this Article, the shaping of conventions concerning open space. As a practical matter,
however, once an agreement is identified, under whatever standards state law sup-
plies, the copyright analysis ends. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
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holder's statutory rights as an exclusive preserve of federal law. In
American Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co.,433 for ex-
ample, the plaintiff, the exclusive licensee of a film from the defend-
ant, claimed that when the defendant nonetheless broadcast that film
over its cable television channel, the defendant breached the license
agreement. The court held the claim preempted, finding that the
plaintiff's breach of contract allegations did not involve violation of a
right not provided by the Copyright Act.434
A different take on preemption doctrine tries to effect the same
result by examining the market for such shrinkwrap transactions.
Scholars including Professors Merges, O'Rourke, and Lemley, in dif-
ferent formulations, each argue that usage of certain forms of license
and license terms may become so prevalent in the market that con-
sumers have no choice but to accept them as a condition to acquiring
products or services in that market. If such forms or terms purport to
restrict rights granted by statute, then, in theory, public legislation af-
fecting that market has been effectively amended by "private legisla-
tion. '435  Such "private legislation" should be preempted by the
Copyright Act.43 6
433. 922 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
434. See id. at 931-32; see also Frontline Test Equip., Inc. v. Greenleaf Software,
Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 583 (W.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the breach of contract claim
was not preempted by federal copyright law); Wolff v. Institute of Elec. & Elecs.
Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the plaintiffs state law
claim for breach of contract was preempted by the Copyright Act). Both formula-
tions of the "extra element" test deal equally, in principle, with works that are not
copyrightable but that are shrink wrapped with use and disclosure restrictions. These
include shrinkwrap for uncopyrightable works that fall within the subject matter of
copyright (such as factual compilations) as well as works of information that do not
(unprotectable processes or ideas, which may be protected, for example, as trade
secrets under non-disclosure agreements).
Scholars argue that courts dealing with the "extra element" test often improperly
bypass the question of constitutional preemption of copyright license claims. See
Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 78, at 361-67 (examining several bases of preemp-
tion and their possible application to copyright, including congressional occupation of
the field, interference with the purpose of a federal statute, conflict with the provi-
sions of a federal statute, and dormant Commerce Clause concerns); Karjala, Federal
Preemption, supra note 2, at 533-34 (describing constitutional preemption in the copy-
right context as an "occupies the field" preemption). The court in ProCD did not
address constitutional preemption arguments. The older shrinkwrap case with which
ProCD is sometimes compared, Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th
Cir. 1988), relied on constitutional preemption arguments to invalidate a Louisiana
statute that purported to validate certain shrinkwrap terms.
435. See Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, supra note 110, at 319; Merges, End
of Friction, supra note 28, at 115; Merges, Review Essay, supra note 27, at 1611-12;
O'Rourke, Market-Based Approach, supra note 5, at 55; see also Rice, Public Goods,
supra note 28, at 561-67 (articulating the market-wide effects of contracts of
adhesion).
436. Constitutional preemption gives effect to the negative implications of congres-
sional legislation on a case-by-case basis; "private legislation" preemption does so on
a market-wide basis. The Copyright Act operates as a default, in effect, so long as
copyright owners act individually, but as a set of mandatory obligations if similar ac-
1130 [Vol. 67
LEGAL-WARE
Setting aside the different current variations of preemption doctrine
from a copyright policy standpoint, and particularly from the stand-
point of protecting open space interests (by preempting contractual
limitations on re-use that conflict, for example, with fair use rights),
the doctrine has only that substance that the federal statute provides.
Transaction-oriented preemption theories merely enforce in public
form private use-based conventions of copyright. Under any theory,
however, if enforcement of a copyright license is preempted because it
interferes with the federal scheme concerning "use," then the parties
are remanded to that scheme, whatever it may be. If the scheme itself
is less than clear on what it requires as a substantive matter, then pre-
emption will not supply an answer. Nothing in preemption doctrine
itself suggests what fair use or the public domain are, or can or should
be. It merely asserts the primacy of federal law.437 Preemption itself
supplies no normative view to displace or compete with the conven-
tions shaped by shrinkwrap practice. Under ProCD, § 301 of the
Copyright Act becomes a vehicle for, rather than a limitation on, the
evolution of the transactional practices with which this Article is con-
cerned.4 38 The majority extra element test opens the gates for all
tion is taken market-wide. The distinction thus resembles Professor Kariala's sugges-
tion that preemption rules distinguish between widely and narrowly distributed
works. See Kajala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 525-28. The scope of the
relevant practice, or market, is the key to applying the concept. If "private legisla-
tion" theories are interpreted too narrowly, they collapse into variants of the extra
element test and the contractualism of ProCD and the Article 2B proposal. That is, if
"private legislation" preemption kicks in only for broadly defined markets, or for
markets in which the promoter of the license form has "market power," bilateral li-
cense terms that differ slightly from the industry norm may be validated. Cf Lemley,
Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 27, at 1274 n.158 (positing that shrinkwrap usage
may be a damned if you do, damned if you don't issue: Conforming to trade usage
would validate shrinkwrap under a prior version of Article 2B but condemn it as
"private legislation"). Many, even most, form contracts (including shrinkwvrap), how-
ever, are deployed by firms that lack market power. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion, supra note 55, at 1218-20. The more narrow the relevant market becomes, or as
market power itself drops out of the analysis, however, the more the concept looks
like the minority "extra element" test.
In practical terms, private legislation theories raise administrability questions. Par-
ticular license terms would in theory reach some critical level of ubiquity at which
preemption would apply. It is unclear, thereafter, how such "private legislation"
could be repealed. If a single-market participant with, for example, some threshold
market share, modified its form to abandon the offending term, would that firm
thereby reclaim its right to contractual protection? Would the remaining firms, which
one assumes would retain the offending language, be liberated by the defection of one
firm?
437. Cf. Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25-34) (stating
that preemption is an incomplete solution to the copyright incentive problem because
the approach lacks nuance and does not account for non-statutory, non-federal as-
pects of intellectual property rules).
438. One need look no further than recent congressional activity concerning § 301
for evidence that preemption rules tie in directly to norms of practice, not to public
values underlying copyright. In each of the last two Congresses, bills have been intro-
duced that would provide special legislative protection against private interference
1998] 1131
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
manner of transactions. Market-oriented preemption narrows those
gates dramatically. Private transactions are permitted or not permit-
ted. Neither approach to preemption, however, suggests an affirma-
tive sense of value. No preemption strategy is informed by a
normative explanation of the public values implicit in copyright policy,
how such normative values could or should be derived, or how con-
ventions of use that shrinkwrap in particular promotes might be sub-
stantively reconciled with them.4 39
with "copyright management" systems. See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1146,
105th Cong. (1997); S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997). See
generally Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 28, at 1019-31 (describing
earlier "copyright management" legislation and arguing that such protection in gen-
eral undermines the right to anonymous participation in constitutionally-protected ac-
tivity). By the end of the session in the Fall of 1998, Congress had passed and
President Clinton had signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see supra note
158, that includes legislative prohibition on circumvention of "technological meas-
ures" that "effectively control" access to copyrighted works. The Act delays imple-
mentation of its anti-circumvention provisions for two years, during which time the
Librarian of Congress is directed to determine whether the prohibition is likely to
affect the ability to make noninfringing uses of classes of works. The legislation im-
plements the United States's obligation to address such technologies under recent
international copyright conventions. See World Intellectual Property Organization:
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, arts. 11 & 12, 36 I.L.M. 65, 71-72; World Intellectual
Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, arts. 18
& 19, 36 I.L.M. 76, 86-87.
That such systems amount to the "ultimate shrinkwrap" has already been consid-
ered. See infra Part I.C.2. All but one of these bills would have left it to courts to
ponder remaining conflicts between copyright law and rights and obligations privately
exchanged in the context of these technological systems, presumably under existing
preemption law. That mode simply closes the circle (under the standard extra ele-
ment test) by enforcing any "agreements" that such systems enable. See Bell, supra
note 27, at 557. The exception was H.R. 3048, the so-called Campbell-Boucher bill,
which, in addition to privileging "copyright management technology," would also
have amended § 301 of the Copyright Act as follows:
When a work is distributed to the public subject to non-negotiable license
terms, such terms shall not be enforceable under the common law or statutes
of any state to the extent that they-
(1) limit the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, or dis-
play, by means of transmission or otherwise, of material that is uncopyright-
able under section 102(b) or otherwise; or
(2) abrogate or restrict the limitations on exclusive rights specified in sec-
tions 107 through 114 and sections 117 and 118 of this title.
H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997). In other words, the legislation would have pre-
empted use-limiting terms accompanying works consisting of public domain material
and terms that conflicted with the rights of owners and users of copyrighted works as
prescribed by the Copyright Act. The bill at least avoided the circularity of proposals
that simply forbade tampering with copyright management technologies, but it, like
other preemption approaches, neither supplied nor encouraged any normative view of
values for works of information, the open space that the bill was trying to preserve.
439. These pitfalls are illustrated by the vagueness inherent in the suggestion that
the preferred approach to preemption questions is one that accepts fact-specific deter-
minations of the "reasonableness" of particular contracts in light of constitutional
goals and the purposes of fair use. See Ginsburg, Protection of Databases, supra note
430, at 170.
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V. OVERCOMING LEGAL-WARE
This Article has argued that the inadequacies of existing fair use
and public domain jurisprudence, on the one hand, and of market and
contract paradigms, on the other hand, exist in part because a major
portion of our working system of copyright exists beyond and is only
indirectly touched by formal legal entitlements and obligations en-
forced by courts. Even under the best of circumstances, social con-
ventions of information creation and distribution are largely private
constructions. How we manage the formal system of copyright nudges
them in one direction or another. Even well-informed and public-
spirited scholars and legislators, fully conscious of the potentially per-
nicious effects of legal-ware and mindful of the need for open space,
may be incapable of devising a legal process that efficiently absorbs
and asserts both the public nature of copyright as a system of informa-
tion management and the private interests of individual system par-
ticipants-and that creators, users, re-users, and those who supervise
resolution of disputes among them all follow to the degree that the
devisers intend.
At the same time, it is unrealistic to suggest that the form of copy-
right law is irrelevant, or that it can or should be discarded. Clearly,
the law sets out important substantive rules to be observed and en-
forced to a large degree in their specifics. As a manager and resolver
of disputes, the law takes the effects of copyright conventions and fil-
ters them through formal rules, thus refreshing the rules and refining
the conventions. Open space, legal-ware, bilateral contract, the mar-
ket for forms and works of information, and formal doctrines of fair
use and the public domain are all constituent parts of and functions of
this process. The argument thus far suggests that management of the
process ought to be an essentially public function, that the process is
being rapidly privatized, that the scope of the conventions that bring
disputes to the system to be resolved is being narrowed, and that re-
versing or mitigating that trend by direct regulation of its several sub-
stantive parts is highly problematic. 0 One might respond: So what?
It may be so that open space is "good" and that legal-ware is "bad,"
but it has proved feasible neither to declare the existence of the for-
mer nor to ban the latter outright. We do not truly know what we
want and need from open space under our system of copyright. We
have at hand a host of theories and possibilities. Until we know, or at
least have a method of arriving at an answer, we will not be able to tell
how much or little open space we should have, and how much or little
legal-ware. That method ought to be one function of copyright law.
Instead, right now, the answer is increasingly the function of legal-
ware itself.
440. See supra notes 347-59 and accompanying text.
1998] 1133
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
What is the proper institution or mechanism for processing and fil-
tering facts, information, and values concerning open space? 441 The
question has three principal dimensions: Do we prefer results gener-
ated by private or by public processes, decision-making at the state or
at the federal level, and decisions by legislators or by judges? Given
the argument so far, the first two dimensions can be dealt with sum-
marily. Part IV argued that contractual ordering and private markets
form the foundations of the problem that this Article addresses. Con-
tracts and markets are the traditional methods of dealing with most
basic private law issues; their public consequences, based on recent
changes in social, technological, and economic changes, threaten open
space. We might limit the permissible range of contract, or rely on the
market to manage itself, but either approach leaves open space an
essentially private phenomenon." 2 State law seems inadequate to the
task for related reasons. For private arrangements like licenses, con-
tract law is primarily state law. ProCD itself, though it concerned the
interpretation of a uniform law, addressed a question of state law. Ar-
ticle 2B, if it is ratified as a uniform statute and forwarded to state
legislatures, will become the state law of as many states as decide to
adopt it. State law by definition may vary from state to state; one of
the premises of the federal system is that local needs and conditions
justify tailoring law to fit them. As influential as ProCD has been as a
practical matter, variable and potentially inconsistent state regimes
are incapable of dealing with matters that require a national perspec-
tive. Copyright law, for its part, has always been a matter of federal
concern. The pressures described earlier in this Article now require
that information law be a virtually (and a virtual) federal preserve.443
Digital technology and computer networks allow information to exist
simultaneously and cheaply in every community throughout the
world. ProCD and legal-ware are spreading a single contractual norm
across communities, media, and all types of works. If ever there was a
441. Cf Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 181, at 1037-38 (describing
the problem as one of identifying norms to support types of uses that should be pro-
tected under various copyright theories and suggesting possibly searching for policy
concerns common to fact patterns in the cases, identifying a "dominant purpose" in
the cases, or searching for converging policies). The problem, I think, is not one of
detection, but of determination.
442. Cf Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corpo-
rate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703, 1745-46 (1989) (noting the tension between the
preference for common law rules dealing with basic and enduring private law topics
and the need for a modern regulatory framework to deal with shifting institutional
arrangements and new social phenomena).
443. Until the adoption of the current copyright statute in 1976, federal and state
copyright regimes existed in parallel, the federal scheme dealing with published works
and state schemes dealing with unpublished works. Pre-1976 copyright law was con-
siderably more complex, but in general the federal interest extended only to pub-
lished works. In 1976, Congress brought unpublished works into the federal scheme.
See Karjala, Federal Preemption, supra note 2, at 515-17.
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time for a national perspective on open space, this is it.' 4 The intan-
gible nature of information means that open space must be deter-
mined at once, not in innumerable separate and disparate
proceedings.
That conclusion leads to the federal system. Federal legislation has
a number of obvious advantages. Congress has the power and (in
principle) the expertise to investigate and distill vast quantities of
complex technical information. It can gather information from a wide
variety of sources and analyze that information in the context of na-
tional policy debates. Legislation can be comprehensive and subtle.
It can balance certainty and flexibility by setting out rules and delegat-
ing particular applications to courts. Congress can respond relatively
quickly to social and economic change, and with appropriate legisla-
tion it can preempt significant harm resulting from that change. Con-
gress is a representative body. Because members are accountable
through the electoral process, legislation benefits from a presumption
of institutional legitimacy. Substantive legislation defining or preserv-
ing open space, in short, has much to recommend it." 5
All signs, however, do not point to Congress. To begin with, the
Constitution constrains what Congress may and may not do. The
combination of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution," 6 which au-
thorizes the creation of copyright interests, and the First Amendment,
which severely limits restraints on free expression, might be consid-
ered to stand for the proposition that expression that Congress has not
protected in copyright (and patent) legislation cannot be protected in
444. The zoning analogy from physical space applies again, this time in reverse.
Local control of zoning of real property makes sense because the costs of zoning are
typically spread across or internalized by the local community, which then has both
the incentive and opportunity to object. To the extent that such costs are improperly
assessed against individuals, there is effectively a "national law of zoning" that re-
stores those costs to the community, under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,391 (1994) (requiring, under the Fifth
Amendment, a "reasonable relationship" between the zoning conditions imposed
upon a private person in exchange for a building permit); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that when a conveyance of property is a
condition of the removal of a land use restriction, the condition must be a valid regu-
lation; if not, then it is a taking); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Mon-
terey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming a judgment on a jury verdict that
"essentially accepted Del Monte's argument that the City forced Del Monte to bear
the burden of creating open space for the public to enjoy"), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct.
1359 (1998). "Zoning" of digital or information space via shrinkwrap allows one com-
munity (one publisher, or all publishers) to externalize virtually all of (what that com-
munity considers) its costs. A comparable "national law of information zoning," or a
national body of open space law, would spread those costs (characterized as a benefit,
from the users' perspective) across the entirety of the relevant space.
445. See Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 78, at 377-78 (arguing that the judicial
function should be limited to ensuring that legislation is consistent with constitutional
goals: "Decisions as to what constitutes knowledge and how to achieve its progress
seem particularly ill-adapted to the judicial branch").
446. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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any other way. That argument does not define what fair use and open
space should be, but it does suggest certain boundaries. It even sug-
gests to some degree that courts need merely to be compelled to fol-
low a constitutional scheme that is implicit in existing law. On this
reasoning, ProCD is simply wrong, and the practice that it endorses
and that follows it ought to be invalidated as a matter of federal con-
stitutional law. It is reasonably well-established, however, that the
Constitution and the Copyright Act do not behave so categorically.
Non-copyright based schemes for the protection of intellectual prop-
erty, both state and federal, are constitutionally permitted, though the
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause affect their legitimate
scope." 7 The First Amendment does prescribe that open space exist
to some extent.448 It should protect whatever we constitute as the
public domain from privatization through copyright. It may also, on
the other hand, proscribe Congress from legislating precisely what the
substance of that open space should or should not be,449 as it is doubt-
447. For discussions of First Amendment concerns, see Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (observing the adverse effects
on the free flow of information caused by monopolies on material in the public do-
main); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(noting the First Amendment interest in the unrestricted availability of facts); Gins-
burg, No "Sweat"?, supra note 78, at 384-87 (concluding that a categorical view of the
Constitution vis-A-vis public domain is not persuasive); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke
L.J. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 53, on file with author) (arguing that under
First Amendment law, copyright law "should have standards that are as definite and
nondiscretionary as possible"); Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copy-
right's Image, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 587, 612-13 (1997) (finding fair use doctrine; a
"troublesome safe harbor" for First Amendment rights because it requires a case by
case analysis); and Michael J. Haungs, Note, Copyright of Factual Compilations: Pub-
lic Policy and the First Amendment, 23 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 347, 364 (1990)
(describing the tension between copyright law and the First Amendment). As to the
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court in Feist ruled that "originality" of copyright-
able material is a constitutional demand, see Feist, 499 U.S. at 346, which suggests that
congressional regulation of non-copyrightable material that nonetheless lies within
the "subject matter of copyright" (such as databases or compilations of fact) is not
legitimate under the Copyright Clause but may be so under the Commerce Clause.
448. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
449. Completely federalizing the law of copyright licensing (preemption doctrine
currently federalizes it, to a degree) represents an intermediate option that is unwork-
able in practice, given the volume of federal litigation that would likely result. The
preemptive scope of § 301 of the Copyright Act might be interpreted as authorizing
the development of a federal law of contracts concerning copyright. See Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403-13 (1988) (stating that the Taft-
Hartley Act preempts state law claims that depend on the meaning of collective bar-
gaining agreements); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57
(1957) (holding that the preemption section of the Taft-Hartley Act authorized thejudicial creation of federal law interpreting collective bargaining agreements). Moves
elsewhere in intellectual property law to federalize parts of traditional state law re-
gimes, see, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)
(West Supp. 1998), (unfair competition law); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West Supp. 1998) (trade secret law), generally have enhanced
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ful that Congress may explicitly take a position privileging certain
uses.
450
Moreover, the strength of legislation, its breadth and comprehen-
siveness, is also its weakness. Existing statutory fair use and public
domain rules are broad declarations intended for case-by-case appli-
cation as local needs and conditions dictate.4 5 ' Decentralizing the
process avoids public choice criticisms of legislation," 2 allows local
actors (courts, firms, and individuals) to experiment with and analyze
novel approaches,5 3 enhances the degree to which individuals and
firms come into direct contact with and affect the law,4- and, most
important from the point of view of this Article, by exposing the legal
system more directly to community norms and conventions of infor-
mation practice, creates the greater potential for ensuring that those
conventions are reconciled in the individual instance and as a collec-
tive matter with constitutional norms and federal copyright policy.
The incremental nature of judicial decision-making ought to produce
the control of creators over re-use or distribution of their intellectual products, on the
supposition that state courts were not giving creators sufficient protection.
450. What the government may not do directly under the First Amendment, how-
ever, it may often do indirectly. See Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 16, at 103542.
Congress might promote particular conventions or norms that give meaning to open
space. Under some formulations of existing doctrine, to a degree, it already does. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (discussing fair use as common law that "presumes that rules will emerge from
the course of decisions"). But see supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text (noting
that, notwithstanding Campbell, courts fail to apply common law methods to fair use
cases). Further efforts, such as exhorting consumers to make greater use of fair use
rights, are doubtful as a political matter. In matters of norms, conventions, and mean-
ings, government efforts to mandate particular outcomes are likely to be viewed with
significant skepticism. See Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 16, at 1016-19.
451. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (noting that the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act confirms that Congress intended that the fair use doctrine continue to
be elaborated on a case-by-case basis); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (same); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448-49 (1984) (finding that
the legislative history of the statute shows that Congress intended that fair use be
applied, as it was prior to the statute, as an equitable rule of reason).
452. In the abstract, common law decision-making is predicted to be welfare-en-
hancing in contexts where both plaintiffs and defendants have equal interests in the
precedential value of decisions. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead- Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974); Vil-
liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud.
235, 280 (1979); see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 35-99 (5th ed.
1998) (exploring the congruence between common law rules and efficiency).
453. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (noting the importance of avoiding a rigid appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine that would stifle creativity).
454. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L.
Rev. 263, 265-73 (1992) (rejecting the anti-democratic criticism of common law rule-
making and arguing that allowing or encouraging the development of federal common
law may increase citizen access to the apparatus of lawmaking); Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312,320-46 (1997) (explaining how
law-making can claim democratic legitimacy by ensuring constructive participation
through interest representation).
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over time relatively stable bodies of rules that reflect community stan-
dards of fairness, including open space.455
This description sounds like the status quo. But it differs. We ought
to preserve the judicial role, but change how judges are deciding cases.
Federal courts dealing with public domain and fair use issues are not,
as a rule, dealing with them in a modern common law sense. Part III
illustrated that courts today undertake detailed case-by-case applica-
tions of the statutory fair use factors and searches for "originality" in
primarily factual works. What courts do not do, as a rule, is take an
additional step, reach beyond the particular facts of each case to con-
sider how analysis of those facts is related to prior analyses of similar
and dissimilar facts-that is, how the "categories" of fair use and the
public domain analysis may, in practice, be connected to one an-
other.456 They do not, in short, exercise their common law "power" to
create the law of open space.457 Congress and the Supreme Court
may have told lower federal courts to act as common law adjudica-
tors,458 but those courts continue to approach the cases by trying to
find open space, rather than by developing it. By applying rules
rather than shaping them, they are helping to sustain the contract-
oriented default that ProCD is supplying.459 If shrinkwrap excludes
open space, then open space will not be found. The common law
mandate needs to be made more explicit. Let me suggest, then, an
amendment to the Copyright Act, a procedural or institutional ap-
455. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (1988) (describ-
ing the nature of common law adjudication); Weinreb, Fair's Fair, supra note 205, at
1253 (describing the characteristically limited judicial function).
456. See supra Part III.B.1.
457. See Eisenberg, supra note 455, at 154-61.
458. Although they did so in slightly different senses. Feist admonishes courts to
develop "copyrightability" guided by fidelity to constitutional purpose. Campbell ad-
monishes courts to develop "fair use" guided by fidelity to congressional purpose.
Neither construction, however, explains how cases should be decided. The difficulty
may lie in ambiguity in the legislative history of the Copyright Act, which encourages
case-by-case or equitable resolution of fair use claims, or in judicial appreciation of
the common law method. The different opinions in Campbell seem to take both sides
of the issue. Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 ("Congress... intended that courts
continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication .... ITihe statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis."), with Campbell, 510 U.S. at
596 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The common-law method instated by the fair use
provision of the copyright statute.., presumes that rules will emerge from the course
of decisions.").
459. See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire Con-
tract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 153, 225-32
(1995) (arguing that rule application, rather than rule creation, through federal com-
mon law is more likely to lead to a contractually-oriented default); Paul Lund, The
Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 954-1012 (1996) (stating that
the trend in federal common law is to incorporate related doctrines of state law, which
tends to undermine rather than promote the use of federal common law for specifi-
cally federal goals).
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proach460 rather than a direct assault on the content of copyright (or
contract) law itself. Congress should expressly delegate authority to
the federal judiciary to develop a common law of fair use and of the
public domain, to allow and encourage courts to create the content of
open space as a matter of federal policy. For § 107,461 concerning fair
use, the existing text of the statute should be assigned to a subdivision
(a), and a new subdivision (b) should be adopted that reads, "This
section shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of rea-
son and experience." The same amendment should be added as a new
subsection (c) to § 102,4 2 concerning the subject matter of copyright
in general, and § 103, 4 concerning the subject matter of copyright in
compilations and derivative works.4 4
Express delegations of federal common lawmaking authority are
rare, but they exist, 4 5 and they are intended, as this proposal is in-
tended to promote the development of a national, uniform legal
framework that is consistent with congressional purposes, yet lies be-
yond congressional skill or interest in legislating more particularized
460. Purely procedural changes might include making the negation of fair use an
affirmative element of the plaintiff's case for infringement, or deleting the presump-
tion of copyrightability that accompanies the issuance of a copyright registration. As
a practical matter, such changes might slow the pace even of legitimate copyright
infringement claims to a trickle, given the existing difficulty presented by proving and
disproving claims of "fairness" and "originality" as affirmative defenses, with few off-
setting benefits that could not be obtained under a more evolutionary approach.
461. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
462. Id. § 102.
463. kd § 103.
464. The effect of the proposal on the preemptive reach of the Copyright Act
would be felt through the corresponding evolution in application of § 301. See id.
§ 301. The definition of preempted rights under that section specifically incorporates
the "subject matter of copyright" as specified by § 102 and § 103 and the definition of
"exclusive rights" under § 106, to which § 107 explicitly specifies exceptions. See id.
465. The proposal is based on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
authorizes the development of a federal common law of privilege for cases in federal
courts for which federal law provides the rule of decision:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501 (1993). Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act is interpreted as dele-
gating to the federal courts the power to develop a federal common law of collective
bargaining agreements. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
403-06 (1988); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); see
also Fisk, supra note 459, at 228 ("Congress intended that courts create a body of
federal common law to govern ERISA cases.").
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rules or in adapting existing legal rules to changed conditions.466 The
potential benefits of such an approach in this context seem clear.
Most important, it continues to locate the evolution of copyright doc-
trine at the local level, the point where innovation and change both in
the creation of new works and types of works, in conventions of use
and re-use, and in their social, technological, and economic contexts,
actually is taking place. Innovation and evolution in practice enter the
legal system as raw data, rather than filtered and expressed only as
policy concerns. Common law adjudication requires that courts ana-
lyze innovation and change, and each claim for control over re-use or
for involuntary open space, incrementally, in the context of other
cases.4 6 7 It requires that courts justify their results on those terms. A
clear and unambiguously concise approach to fair use and to public
domain issues is not likely to result (nor is it necessarily to be de-
sired),468 but requiring courts to consider and to justify how different
allegedly "fair" uses are or are not related to one another, for exam-
ple, should illuminate why open space is important in general. Use-
based definitions and limitations in shrinkwrap and bilateral contract
are not reflexively preempted or validated; particular unconsented
uses and classes of use are characterized as fair (or not fair) not only
466. The nature of the judicial decision-making contemplated is that implicit in
Campbell: the creation and elaboration of a body of open space doctrine that is con-
sistent with-but extends-congressional expression of constitutional purpose found
in sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act. It assumes that Feist's originality re-
quirement and the limitations on copyrightability in existing § 102(b) (no copyright in
ideas or processes), see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), are co-extensive. That is, that Congress
authorized in § 102(b) the copyrightability of all (constitutionally) copyrightable
works.
467. As an illustration of how different institutional processes might handle such
issues, consider the argument that temporary Random Access Memory ("RAM") or
cache copies of computer codes constitute infringing copies of digital works. See Triad
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiffs in
Triad and in the case on which it relied, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), raised copyright claims initially as levers to attack com-
petitive challenges to their computer hardware service businesses. In that context,
claims of infringement by RAM or cache copies of software are closely related to
claims of copyright misuse raised by so-called Independent Service Organizations
("ISO"). See In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1142-
43 (D. Kan. 1997) (rejecting the copyright misuse defense against copyright infringe-
ment claims). Both classes of claims are rarely seen as posing serious challenges to
the structure of copyright law, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains a
legislative safe harbor for software maintenance performed by such ISOs. See supra
note 438. The same argument played out quite differently in the legislative context.
The Clinton Administration's White Paper proposed to legislatively reconstruct the
exclusive rights of the copyright holder around the doctrine. See White Paper, supra
note 199, at 63-66, 100-01 (describing the Triad and MAI decisions as unexceptional
applications of the copyright holder's right of reproduction found in the Copyright
Act of 1976); id. at 217-20 (proposing the codification of a copyright owner's right of
"transmission" and the amendment of the definition of "publication" to include elec-
tronic transfer).
468. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). The balance
between certainty and flexibility, however, is ultimately for the courts to determine.
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in the idiosyncratic contexts in which disputes arise, but in the process
of judicially weaving the legal fabric of creative expression. Taking
ProCD as but one example, the approach would re-define the relevant
question, from whether or not an enforceable contract existed (the
approach of the court), or whether or not the compiled material lay in
the public domain (the approach of ProCD's critics), to how this use-
restriction (which forbade loading the compiled data onto a computer
network), in the context of this compiled information (telephone
numbers and addresses), suited (or failed to suit) a balance among
incentives to produce this type of work and the need for the unfet-
tered availability of the data, as evident from prior cases. To the ex-
tent that copyright law ought to be concerned with limiting the effects
of legal-ware and private conventions on discourse and behavior con-
cerning information that does not lead to litigation, or at least to pub-
lished opinions, local expressions of the law ought to be more
effective. Local courts are more likely responsive than legislatures or
higher courts; citizens similarly are more responsive to, and typically
have greater trust in, lower level institutions. 69
Objections to the proposal, I think, can be overcome. First, it is
true that to a certain extent, the proposal encourages a return to the
type of judge-made fair use jurisprudence that existed prior to enact-
ment of the current Copyright Act in 1976.470 The goal of the propo-
sal above, however, is also consistent with the original goal of the
statute, which was to take a disparate body of law and create a frame-
work, consistent with that body, that would produce more reliable re-
suits. If that was Congress's intention in 1976, however, that has not
been the result. Reliance on existing open space doctrines is now pro-
ducing results that seem fundamentally at odds with congressional and
constitutional purposes.47' The amendment attempts to restore some
balance to the administration of the statute. Second, the relatively
shallow pool of cases on which part III of this Article is based suggests
that too few fair use and public domain cases may be heard, decided,
and published to allow a coherent open space framework to evolve
except over a long period of time-too long, then, to have any effect
on the legal-ware phenomenon now developing. The third and per-
haps sharpest objection is closely related to the second, that is, the
469. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13, at 952.
470. See Yankwich, supra note 146, at 212-14.
471. The risk that judges will simply get it wrong is no greater and likely far less
than the risk of congressional mistake. If ProCD is an example of error, then I recog-
nize that this exception might swallow the rule. ProCD is, however, evidence of the
failure to follow common law principles rather than the common law at work. The
UCC is neither common law product nor process. See Slawson, supra note 392, at 158-
61. The pace of change in the technological context of copyright law is so rapid that
any legislative intervention will probably be obsolete within a short time of enact-
ment. On the other hand, my point that ProCD has had a wide impact suggests that
the judicial decision-making might not be such a crude and sluggish instrument in
dealing with rapidly changing technologies and institutions.
1998] 1141
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
proposal does nothing in and of itself to deal with legal-ware; in fact, it
largely leaves the development of legal-ware alone and attends only to
copyright law itself. What open space results from the development of
the common law evolves is based, among other things, on contract and
license terms specified by authors and publishers, which, this Article
argues at length, constrain the nature and form of disputes that enter
the judicial realm. As practical and theoretical matters, however,
these two objections describe the condition in which the system exists
today even more than it describes the proposed change. It is the ob-
ject of the proposal to introduce a dynamic that does not eliminate
voluntary transactional considerations, but places them on a footing
with competing considerations of involuntary access. To close on the
counterpart of the theme with which the Article began, it is neither
surprising nor inappropriate to afford authors and publishers the ben-
efit of a conventional understanding that at some level they are enti-
tled to a say in how their work is consumed. That say is, too, a part of
the construction of open space. We cannot create a system of per-
fectly unconstrained choice. We can, however, recognize the con-
straints that exist and adjust the system to a degree, hoping to account
for their influence.
CONCLUSION
The Internet and digital technology allegedly make every soul on
the planet a potential author, editor, and publisher. What the technol-
ogy really does is make every one of us a potential "user."47 I "use"
the service provided by my Internet Service Provider when I send or
receive e-mail, surf the Net, and post a home page on the World Wide
Web. I "use" the websites that I visit. I "use" the computer software
with which I wrote this Article. I "use" the journals and books on
which I rely for authority. I have no context, no norms or understand-
ings, that helps me to understand what I can or may do as a "user."
Copyright and other information law is only distantly related, at pres-
ent, to digital needs. The market, however, can and does provide.
Shrinkwrap is privately generating context. It defines me as a "user."
It defines my "use." If there is a public interest in information, in
creativity and expression embodied in text, image, and sound, shrink-
wrap is defining that interest out of existence.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, which enforced a shrinkwrap license,
confirms that tendency in legal doctrine, beginning in contract law and
extending through copyright. The relevant question for copyright law
and practice is not whether cases will emerge that contradict the result
in ProCD as a matter of contract law. Such cases may. The more
important question is how to deal with a transactional reality that is
rapidly absorbing ProCD, that has legal justification for making me a
472. I do at last object to this term. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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mere "user." Public interest concerns must find outlets to respond to
the "lessons" of ProCD-that by framing shrinkwrap as a nominal
contract, publishers can not only avoid copyright law but can define
the scope of legitimate debates about what society values in access to
and use of information.
The challenge for public policy is to find public means to reinvigo-
rate and define open space positively. Shrinkwrap has expanded and
pushed the legal structure governing works of information to a new
position. Formal public law can push back, but it cannot effectively
engage the transactional norms of shrinkwrap unless it more directly
and affirmatively puts other practices and conventions in play, defined
not merely as the residue of transactional conventions, but on those
independent grounds copyright consumers may bring to the system.
The robustness of open space can be tested by not only empowering
courts but directing courts to apply methods of common law decision-
making within copyright itself.
Notes & Observations
